ORCID

https://orcid.org/0009-0003-4760-7328

Date of Award

2026

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Criminal Justice and Homeland Security (D.P.S.)

Department

Division of Criminal Justice and Homeland Security

First Advisor

Bernard Jones

Second Advisor

Keith Cozine

Third Advisor

Brian Harte

Abstract

This research evaluates the feasibility of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware developed into an electronic warfare (EW) system used to degrade or deny Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. All 16 critical infrastructure sectors rely on GPS signals to operate safely and effectively. Millions of Americans rely on GPS signals and the services they provide in their daily lives, so the loss of these vital services would dramatically impact our society. Our nation’s reliance on the GPS network makes it a potential target for COTS EW threats. The ways and means to develop COTS hardware into EW systems to interfere with GPS receivers are more prolific than ever before due to the decreasing cost and increasing availability of satellite communications hardware needed to create homegrown COTS EW systems. Further, the Internet can provide key information on the inner workings of the GPS network that can be used to derive their vulnerability to jamming attacks. The Internet also provides data on EW tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be utilized against GPS receivers. This research utilizes a quantitative approach with specialized software and hardware to test simulated COTS EW systems against published GPS signals in a modeled spectral environment. This model examines whether signals from notionally built COTS EW systems can degrade or deny simulated GPS receivers. The results of this research seek to provide law enforcement and homeland security organizations insights into the ability of COTS EW systems to produce jamming signals to deny or degrade the GPS network.

Download

Included in

Criminology Commons

Share

COinS