Date of Award

2025

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

MA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Paul Gaffney

Abstract

This thesis explores the interpretive theory of textualism as developed and practiced by Justice Antonin Scalia, examining its core commitments, methodological boundaries, and enduring influence on American constitutional law. While Scalia often emphasized the constraining force of text, his approach also reveals internal tensions that complicate the relationship between judicial restraint and discretion. Through detailed analysis of primary opinions, such as District of Columbia v. Heller and Crawford v. Washington, alongside critical commentary from legal scholars and Scalia’s own extrajudicial writings, this thesis demonstrates that textualism operates as a structured framework within which constrained interpretive judgment is exercised. The thesis interrogates the theoretical coherence of textualism’s supposed neutrality, its relationship to originalism, and its selective application in contemporary jurisprudence. Ultimately, it argues that Scalia’s legacy lies less in doctrinal purity than in the institutionalization of a judicial philosophy that legitimates certain forms of discretion while formally rejecting others—a duality that continues to shape interpretive debates within the Court.

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