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ALIEN: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF 21ST CENTURY UNITED
STATES BORDER SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
CAPABILITIES, COMPETENCIES, AND CAPACITIES DESIGNED TO
COUNTER TRANSIENT CRIMINALITY RECRUITMENT**

Christopher C. Palme

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FROM THE DECEPTIVE DELINQUENT TO THE ILLUSIVE ILLICIT ALIEN:
A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF 21ST CENTURY UNITED STATES BORDER
SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT'S CAPABILITIES, COMPETENCIES, AND
CAPACITIES DESIGNED TO COUNTER TRANSIENT CRIMINALITY
RECRUITMENT

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New York

by

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ABSTRACT

FROM THE DECEPTIVE DELINQUENT TO THE ILLUSIVE ILLICIT ALIEN: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF 21ST CENTURY UNITED STATES BORDER SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT'S CAPABILITIES, COMPETENCIES, AND CAPACITIES DESIGNED TO COUNTER TRANSIENT CRIMINALITY RECRUITMENT

Christopher C. Palme

The transient criminal enterprise progressively evolved through expansion of illicit trafficking pathways throughout the 21st century. Scholars and practitioners share roles and responsibilities in missed opportunities to combat transient criminality. The Intelligence Community's intelligence process is deficient in timely production and dissemination of their products. Starting with the transient criminality recruitment process, a correlated lack of psychosocial training programs dedicated to countering the transient crime threat exists.

This study is rooted in sociological theory. It addresses Homeland Security dilemmas through the theoretical lens of sociology of security (Bajc, 2013) and is enhanced by concepts from Social Identity (Tajfel, 1979), Social Networking (Bajc, 2011), and Chaos (Hodges, 2015) theories. Collectively, these theories fill the literature gaps that exist in explaining the 5Ws of border security law enforcement's (LE) preparedness to combat transient criminality.

This research project incorporates a successive qualitative methodological framework. It selected 20 subject matter experts (SME) from the United States' (US) border security sector. Border security academics, intelligencers, and LEOs were interviewed to confirm, enhance, and expose existing and new operational gaps that limit border security LE from effectively countering transient criminality.

This study discovered that border security practitioners do not exuberate a collective level of confidence in their abilities to fight transient criminality. Their lack of transient crime related training combined with insufficient cohesion through communicating information and sharing intelligence with their border security networks led to lower than optimal confidence levels and reduction of transient criminal activity. Furthermore, this study found that the institutional framework for educating, training, and resourcing the US' border security tactical forces aids the transient criminal enterprise in illicit profiteering and organizational expansion throughout the Americas.

This project concludes with a comprehensive discussion about border security LE's current posture to employ and deploy their "Triple Cs" (capabilities, competencies, and capacities) against transient criminal activities. It illuminates the needs for enriched agency collaboration efforts. Improvements to training program designs that focus on academics teaching social science concepts, theories, and tactics to border security LE are in demand to increase LE's effectiveness in proactively identifying potential transient criminal recruits and recruitment centers of gravity.

DEDICATION

Every person in the world deserves a superhero; a physically, mentally, and emotionally tough juggernaut, a compassionate and calming ninja, a spirited and motivating warrior that without hesitation will go to the ends of the earth with you during your deepest sorrowful and darkest moments in life. This hero too often is so selfless and humble to be present, standing next to you when you scream victorious, “I have the power” from the gates of Castle Grayskull.

This conquest is dedicated to my superhero, to my wife, and my best friend in this world and the next, Katie. Without your fearlessness to step into the unknown, your ferocity to always keep fighting, and your sainthood patience to put up with my ‘squirrel’ moments, this academic feat and moreover, our amazing life would simply not exist. Words alone cannot express my sincere gratitude for your devoted love and support over the last twenty plus years of this academic-practitioner quest. You are my champion and the love of my life.

I love you 3000 and 1.

-Chris

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Cohort 2 is “Second to None!” This is the greatest ‘think-tank’ I have ever met. The mental brilliance combined with such robust practical experiences from the vast various sectors of homeland security makes our team unmatched. You are all real-life Avengers!

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
LIST OF TABLES	XI
LIST OF FIGURES	XII
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	7
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	8
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	9
INTRODUCTION	9
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REVIEW	10
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK DESCRIBED	11
Theory: Sociology of Security Theory	12
Theory: Social Identity Theory	13
Theory: Social Networking Theory	14
Theory: Sociology of Chaos Theory	14
Theory: Social Disorganization Theory	15
Theoretical Approaches	15
SECTION 1: THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING TRANSIENT CRIMINALITY.	18
Defining Transient Criminality	18
Exposing Criminal Recruitment Throughout the Americas	19
SECTION 2: EXPLAINING TRANSIENT CRIMINAL RECRUITMENT PROCESSES AND STRATEGIES.	22
Comparative Relevance to Transient Criminal Recruitment	22
The Transient Criminality Recruitment Pool and Talent Sources throughout the Americas	23
Transnational Criminal Organizations	27
Territory Versus Ideology Versus Enterprise...The Modern Blur	28
SECTION 3: INTEGRATING THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS	30
The Intelligence Community’s Role in US Border Security Protection	30
A DISCIPLINE IN DEVELOPMENT.	36
Back to Border Security	36
Local LE	40
Foreign Influences	43
SECTION 4: TRAINING TO COUNTER TRANSIENT CRIMINAL RECRUITMENT.	44
Capabilities	44
Competencies	45
Capacities	47
CONCLUSION.	54
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	58
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.	58

RESEARCH QUESTIONS (RQ).	58
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.	58
TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS.	59
Population.....	59
THE INTERVIEW PROCESS.	61
VALIDITY	63
RELIABILITY.	64
STUDY PROCEDURES.	64
LIMITATIONS.	64
DELIMITATIONS	66
ETHICAL ASSURANCES.	67
SUMMARY.	68
CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA	70
INTRODUCTION	70
FUNNELING OF INFORMATION.	71
A WALKTHROUGH OF THE ADAPTIVE INTERVIEW GUIDE.	72
THE DATA ROADMAP.	73
PROFESSIONAL SELF-IDENTITY.	74
The Clash of Categorical Labels.	74
The SMEs’ Organizational Identities.....	75
PREVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS	77
OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE	
DISCIPLINE.	82
Why Choose Border Security LE.....	83
Making a Difference.....	83
Why Choose to Police.	84
Finding the Right Fit.	85
The Border Security Battle Rhythm.....	87
The Best Parts of Policing.	88
The Worst Parts of Policing.	89
Leading to the Best Experiences.	91
Causing the Worst Experiences.....	93
Conclusion.....	95
BORDER SECURITY LE KNOWLEDGE.	95
Academics and the Intelligence Process.	96
Conclusion.....	99
CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION TO DISCUSSIONS.	102
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSIONS	103
INTRODUCTION	103
DISCUSSIONS: AN INVALUABLE COMPONENT TO EXPLORATORY	
RESEARCH.	103
REENGAGING THE LITERATURE.	104
Literature Summation.	105

Important Authors and Literature Touchpoints to Remember	105
Conclusion	107
CHAPTER LAYOUT	107
RESEARCH QUESTION 1	108
The Question.	108
The Short Answer.....	108
Key Takeaway.....	108
Conclusion.....	118
RESEARCH QUESTION 2	119
The Question.	119
The Short Answer.....	119
Key Takeaway.....	119
Border Security Knows More than they Think.	121
Discussing Border Security LE Training.	129
Is Border Security LE Training like Champions.....	135
Learning from the Minds of the Scholars.....	139
CONCLUSION	142
BRIDGING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 AND 3	144
Introduction.	144
Social Science Training Influence.....	145
Training on Socioeconomic Statuses (SES).....	146
Finding Other Training Value.	147
Social Science Enhancements.	150
The Social Science Power Five.	152
From Theory to Life Saving Practicality.....	153
More about Teaching over Instruction.	154
Border Security LE’s Cultural Dilemmas.	158
Finding the Composition for Border Security LE Confidence Building.	160
Confidence Finds a Replicable Process through Certain Classes.	164
RESEARCH QUESTION 3	167
The Question.	167
The Short Answer.....	167
Key Takeaway.....	168
The Composition of Confidence Levels.....	168
Returning to Networking.....	172
Discussing Transient Criminal Recruitment.	176
Confidence Follows Training Alignment.....	178
RESEARCH QUESTION 4	194
The Question.	194
The Short Answer.....	194
Key Takeaway.....	195
Discussing Border Security Crosstalk and Counter-Criminal Communications.	211
A Deeper Dive into Interagency Level Communications.	218

A Closer Look at Intra-Level Communications.....	224
Overall Communications and Comparative Summary.....	228
Connecting Communication Experiences with Concepts and Theories.	231
Practicing What has been Preached about Improving Communication.....	238
Words have Meaning.	242
Concepts.....	242
CONCLUSION.	257
CHAPTER 6 SUMMATION OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS....	260
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY.....	260
WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS.....	260
Additional Gaps.....	261
IMPLICATIONS.	262
FUTURE RESEARCH.....	263
Border Security Organizational Structure.	264
Training Programs.....	265
Communications.....	269
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS.....	270
Cyber.	270
Fighting Crime.	270
Split-Operations.	271
Influencing.	272
Cultivating Controlled Chaos.....	272
Focusing on the Fundamentals.....	273
Collective Genius.	274
CONCLUSION.	274
One Last Question.	274
Final Thoughts.....	276
APPENDIX A Interview Process.....	277
APPENDIX B Invitation to Participate in the Study	286
APPENDIX C Informed Consent Form	288
APPENDIX D Definitions of Key Terms.....	292
APPENDIX E List of Abbreviations/Acronyms	300
APPENDIX F Border Security On-hand Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities that Enhance Combatting Transient Criminality	303
APPENDIX G Border Security Wishlist of Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities.....	311
REFERENCES.....	313

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Critical Components and Key Takeaways from SME Responses.....	82
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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Border Security SMEs’ Interview Funneled Glidepath.....71
FIGURE 2: Roadmap for Information Flow on Presenting Empirical Data.....73
FIGURE 3: Additional Reasons for Why Pure Academics Should Not Be LE
Instructors.....101
FIGURE 4: List of Most Valuable Border Security LE Courses to Combatting Transient
Criminal Recruitment.....151
FIGURE 5: Border Security Practitioners’ Wishlist for Future Border Security
Academic or In-Service Training Courses.....166

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Ambition has but one reward for all: A little power, a little transient fame.

A grave to rest in, and a fading name!” – William Winter

Identifying, moreover, combatting transient criminality is extremely difficult for US border security professionals. Illicit traffickers of drugs, weapons, sex, humans, and rising commodities such as fraudulent identity documents are multitudinous by modern joint US border security LE crime reporting (US Department of Justice, 2020).

Attempting to strategically or operationally capture the profiles of transient criminals and recruits is taxing on the LE sector. However, not proactively addressing and resourcing this joint homeland security mission creates foreign and domestic US border security problem-sets (US Department of Homeland Security, 2022). Fortunately, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not have to recreate the wheel as border security agencies have been successful in countering the US’ organized border crime epidemic over the past decade (Bersin & Lawson, 2021).

Notable successes in refuting organized crime have predominantly focused on sociological drivers of influence that entice criminal behavior (Bergman, 2018; DeLisi, 2016). Additionally, organized crime scholars like Jay Albanese explored ‘how’ and more importantly ‘why’ people choose a life of organized criminality (Albanese, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020). Many of these findings return to the basic sociological and psychological theoretical concepts linked to the principles of rational choice theory and the notions of “risk versus reward.” It is not rocket science; yet that may be exactly why it is so frustrating that US LE continues to metaphorically chase criminal ghosts that

seem to exponentially multiply overnight. When people have nothing to lose, they are extremely vulnerable to criminal organizational recruitment (Cruz, 2010; Garcia, 2006). Hence, the limited strength and validity of many qualitative methodologically designed research projects lies in the researcher's inability to access the "criminal" or "potential criminal" within the organized criminal enterprise during their initiation into the criminal enterprise and throughout their organized crime life course (Tonry & Reuter, 2020). For both academics and practitioners, the limitation to access and control of the niche population of criminals often diminishes any significant advancement to the discipline of homeland security. Thus, this study approached this topic from a different angle. Instead of looking at transient criminals, this study queried border security LE practitioners and their SME supportive partners.

Culminating several successful qualitative strategies from Albanese, et al, an appreciation for the level of difficulty in unifying a categorical definition of a globally recognized criminological term such as transient criminality is achieved. This study coins the definition of transient criminality as, "**Illegal activities that move goods, people, and services between or across geographical borders and barriers.**" Additionally, the description of a transnational criminal organization is established. Transnational criminal organizations are structured entities that share similarities in their organizational composition because they are motivated to achieve the same overarching objective of profiteering by, with, and through criminal activities (Shelley & Picarelli, 2010). Due to their geo-dispersity, consortiums between these criminal organizations find innovative ways to unify their criminality across physical nationally recognized borders. Thus, the combination of "organization," "motive," and "commission of crime across different country borders" is what differentiates transnational criminal organizations from other

organized criminal categories (Shelley & Picarelli, 2010; Albanese, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019; Cozine, Joyal & Ors, 2014).

Globalization and the easy movements of illicit goods and people across borders have transformed security into a transnational phenomenon (Albanese, 2015). The evolutionary interconnectedness of the transient criminal enterprise places US border security agencies defending an accordion effect against a new wave of both tangible and virtual transient enemies on and around the US' southern borders (Albanese, 2015; Marquardt & Berger, 2000). Since transient crime across the Americas continues to grow at such an alarming rate, a combined increase of almost 30% of trafficking related criminal activity (weapons, drugs, human and sex trafficking, etc) over the last two decades across the southern to the US border (DEA, 2023; FBI, 2023; ATF, 2023), this study began to explore theories and strategies that could help border security LE thwart the predictable future transient criminality recruitment threat. During my exploration, it quickly became clear that the required framework for preparing border security LE to fight transient criminal recruitment simply had not been erected. Consequently, this study identifies the gaps in border security research and practicality that must be filled for the homeland security discipline to begin to construct the requisite pillars for countering the threats embedded in the transient criminality enterprise's recruitment process. This study also explains the decisive point of intersection between the leading transient criminality motivator of increased profit gains and potential illicit recruits. As this threat inches closer to owning and controlling the market share of consumer supply and demand of more and more lucrative commodities (Blumstein, 1993, 1995), their expansion will require more recruits.

The link between transient criminals and US border security LE is not a new relationship. It has had a significant lasting domestic presence in the US since the early 1920s (Glenny, 2008). This connection between “cops and robbers” intensified during the 1980s and 1990s; when South American drug cartels reenergized and redefined transient crime by making drug smuggling a multi-billion dollar industry (Liddick, 2004). Yet, the historical significance of organized transient crime really only serves this study in two directly interrelated ways. First, it provides a chronological longevity glidepath to how transient criminality has endured as a growing enterprise while being labeled as a competitor to the US during the country’s global economic rise (Cohen, 1999). Second, the historical narrative to transient criminality throughout the Americas indicates that this threat is far more innovative, adaptive, and aggressive in tactical, operational, and strategic decision-making than US homeland security policy and program leaders (The White House, 1997; Albanese, 2015; Bersin & Lawson, 2021).

The southern US border states continue to be consistent leading contributors in the continental US’ reported criminality associated with the organized crimes of trafficking, smuggling, and illegal immigration (UCR, 2011-2021). These illicit activities pose a serious concern for US border security LE; for as tensions rise on and around the US’ southern border, people naturally become more vulnerable to transient criminality recruitment schemes. Those that once did not meet the illicit recruitment profile are now prime targets for hiring; for, as more criminal activity becomes transparent to American citizens and profitable for the criminal enterprise, the closer desperate people come to joining this criminal network. This cascading effect continues to decrease the ability for border security LE to defeat “the enemy next door;” as the more recruits choose a life of

criminality, the more overwhelmed the already understaffed and under-resourced border security sector will become. A cultural paradigm shift toward border security instability is likely to occur if the transient criminal enterprise continues to expand through both the licit and illicit international and national financial marketplaces. Within the last 5 years, the Global Financial Integrity and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) claim that the underground, black market ran by the transnational criminal enterprise averages \$1.6 to \$2.2 trillion in international profits and nearly \$67 billion in US acquisitions of stolen property alone (Clough, 2017; FBI, 2021).

The southern 40 counties of Texas own the market share (transient crime per square mile) for having the nation's greatest collective potential for future transient criminality expansion (UCR, 2011-2021). Subsequently, it should be assumed that this geographical hotspot will provide the highest potential opportunities for the transient criminal network to recruit within the domestic, continental US. The amount of transient-controlled ports of entry, known and probable criminal trafficking routes, and the transnational criminal enterprise's pragmatism to yield predictable profit gains (both in monies and in recruiting the next generation of transient criminals) in this area of operations causes a formidable threat to both border security LE and the legitimate American business enterprise. However, even with over 30% of the US' reported transient crimes (UCR, 2016) coming from just under 40,000 square miles (Google Maps, 2021), I theorize that due to underreporting of crimes (specifically, transient related crimes) at the local, state, and federal LE levels (Suddler, 2020; Dispatch, 2018; Sennewald, 2016) and collective undertraining of border security tactical assets on being able to identify the sociological abnormalities in subcultures that frequently lead to

transient criminality recruitment, current transient based crime statistics and analyses are skewed; flawed at their foundation.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The US DHS' facet of border security is architecturally designed to ensure US persons receive an enduring defense against foreign and domestic enemies. Millions of tax dollars and privatized investments are devoted annually to increasing border security measures. This venture capital is used to fortify infrastructure, improve technology, advance weaponry, and develop more capable border security LE agents through knowledge transfer and experience generating training. The end state of this consortium should lead to the strengthening of the joint organizational fabric that creates border security. However, the practitioners of the border security sector significantly lack in their processes to gather, analyze, and disseminate useful intelligence regarding how LE will identify, divert, deter, counter, and combat the present and future transient criminal enterprise's recruitment efforts. Thus, this qualitative research project addresses the aforesaid issues by exploring the following four research questions.

RQ1: How does the border security LE community (practitioners and academics) define transient criminality?

RQ2: How does the border security LE community (practitioners and academics) train to identify transient criminality recruitment?

RQ3: Why do border security LE agencies differ in their confidence levels to employ and deploy similar capabilities, competencies, and capacities to address transient criminality recruitment?

RQ4: How can information gathering and intelligence production processes be improved in order to lead to higher levels of joint border security operational confidence in combating transient criminality recruitment?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The findings of this study will benefit the homeland security discipline, specifically tactical and strategic academic-practitioners with US border security research interests and operational missions. The greater exposure to unoptimized aspects of current border security LE training will result in clearly defining objectives to new and existing training programs and those objectives which instructors should consider for future courses and scenarios. In turn, this study's findings should naturally urge the fusing of joint service partners to agree upon how to jointly train on tactics, techniques, and strategies that are designed to confront transient criminality recruitment.

Additionally, joint agency funding conversations for such futuristic training pipelines will be able to be had based on this research project's outputs. Secondary yields to improving the training pipeline renders an opportunity for an immediate culture shift of empowering a new generation of border security LE agents and officers by providing them with the knowledge and moreover, the confidence to counter and combat the new wave of transient criminality, especially from a sociological perspective. A tertiary effect of uncovering impediments in border security law enforcement officers' (LEO) confidence to employ and deploy their Triple C's (Capabilities, Competencies, Capacities) offers possibilities to improve inter and intra level communications. Leveling up in communicating will directly lead to enhancements in the consistent efficacy of the intelligence process.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION.

In searching for an explanation to why southern to the US border transient criminality recruitment has found success during their expansion from smuggling drugs to trafficking people and investing resources in identity fraud and money laundering, the collective literature provided an unexpected realization about the transient criminal threat's prioritization of importance to DHS. The future expansion of the transient criminal enterprise and the consortium of the transient criminal networks seem to be far less important to DHS, compared to combatting present transient criminal activity. This is evident in the fact that no scholarly literature exists on transient criminal recruitment. Do we really not know who is being recruited by the transient criminal enterprise? And, why have academics and practitioners in the discipline of border security collectively chosen to not publish about transient criminality recruitment? Transient criminality recruitment is absent in scholarly research and professional academic-practitioner training discussions regarding countering transient crime. Thus, this study explored potential reasons why agencies may not be optimizing their capabilities, capacities, and competencies, both in practicality and in the classrooms of agency training and higher educational institutions. Along with trainers and professors, border security LE entities must continue their efforts on deterring transient criminality recruitment externally, while dedicating time and resources to preparing for a domestic transient criminality recruitment surge. If DHS provides a concerted determination in applying constant and actionable organizational pressure to the transient criminal enterprise, then this added burden of financial and

operational liabilities may just offer enough apprehensions within the illicit enterprise to significantly delay and deter transient criminality recruitment within the borders of the US. However, DHS cannot win this battle alone. It will take a joint, border security LE agency consortium to counter and combat this highly opportunistic and adaptive threat.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REVIEW. In order to fully comprehend the socio-cultural impact that transient criminality recruitment is having on US border security LE, I have determined it “critical” to expose this threat from a holistic approach that explores this topic from a compilation of sociological, psychological, criminological, business, economics, and education influences. Additionally, the framework for this review follows a deliberately constructed, cascading effective design, starting with the ambiguity of defining transient criminality. Next, I will explain how the theories I have chosen to implement throughout this study are interwoven between border security LE and the common threats and enemies associated with the transient criminal enterprise. A deeper dive into the specific border security threat of transient criminality recruitment pursues. Comparing and contrasting tactics, techniques, and organizational structures from both border security LE and organized criminal networks will help to comprehend the magnitude of criminal reach and partnerships that not only exist but aid in the transient criminal enterprise’s recruitment process. Moreover, the overarching category of “social science influence” will discuss sociological, criminological, and psychological influencers and enablers to transient criminal recruitment. The final pillar of this review examines the organizational structure of the US’ border security agencies and supporters that have been charged with the mission to defend the US’ borders against foreign and domestic transient criminal enemies. This section will expose the attributes and

limitations of the border security academics and practitioners' Triple Cs as they relate to countering and combatting the transient criminality recruitment epidemic.

This literature review is divided into four sections: 1) Defining Transient Criminality; 2) Recruitment; 3) Intelligence; 4) Training. The four sections' content represents four equidimensional facets that unitedly support the central theme of improving border security LE's confidence in being capable, competent, and having the capacities to counter transient criminality recruitment. Due to the lack of specific studies that are dedicated to transient criminality recruitment, I refocused my research strategy and approached my exploration from three distinctly different angles. Each strategy intertwined with the enduring theme of countering transient criminality recruitment. The three strategies used during this literature review were: 1) comparable case study analysis; 2) comparing and contrasting similar threats to border security; and 3) review of social science studies with methodological approaches to research projects similar to mine.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK DESCRIBED. This study's research is observed through the theoretical lens of Sociology of Security Theory (SOST). Specific aspects of this study are enhanced by theoretical approaches from Social Identity Theory (SIT), Social Networking Theory (SNT), and the Sociology of Chaos Theory (SOCT). Additionally, Social Disorganization Theory (SDT) enables SIT and SNT to reach greater levels of influence on explaining how and why the transnational criminal enterprise targets specific individuals and groups for recruitment and why those recruits are interested enough in the transient criminal world to entertain such proposals. It is through theoretical concepts such as securitization and societal security (O'Sullivan in Ramsay,

Cozine & Comiskey, 2021) that people learn to believe in their protectors. The entities that train LE assets and devise strategic plans to counter and combat foreign and domestic enemies provide the requisite security blankets US persons have come to rely upon and expect to be flawlessly executed in thwarting threats that jeopardize the freedoms of the American way of life.

Theory: Sociology of Security Theory. SOST has become an intimate theoretical partner in the academic discussions and practical applications of security and surveillance (Bajc, 2013). This theory explains how societies approach their need for security and moreover, why the people in that respective culture choose their level of security from natural and manmade adversaries (Stampnitzky, 2013). SOST continues to naturally expand its impact to critical security forums for the US such as DHS and even the National Defense Strategy. However, the entity of border security LE appears to internally limit their theoretical knowledge base by merely focusing their entry-level training on the legal and criminal justice aspects of security, rather than the sociological qualities that pointedly boost effectiveness in identifying precursors and unscrupulous vulnerabilities in the criminal recruitment pools that are prevalent in the communities in which these agents and officers serve.

Bajc's concept of security metaframing directly connects to this study's theoretical framework by explaining that the cultural perception of "security" can significantly shape and shift the social lifestyles and decision-making processes for a group of people (Bajc & de Lint, 2011). Consequently, there is more than potential value in merely comprehending superficially an organization's cultural dynamics and climate; for the significance of the organization's internal and external relationships with its

employees, partners, and adversaries have far greater levels of influence on its cultural outreach (Morely, 2015; Busch & Givens, 2014). Henceforth, it should be debated that the sociological attributes of a business or for this discussion's purposes, a criminal enterprise, are in fact the prominently motivating incentives that aid and assist the transient enterprise in increasing or decreasing the overall impact and effectiveness of the transnational criminal organizations successfully achieving their projected leadership's intent and organizational objectives. As each individual transnational criminal organization begins to develop and then implement strategies built toward reaching their organizational objectives, either an autonomous or joint relationship between these partners starts to form within the transient criminality community. In fact, the lack of assimilation of SOST in homeland security operational planning raises the likelihood that border security practitioners become hoodwinked by false security threats (O'Sullivan in Ramsay, Cozine & Comiskey, 2021). It is noteworthy to mention that not all the rabbit holes border security travel down are fictitious; in fact, many of them are real and do seriously threaten homeland security. Such threats are found in the battles against trafficking drugs and people, creating fraudulent documents, and illegally selling and distributing weapons. Moreover, SOST is this study's conduit that unites these significant transient threats through a very specific center of gravity called recruitment.

Theory: Social Identity Theory. SIT combines concepts of sociology and psychology to explain how people behave due to the influences of the social groups that surround and interact with them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Ultimately, SIT provides a sense of predictability to a person's actions. For this study predictable actions are focused on criminal behaviors. And, while many researchers, such as Hogg and Abrams, have

published findings on how SIT is associated with creating a positive social identity that positively enhances a culture's identity (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). This 'self-esteem hypothesis,' interacts with a transnational criminal recruit in the same manner as previously explained; however, while the transnational criminal organization exposes a positive social identity for the yearning for a social identity recruit, the recruit's society is negatively impacted by the behaviors of that new criminal.

Theory: Social Networking Theory. SNT speaks to two cultural disciplines: language and sociology. This theory focuses on how the meaning of social terms such as: gender, age, ethnicity, and social class interact with how and why people behave (Milroy, 2000). It examines how verbal and non-verbal language influences the transmission of information during the building and maintaining (or lack thereof) of social relationships (Drew and Heritage, 1992). This study implements the concepts of SNT to explain how and why transnational criminals and their recruits interact with one another. SNT also assists in explaining how these criminals affect the societies in which they commit crime. Furthermore, SNT offers clarification to why border security LE continues to experience difficulty in infiltrating social circles of transient criminality.

Theory: Sociology of Chaos Theory. SOCT (Hodges, 2015) provides this study a general sense of order amongst a Homeland Security adversary that has seemingly infinite possibilities and the Triple Cs to rapidly adapt and evolve its behaviors before border security can effectively react to the crimes that are committed. This sense of order is explained through examining and improving border security training programs, information gathering processes and procedures, and intelligence production systems. SOCT assumes that unpredictability in behavior due to a system, process, or procedure's

degree of stability will actually offer relatively accurate predictability in how a person or group of people will behave (Crossman, 2019). This study utilizes SOCT to predict both border security LE and transient criminal behaviors based on the way each respective group exposes and then attempts to navigate through the gaps and loopholes in the processes and procedures of systems, laws, rules, and regulations their societies and organizations have created.

Theory: Social Disorganization Theory. SDT introduce physical and social environments as the primary reason for a person's behavioral choices (Shaw & McKay, 1972). Park and Burgess (1925) linked the concepts of "Darwinian evolution" to SDT. They explained that people, in this case, criminals, will evolve based on the constants of their surrounds. Faris added that SDT speaks to the "weakening or destruction of the relationships which hold together a social organization" (Faris, 1955). It is through these very relationships that both the criminal and security sectors can preemptively engage in influential recruitment and anti-recruitment warfare. For the transient criminal enterprise, shaping the environment in a way that convinces a recruit that a life of crime is more advantageous to their life goals than abiding by the law is beneficial. For DHS, especially LE, SDT aids in explaining that border security improves and strengthens if criminal recruits choose a life path other than criminality. This means that the transient criminal recruit does not have to join LE to better border security, the recruit just has to not join the criminal enterprise or commit crime.

Theoretical Approaches. Exploration of solidifying concepts and attributes of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SNT (Milroy, 2000; Hodges, 2015) to the outer edges of the theory of SOST (Bajc, 2013) offers DHS an initial barrier to the transient criminality

recruitment threat; buying enough time for DHS to re-identify itself through vitally needed improvements and logistical enhancements to its' transient criminality combatant operational planning. Transient criminal organizations have exposed a crack in DHS' shield of protection by illuminating the reality that transient based crime can and will, for the foreseeable future, attack and feed off US citizens and aliens for monetary, territorial, and recruitment of personnel purposes. The transient criminal enterprise's social network is vastly increasing (US ICE, 2019). Partnered with mafias, cartels, gangs and even terrorist groups, transient criminal organizations of South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico have organizationally structured their competencies, capabilities, and capacities on a global platform (UNODC, 2023). These global networks vulture vulnerable targets for their recruitment, while strengthening and enhancing their partnerships with higher echelon leaders from other countries and criminal organizations (to include terrorist organizations). The progressiveness of the transient criminal enterprise's social networking stems from the criminals' ability to sympathetically connect to the courted partner by exploiting the interconnectedness of similar historical cultural injustices such as racism, inequalities, through war and violent conflicts, and socio-economic class differences (Goldstein, 2010). Referencing back to Bajc's model of "meta-framing," as it pertains to the overarching discussion of SOST (Bajc, 2013) presented in this study, it is of importance to note that social networking, through exclusionary classification has afforded historical and now present criminal organizations to divide their enterprises into categorizations. These specific categories create a recruitment foundation that links common attributable values to each individual and then seeks to strategically position potential recruits, based on their skill-sets to vacant

positions within the greater transient criminal enterprise (Handelman, 2004). This method of recruiting intensifies the transient criminal organization's social identity and exponentially increases the entire illicit transient enterprise's social networking capacity.

SOCT measures the impact and effectiveness of how inter and intra communication deficiencies in gathering information and processing intelligence through the concepts associated with how civil components of society interact with the fragility of that culture's most critical centers of gravity. Emergency management, to include DHS, is the most significant partner to American resiliency (Crossman, 2019). I believe that out of the four methodological systems associated with SOCT, social systems and complex adaptive systems offer the greatest avenues of approach to understanding why information gathering and intelligence production significantly struggles when attempting to counter transient criminality recruitment. SOCT in this study will serve as a supportive agent to SOST (Bajc, 2013) by explaining how the current LE response plans to counter transient criminality recruitment significantly incumbers timely and accurate intelligence from being generated and disseminated to the border security officers and agents who need it the most.

The threats US residents and the US face are real and yet, the modern strategies, techniques, and tactics that federal agencies such as Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), the FBI, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) currently employ within the borders of the US in order to deter and combat these threats are many times opening the door for threat groups. The stigmas of DHS are regularly referred to as intrusive, controlling, and ineffective in their

attempts at providing safety to the American way of life (Molotch, 2012). Thus, while this study initially sought to find the current transient criminal recruitment profile of South Americans, Central Americans, and Mexicans, it inadvertently discovered that an eerily similar transient criminal recruiting profile exists domestically in the US amongst US persons. The US's citizens and aliens from lower socio-economic statuses are not immune to the external threat of criminal organizational recruitment (Brown, 2007 and Cozine, 2019). The pressures US persons, both legal and illegal, face financially, professionally, and socially culminate to increase their probability to be targeted by such threat organizations. Thus, the results of this research have concluded that while a literary gap does exist regarding specific southern to the US transient criminal enterprise's recruitment both internal and external to the US' borders, a transient criminal recruitment profile that focuses on capabilities, competencies, and capacities can indeed be determined.

SECTION 1: THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING TRANSIENT CRIMINALITY.

Defining Transient Criminality. There is tremendous ambiguity in defining “transient criminality” for academics and practitioners. The complexity of this dilemma extends latterly across social science disciplines in academia and separately throughout practical occupations in homeland security. The issue also parallels one another, as cross disciplinary information cannot travel efficiently and timely between academia and LE due to the lack of a unified definition for transient criminality.

Jay Albanese spent years compiling the required data that was necessary to define “organized crime” (Albanese, 2009, 2015, 2019). He dissected each part of nearly every credible definition LE used for organized crime. Even after proving the value of his

definition through the creation of an organized crime category in the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR), local, state, and federal LE agencies, along with private sector security entities and pure academics, continue to disagree on the operational definition of organized crime. It seems that transient criminality will be impacted by the same type of dilemma Albanese faced.

Exposing Criminal Recruitment Throughout the Americas.

Cultural Comparative Analysis Between Recruits and Criminal Entities. Myths run rampant when discussing gangs, terrorists, and the transient criminal enterprise. Blogs, articles, and even the local and national news reports lack the scholarly rigor necessary to debunk the falsehoods of just how similar and dangerously close gangs, terrorist groups, and transnational organizations are intertwined in organizational structure, operational motives, and financial partnerships. The following subsections of this study will define the differences between gangs, terrorist groups, and transnational criminal organizations. Then, a comprehensive comparative analysis will explicate the current impact gangs and terrorist groups continue to have on the transient criminal enterprise's recruitment process.

Stereotyping and Profiling Transient Criminal Recruits. Quite a large sample size of quantitative and qualitative data supports that South American, Central American, and Mexican transient criminality recruitment prey on the sociological vulnerabilities of the disenfranchised and poverty-stricken citizens that desperately seek survivability through financial and defensible security. A chronological glide path of how Mexican and Central American transient criminality recruitment claims that as drugs began to be pushed from South America to the US at alarming rates. The first criminal organizations

in Mexico, Central America, and South America were comprised of small family-founded businesses (Dudley, 2012). As with most profit-making organizations, when the demand for products and delivery rapidly increased, rivalries for territory and market control conversely impacted these small family-based groups. This forced expansion through external recruitment that involved experienced, more sophisticated and even armed forces (for security) (Dudley, 2012).

In the mid-1990s gang activity began to flood illicit transient recruitment. With South American drug smuggling reaching its apex, it became necessary for individual criminal organizations to fuse into larger criminal organizations and even enterprises. Once again, rapidly increasing in size meant that recruitment techniques must be readdressed and revamped. Consequently, transnational criminal organizations took full advantage of the intensification of the US' criminal deportation efforts. With a large part of the US border security's increased operational tempo focused on removing the transient criminal threat from US soil, the US unintentionally leveled up seemingly all echelons of the transnational criminal organization's elaborate enterprise. Illegal aliens that were arrested for committing crimes in the US and that fell under deportation punishments, along with US criminals that migrated back to Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean after their incarceration bolstered the transnational criminal enterprises Triple Cs by providing the criminal network with firsthand knowledge of newest and most successful ways US border security LE aimed to catch and convict transient criminals. Criminals were not the only groups of people from the US to assist the rise of transient criminal recruitment and the expansion of the transient criminal enterprise. Family members that remained in the US after their loved ones were deported,

incarcerated, or killed became emotionally charged and were tempted to share any knowledge they had in the hope of attaining retributive justice. Additionally, US legitimate and illegitimate business, primarily businesses with lower levels of US patriotic loyalty and an inferior morality to protect the secrets and infrastructure of US border security acknowledged that a convenient, profitable opportunity presented itself through a partnership with the transient criminal enterprise. The diversity in disassociated threat advisors to the transient criminal enterprise unbalanced the scales of US border security versus transient criminality. This left the limited number of transient crime-fighting agencies even more undermanned and under resourced to combat this expanded threat.

Transient criminality recruitment has maintained its recruitment methodology, focusing only on adapting to the newest supplier-consumer demands. With their uninterrupted expansion of smuggling drugs across the global marketplace, the illicit transient enterprise has recently bolstered their criminal imprint by inserting white-collar crimes of identity fraud, money laundering, and extortion to their newfound financial prosperities in trafficking people for sex and potential “freedom.” It is through this systematic methodological approach that the rise of transient criminality recruitment clearly identifies psychosocial characteristics that make a person increasingly susceptible to recruitment. Furthermore, while research and literature remain limited regarding specific internal and external to the US illicit transient recruitment data, the transient criminal recruitment problem in South America, Central America, and Mexico offer numerous sociological comparisons that allow for exploratory researchers to draw from commonalities between US and southern border gangs, international and domestic

terrorists groups, and US and southern border mafias and cartels recruitment schemes in order to build a “working” profile for modern transient criminality recruitment.

SECTION 2: EXPLAINING TRANSIENT CRIMINAL RECRUITMENT PROCESSES AND STRATEGIES.

Comparative Relevance to Transient Criminal Recruitment. Three main stages exist in the criminal organizational recruitment process. These stages are applicable to this study’s transient criminality recruitment across the Americas, as this research has a vested interest in identifying vulnerable targets for recruitment, creating trustworthy relationships between the recruit and the recruiter, and immediately instilling discipline and compliance of recruits through the implementation of prescript rules (Smith, 2014). As the recruiter and recruitee court, roles and responsibilities for each partner are naturally established. Thus, bonding the two partners together through a quasi-paternalistic and empowering relationship (Morley, 2015) often finalizes the illicit recruitment process.

Where exactly does a recruiter and recruit find one another? How does this relationship start and where do their paths symbiotically intersect? The answers to these questions are found in recruiter and recruitee pathways. Recruiter pathways are identified when organized crime leaders utilize recruitment strategies to guide new members toward a life of criminality. Constructed pathways are established in order to acquire new members and to reduce the risk of critical, established members of the criminal group from being arrested for actively participating in high-risk illicit behaviors, such as the manufacturing of illegal drugs or the creation of fraudulent documents (Smith, 2014). Recruitree pathways are created when law-abiding citizens begin to entertain the realism

that they could benefit from the profits organized crime achieves. These pathways tempt people with funds and protections to pay off debts and improve their social statuses through the simple process of membership (Smith, 2014).

The Transient Criminality Recruitment Pool and Talent Sources throughout the Americas.

South Americans. South America offers the transient criminal enterprise their longest standing success methods, practices, and procedures of recruitment in the southwestern hemisphere. Their formula for diversity in criminal recruitment has lasted over a hundred years and has rendered adaptive and innovative strategies that have directly led to transnational enterprise success. Recently, the South American illicit enterprise has demonstrated the ability to expand its manufacturing and distribution of illicit goods and services through the recruitment of nonnationals from African, Trinidad, Guyana, and China. These illegal immigrant workers are kept in the dark about the innerworkings of the transient criminal enterprise and if caught by LE, the criminal organization protects itself by claiming no connection to the arrested (Manwaring, 2017). Additionally, individual South American mafias are uniting to create transnational mafias. These joint criminal entities operate without a host nation headquarters and thus, generating international legal loopholes in major illicit transient crime categories such as drug and people trafficking and largescale fraud. These criminal consortiums are not geographically restrictive either; rather, their collective motivation for increased profit gains has rendered partnerships with significant transnational crime syndicates from the Russian Mafia to street and motorcycle gangs (Hudson, 2010).

Central Americans. Rising north in the Americas, Central Americans are deported by the US border security at an alarming rate. Since the early 1990s, over 90% of the hundreds of thousands Central Americans that are deported reside in the US' neighboring Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Central American gangs recruit deportees as new and returning members, and due to the underwhelming criminal justice systems that exist, gangs fearlessly continue to expand their access and control in local territories. These reenergized Central American gang members are now at a seniority age for gang activity; however, they are at the primed age for criminal organizational leadership for transient criminality. Guatemala transient criminal organizations, for example, have found a decade of success in recruiting former military intelligence officials to lead their markets of manufacturing fraudulent documents, providing private security, distributing illegal weapons, and even servicing illegal adoptions (Dudley, 2012). Due to the continuous corruption in Central American security forces and political governance, along with the perpetual degradation of Central American infrastructure, it should be considered that through the lens of SOST (Bajc, 2013) that Central America poses the most promising current recruiting ground for transient criminality throughout the Americas.

Mexicans. Mexico provides a significantly unique threat to the sociocultural aspect of border security in and around the borders of the US. Due to their bordering proximity and illicit and licit partnerships with both the US and southern border countries, Mexicans enter and exit the transnational trafficking routes every minute of every day. Additional threats to Americas and tourists of Mexico exist that may impact the US' future security. The tactic of forced recruitment (Mazzitelli, 2011) for the

commission of transient crimes such as kidnapping migrants and trafficking humans is an increasing threat that must be addressed. This forced recruitment process, like other national and international emerging criminal organizational threats, are a result of the dire need to increase the transient criminal enterprise's tactical forces with new and younger criminals (Mazzitelli, 2011). Mexican recruitment often involves corruption that stems from quid pro quo agreements between the criminal organization and Mexican military and LE officials. These officials possess a unique knowledge of combat operations and their experiences with violence make them a natural fit with the criminal underworld. Adding to their value is the fact that they are intimately familiar with local licit and illicit networks that could significantly enhance the transient criminal enterprise's national and global identity (Mazzitelli, 2011). Thus, the enterprise offers these Mexican officials money and status increases for intelligence and networking handoffs.

Mexico's military and LE participation in transient criminal recruitment causes another major threat to US border security agencies. As Mexican border security integrity weakens, so does the US border security's ability to control the thousands of miles along the southern American border. Along with a decrease of trusted international border security partners, the US must also account for the reality that bribery of Mexican border security occurs and these known temptations, once accepted, result in enhanced trafficking of goods and people into the US. It is reported that traffickers from Mexico pose the most significant domestic transient crime threat to US border security. These traffickers conduct business in all continental US states (Shirk, 2011). With trafficking drugs and weapons innately comes violence. Thus, thousands of Mexican nationals, out

of fear, continue to seek sanctuary in the US annually to escape this transient sparked violence (Shirk, 2011).

US Persons. US persons, especially those with Mexican, Latino, and South American heritage and have experienced the US deportation, criminal, or illegal immigration processes are considered high-risk for transient criminality recruitment. These vulnerable targets own an intimate knowledge of transportation routes, criminal justice procedures, and logistical accesses; all valued intelligence that transient criminal organizations actively seek. The uniqueness of the US' middle class adds another unique layer of recruiting opportunity for the transient criminal enterprise. As the national and global economies rise and fall, US persons may become tempted to explore criminality to pay debts, acquire desires, or find social net worth.

Amongst US persons, subcategories of United States citizens (USC) and lawful permanent residents (LPR) exist. It is important to recognize that USCs cannot be deported; however, LPRs can. This reality for LPRs significantly impacts their "recruitability," the amount of recruiting effort a licit or illicit entity is willing to invest in a potential recruit or group of recruits. The more a soft target population, such as LPRs, are vulnerable to governmental legal sanctions and constraints, the more deterred most criminal organizations become in their recruitment attempts of this specific population. If caught by border security LE, the risk of organizational connectiveness between the criminal organization and the LPR is often not worth the potential reward of adding the LPR to the criminal enterprise. There are simply more potential recruits with less potential liabilities for the criminal network to recruit.

Transnational Criminal Organizations. This study references Article 2 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime by defining transnational criminal organizations as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time, acting in concert with the aim of committing serious criminal offenses in order to obtain some financial or material benefit. One of the greatest challenges with beginning to defend the US against transient criminals is comprehending the reality that this type of adversary is borderless (McQuaid & Gold, 2017).

The borderless illicit enterprise causes a difficult border security dilemma. Transnational criminal organizations have forced local, state, and federal border security LE entities to train and fight against the black market by using business and counterterrorism techniques. This adds additional stress and pressure to the already weighted down 21st century border security officer. Furthermore, transient criminality recruitment is prevalent throughout the licit sectors of business. Recruitment becomes easier for transnational criminal organizations as they will capitalize on people during their most vulnerable times (ie: when fired, laid off, furloughed, disgruntled, etc) (Busch & Givens, 2014).

Terrorists. This study references the US Federal Emergency Management Agency's definition of terrorism and terrorist groups. Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the US for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom. Terrorists often use threats to create fear among the public, to convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent terrorism and/or to get immediate publicity for their causes. Modern terrorists can be categorized as criminalized insurgents (Zoller, 2018). This is a bold, yet very impactful

label, as the transient criminal enterprise is ever adaptive and will seek out skilled “insurgents” if their potential rewards outweigh their foreseeable risks.

Gangs. This study references the federal definition of a “gang” by the Department of Justice and the DHS’ Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Gangs are associations of three or more individuals whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity, which they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation. A gang’s purpose, in part, is to engage in criminal activity which it uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal objectives. Its members engage in criminal activity or acts of juvenile delinquency that if committed by an adult would be crimes with the intent to enhance or preserve the association’s power, reputation, or economic resources.

Territory Versus Ideology Versus Enterprise...The Modern Blur. Prior to September 11, 2001’s terrorist attack on the US, gangs, terrorist groups, and transnational criminal organizations were most often referred to as separate local, national, and global threats. These “threats” found similarities by, with, and through their organizations’ reputations of actionable implementation of violence and performing heinous crimes that struck fear into the lives of victims and law-abiding citizens that struggled to fully comprehend the magnitude of these organizations’ devastating capabilities. However, in 2001, few people, including sociologists and criminologists in academia and security practitioners, would have ever discussed, concluded, or predicted the active efforts of criminal threat networks partnering like they do today.

Two primary objectives coalesce the transient criminal enterprise and terrorist groups. First, the ability to incite fear on a global level is a powerful tool for the advancement of terrorism; however, mass fear amongst the transient enterprise is not

necessarily beneficial to expanding commerce (Schneider, 2010). Similarly, transient criminal organizations seek to exploit and then manipulate structured legitimate entities such as government officials and politicians. Destabilizing one of these societally trusted or needed systems decreases maximum profit opportunities (Williams, 1994). In an intriguing comparative-contrast, the concept of transnational terrorism (Schneider, 2010) offers a socio-scientific formula that begins to connect the transient criminal enterprise and terrorist groups together through organizational end states. In other words, each organization has begun to realize that they are stronger united and more able to achieve their individual objectives when financially, logistically, and socially networked.

Gangs and gang members have become the ants, the worker bees that facilitate the linkage between criminal organizations. A concept known as transnational gang activity involves the recruitment strategy of exploiting the potential profits that could be gained if members join in groups and masses to control, takeover, and ultimately saturate the market. Central American and Mexican gangs have joined forces to expand their respective territories and raise their reputations (Mendez, 2017). When gang earned street credit through violence, fear and compliance from the local people of these geographical areas is achieved, raising economic growth for the transient criminal enterprise and furthering the expansion of access and control to areas just outside the US can be expected. Along with transnational gang activity, migration movements from Central America to the US border must be addressed. The US' current policies and border security authorities to suppress and limit the migration of southern American people, especially youth gang members are weak; resulting in another prime opportunity for the transient criminal enterprise to recruit through incentivization. Cruz argues that US

deportation and the increase of gang activity in the transnational criminal trafficking enterprises' social space have created a social security fissure and this opportunity is being capitalized by transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups (Cruz, 2010).

Strategic alliances among transnational criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and gangs enhance the transient criminal enterprise's ability to identify and then quickly adapt to operational and management constraints (Williams, 1994). It is through these strategic alliances that social identities are created, and social networks are formed. Therefore, recruiting gang members who operate within the "grey space" of these larger criminal organizations offer the transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups enhanced operational capacities by tapping into the competencies and capabilities of these local illicit subject matter experts. Through this social conglomerate of criminal organizational synergy DHS finds itself behind the social facet of the tactical border security power curve.

SECTION 3: INTEGRATING THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

The Intelligence Community's Role in US Border Security Protection. Today the IC is robust with policies, programs, and partnerships that feature state-of-the-art technologies and SMEs that dedicate their entire professional careers to gathering information and turning that information into actionable intelligence. Yet while information and intelligence gathering have actively assisted war leaders since biblical times (Cozine, 2019), the concept of espionage tactics and collaborative efforts that share national secrets with one another is still in its infancy. This worries many of today's citizens and even governmental leaders. Both parties seem to similarly remain uneasy and

fearful that sharing strategic intelligence purposefully risks the probable exploitation of their country's border security protection.

The intelligence process is comprised of four generalized activities: information collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence (Lowenthal, 2019). And, while covert actions cannot be conducted domestically, it will take significant improvements, through the intelligence process in all four of these aforementioned activities if homeland security intends on countering transient criminality, especially recruitment. The IC is comprised of seventeen organizations that are designed and trained to find valuable information and then turn that knowledge into actional intelligence in order to bolster the US' security posture. Additionally, the US has dedicated more than twelve agencies to the fortification mission of border security (Cozine, 2016). Intertwining the IC's capabilities to the protection of border security is relatively a natural process. Border security protection against illicit transient recruitment will require a vast array of LE entities across US homeland security communicating symbiotically and practically ascending on the staircase of relationships (Morley, 2015). Without this level of joint organizational commitment from the collective border security LE community, creating and then leading a formidable team that is smart, skilled, and adaptable against the rapidly evolving criminal recruitment environment is unlikely to be accomplished (Hodges, 2015).

One of the most imminent fears for US border security protection is combating a cascading effect caused by transient criminal recruitment (Lewis, 2015). This is the precise decisive point for homeland security decision-making and risk mitigation analysis that must be addressed if border security protection is to rise to a level of sociocultural

and infrastructural resiliency across the complexity of Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Key Resource (CIKR) systems in their clashes with transient criminality. Since the IC has stakeholders in all jurisdictions of homeland security, it logically makes sense that the IC should attain the responsibility of being the first line leaders in border security protection against transient criminality threats.

Intelligence Gathering Techniques. Five intelligence collection methods are most commonly used throughout the IC. These collection methods are Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) (gaining intelligence from pictures, satellite images and comparing imagery over time), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) (gaining intelligence through intercepting and studying electronic, communication signals), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) (gaining intelligence through radar, acoustic, nuclear, chemical and biological characteristics/signatures), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) (gaining intelligence from accessible media, public data, internet search engines and websites), and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (gaining intelligence directly from the source) (Cozine, 2021). Intelligence analysts and scholarly authors often spend their entire careers honing their skills and improving their knowledge about only one or maybe two of the intelligence methods. For example, GEOINT's modern technological advancements increase its operational value above the other intelligence gathering methods when creating mapping products (Martin, 2018). This makes sense during a singular focused mission that has an operational end state that requires only mapping. But what types of modern, real world border security missions only have a need for mapping? Hence, I stand firm in countering these types of claims, that one method is more valuable than another, because in today's everchanging operational environment, a multiple

layered intelligence method is the most valuable approach to collect, analyze, and present intelligence products. It is vitally imperative that decision-makers of border security operations are afforded a holistic, synergized intelligence production rather than a one-sided, limitedly scoped intelligence update.

This study levies significantly on the tactics and techniques of the HUMINT method. HUMINT is highly valuable in collecting information at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It offers a unique perspective and opportunity for intel analysts to receive information directly from the source and from the operational environment, without some of the issues that are described as vacuum cleaner (noise vs. signals) and the constant competition with border security budget constraints (Lowenthal, 2019 and Cozine, 2019). HUMINT is the most adaptable method of information and intelligence collection. It can take on a sophisticated and technologically advanced personality; however, it can also revert back to its most primitive state of one-on-one, personal interaction with the target. This method can be a bit riskier than some of the other methods because of the close proximity an intel asset must become to their target(s) (Cozine, 2013; 2019). The disadvantage of long lead times that naturally can hinder intelligence collection during the HUMINT method is also present (Lowenthal, 2019 and Cozine, 2013; 2019). If the proper amount of proactive planning goes to an operational intelligence environment, such as the illicit transnational trafficking routes and border pathways throughout the Americas, then establishing enduring relationships that will last decades can and will offer a level of intelligence collection that no other method can single-handedly replace. With this being said, HUMINT cannot and should not stand alone as the border security intelligence's only source of information gathering and

intelligence processing. A multi-faceted incorporation of GEOINT, SIGINT, and OSINT should always be part of any HUMINT border security intelligence operation.

Border Security Intelligence. Through a significant organizational restructuring, the border security intelligence process since the US attacks on 9/11 have improved drastically. However, due to the overall inter and intra level communication disjointedness that still exists between LE agencies within the IC, linking nodes and spheres of influencers and targeted vulnerabilities across the US' southern border has limited the IC from reaching its intended mission objectives, and moreover, its optimal potential. In turn, border security intelligence remains consistently lacking in producing intelligence reports that speak to actionable details when answering the operational 5Ws (who, what, when, where, and why). Intelligence's greatest factor is time (Cozine, 2013; 2020). This is why border security intelligence must increase its cohesiveness in information gathering, intelligence creation and analysis. Timeliness in intelligence sharing is the key to improving border security intelligence processing effectiveness. For it is through replicability of providing both tactical assets and strategic decision-makers timely, predictable intelligence products that measures of operational effectiveness levels can be determined.

Applying the Concept of Border Security Intelligence in Border Security Protection. This study revealed that most academic practitioners in homeland security agreed that the IC and border security are critical pieces to the US' national security strategy. They also assumed that both the IC and border security have an implied responsibility to work with one another in border security protection planning and operations. However, the concept of fusing the two power players into border security

intelligence is not so commonsensical and has been substantiated to be much easier said than actually done. There does exist a successful “checklist” of three important factors to effective border security intelligence sharing. These factors are: “cross border interdependence in terms of trade and economic health, natural physical barriers that separate from other neighbors, and events on one side of the border that can have an immediate and profound impacts on the security on the other side of the border” (Cozine, 2016, 184). The latter of the three is most applicable to my study because it incorporates the civil components of sociology and how decision-makers on either side of the border internally process their intelligence and decide how to respond to border security threats.

Intelligent Advisories. Today’s enemies are no longer conventional. Their asymmetries are vast and threaten border security externally and domestically (Cozine, 2016). This reality forces traditional border security entities to rely on their sister service, the IC, to process tactically acquired border security information into actionable border security intelligence. Prioritization of intelligence requirements can and will fluctuate based on real-world changes to the operational environment (Cozine, 2019 and Lowenthal, 2019). Thus, intelligence requirements strive to offer the IC a clear vision and path through a spiderwebbed maze of human and cyber information. The value of the IC in the tactical environment was exemplified during the killing of Osama bin Laden. It was the intelligence requirements that drove the intel analysts to focus on certain aspects of HUMINT, SIGINT and GEOINT during the analysis and production phases of this joint, international security operation (Cozine, 2013). Timeliness, specifically the ability to get actionable intelligence to ground forces quickly was critically important during this

mission (Cozine, 2013). This same notion holds true throughout the IC's vast mission sets. Speed and intel accuracy lead to better decision making by junior and senior leaders and even policy makers.

A DISCIPLINE IN DEVELOPMENT. Homeland Security is in its infancy as a social science discipline. Much like the journey embarked on by Criminology, Homeland Security must now draw from known theoretical frameworks of psychology, sociology, and even physical sciences (Binns in Ramsay, Cozine, & Comiskey, 2021) to learn and mature into their own academic discipline. Along with theory, practitioners associated with Homeland Security cannot consistently and effectively combat border security threats alone. Thus, the enduring and ever-growing relationship between homeland security professionals and the IC simply must coexist (Logan, 2018). Furthermore, both short-term and long-term relationships between border security officers/agents/agencies and intelligence analysts/agencies should begin with interagency honesty through communication agreements which feature full mission related disclosures of information and intelligence (Winstead, 2021).

Back to Border Security. There are both theoretical and tangible capability gaps which CBP currently faces when preparing and executing border security protection operations. If not proactively addressed, three of these five capability gaps (having undertrained tactical agents, understaffed operational assets, and unfocused leaders and agencies) have the likely probabilities of aiding the transient criminal enterprise's recruitment process for their next generation of members (Barnett, 2019). Yet, these capability gaps are not the sole responsibility of the CBP, for It is the collaborate effort of all DHS and National Defense entities and their respective assets that must make

concerted efforts in addressing countering transient criminal enterprise recruitment. If not made a priority by the majority of US border security defenses the transient criminal threat will likely intensify their recruitment tempo, exploiting the US' most venerable target(s) to reach even greater capacities than the Americas have ever experienced. Currently scholars claim that US border security is on a glidepath that is historically cyclical and nearly always ends with counteroperations that are filled with hopes, not facts; resulting in enhancing the enemy's outputs (Barnett, 2019).

Influence and Exploitation on Border Security Infrastructure Protection.

Fortifying border security infrastructure and improving protective measures through process and systematic enhancements to how and why border security barriers are designed and utilized can assist in combating transient criminal recruitment. Yet, simply reinforcing and strengthening border security infrastructure does not automatically result in tangible border security LE improvements like arrest rates and limited illegal border security crossings. It takes proactive planning from all jurisdictional levels of LE and moreover, it requires precision targeting of the threat's centers of gravity to render these types of results. The latter of these requisites is intelligence process driven and thus, cross-leveling communication between border security LE agencies is vitally essential to generating measurable and replicable outcomes. However, any tactical, operational, or strategic border security disruption effort to any aspect of this transient criminal activity should be considered a homeland security win (Bersin, 2021). Thus, layering upgrades and refinements to border security protection of its infrastructure and its personnel should naturally lead to boosts in border security LE operational effectiveness against transient criminality and increases to border security LE retention rates. Yet, it must be

remembered that both law-abiding people and criminals build, maintain, stabilize, and use US border security related infrastructure every day. Both the public and private sectors of border security employ professionals to secure and protect border security infrastructure that is required to keep USCIs and LPRs safe from natural and manmade border threats. Thus, it is the people that ultimately decide whether infrastructure is used for border security or for illegal profiteering; sometimes border security infrastructure is used for both (even at the same time). Hence, border security infrastructure protection must be at the forefront of planning and operational phased missions that combat and counter illicit transient recruitment.

Border security infrastructure vulnerability can be assessed, and risk can be managed through transfer pathways or supply chains and networks that use and abuse the border security infrastructure throughout their progression toward achieving their organizational goals. Research findings and predictive models of infrastructure interruption and damage from weapons of mass destruction offer tactical methodologies and strategic theories that are conversely applicable to the illicit transient enterprise's recruitment transfer pathways. Furthermore, due to this study's asymmetric threat that operates in an asymmetric environment, all ports of entry infrastructure must be accounted for in border security protection planning; for each port of entry offers the transient criminal enterprise unique and specific opportunities to capitalize financially, while imposing grave damages to people and property in the US (Watts, 2005).

Evaluating Infrastructure Protection of Border Security through Social Fragility. Transient criminals are opportunistic predators. They seek out weaknesses and then exploit the diffuseness of their prey in order to yield maximum profits. The

enhanced level of transient criminality proficiency in manipulating and exhausting US border security infrastructure for their operational gains is often underestimated and under analyzed by the IC, DHS, and National Defense entities (Cozine, 2016). Striving to achieve sustainability, the ability for border security to persist during a constantly evolving operational tempo (Lewis, 2015), is a winnable area of opportunity for border security. Additionally, sustainability of complex CIKR systems is one of the most common victims to predators. In these scenarios, the transient criminal enterprise leaches their desired resource(s) from a selected area then moves on to another choice location (Lewis, 2015). The ravished area is left devastated, bamboozled to why border security was not able to protect them. This inquiry is further complicated because of the transient criminal enterprise's historical precedents of being masterful at threat-shifters (Taquechel & Lewis, 2017). Combined with the current depletion of vital resources for US border security protection, US border security infrastructure could quickly become an increasingly friable soft target for transient criminal recruitment in the near future.

Recruitment Impact on Border Security's Infrastructure Fragility. The US southern border is a tremendously massive geographical territory to secure. Current US border security LE personnel cannot patrol and secure the ever-expanding sex trafficking routes that run from the south to the north of the US (Nichols, 2016). Similarly, human trafficking flourishes throughout the US because the US borders' infrastructure is not only vulnerable to trafficking, but it also contains policy holes that make it easy for the transient threat to exploit and conquer (Majeed, 2017). Thus, the concept of mission creep becomes important at this point in our discussion. Mission creep accounts for many of the successful border security protection planning efforts in the Operator Driven Policy

(Alessa, 2018). However, these successes come at a price. Mission creep occurs when homeland security academics and practitioners place the preverbal “cart before the horse.” They attempt to either solve the imminent problem in front of them before considering all the variables that could and should impact their protection plan. Another type of mission creep exists when border security attempts to plan for and defeat their threat at the same time. This mission flaw inadvertently causes duplicated efforts in both the planning and execution phases of border security protection operations. Both of these scenarios lead to communication divergence and cause confusion throughout the homeland security sectors. Without any effort, the transient criminal enterprise is afforded another win. In order to avoid mission creep and to properly plan for border security protection, capability gaps, as they pertain to not only CBP but all border security LE defenses against transient criminality and its recruitment, must remain humble and adaptive; while being willing to consistently reevaluate their risk-management processes (Barnett, 2019) and external networking programs.

Local LE. Patrol officers make up the majority of the tactical LE forces throughout the US. Many of these patrol officers are “rookies” and are at the beginning of their LE careers. However, even with limited time policing, a local level patrol officer’s contribution as an intelligence sensor and informational gathering node is invaluable to the fight against transient criminality recruitment. Yet, due to internal and external border security LE organizational structure, patrol officers rarely receive specialized training on topics like organized and transient related criminality. Moreover, patrol officers are often underappreciated by higher ranking officials and federal agencies. The process is fragmented, resulting in intelligence value being weighted by jurisdictional hierarchies

rather than by impact on the mission at hand (Cozine, 2016). Returning to the concept of the Operator Driven Policy, the boots on the ground, the tactical border security LEO at the lowest hierarchal level (often the municipal police officer or county deputy sheriff) has the most potential to effectively implement theoretical homeland security concepts on and around border communities and with US persons. These local LEOs also possess the greatest opportunity to apply newly created or modified tactical and operational techniques and strategies throughout the border regions of the US. The natural access and control to people, places, and things that make transient criminality move and shake are inherently and readily available to these local border security assets on a daily basis. Yet, the reality of the political pecking order and prioritization for these unparalleled community-based experts significantly lessens the impact they can have on and around the US' southern border. These patrol officers live and work on these border streets. They know the key leaders of both licit and illicit businesses. More importantly, they have a keen sense of what "normal" looks like in their area of operations. Hence, when a cultural or social shift takes place, these first line border security officers are often the first ones to know.

Local, State, and Federal Fusion Cells. Classifying information and secrecy have remained staples of national security and border security operations (Logan, 2018). The intelligence process, and more importantly, the vital importance of intelligence products in the US' foreign and domestic security sectors seem to have an uncannily relationship with the practical operational importance they place on their versions of their intelligence process. The local and state LE fusion cells have a great deal of value in homeland security's response to the illicit transient recruitment threat. Many of the IC

agencies do not realize the value of information gathering assets and initial intel processing SMEs they have working on patrol or in detective divisions. The personal interaction these tactical LEOs have with their cities, counties, and states; moreover, with their citizens, offer the IC and joint fusion centers “real” intelligence that cannot be gathered through OSINT or GEOINT. This information is domestic HUMINT. And, unless policies change, local information will not result in rendering optimal intelligence outputs at the local, state, tribal, or federal levels; thus, leaving the IC and DHS continually and reactively chasing transient criminal ‘ghosts’ across US borders.

The federal LE system has the greatest chance to positively or negatively impact the battles against threats on the US border. The decisive factor in shifting the pendulum toward winning the fights against border threats is in federal agency joint, collaboration operations (Winstead, 2021). DHS agencies such as the CBP US Coast Guard, US Secret Service, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), along with Department of Justice agencies and divisions like the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Tribal Justice and Safety, and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), as well as Department of Defense (DOD) special military units with mission statements that devote their time, funds, and resources to countering and combating transient criminality. Yet, even collective federal LE entities do not maximize border security efforts in the fight against transient criminal recruitment. Federal LE sponsorships, such as the 287(g) program (ICE, 2023) and concurrent jurisdiction allow for annexed jurisdiction to be granted to state and local border security agencies and officers. Expanding the knowledge and experience levels of the joint fusion cells and teams successfully matches the modern organizational enhancements of the transient criminal enterprise.

Along with sharing jurisdiction with state and local LE, it is important that individual federal border security agencies grasp the value of authorities and mission scope of their federal colleagues. For example, the lone DHS agencies that are members of the IC the US Coast Guard (Cozine, 2016) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Recognizing both the capabilities and limitations of each federal entity improves the fusion process. The concept of “Think Globally, Act Locally” (Lewis & Darken, 2005) addresses local problems in border security timely, in order to mitigate the concept of self-centered tunnel vision and a cascading effect (Lewis, 2015) that can unintentionally force individual mission distractions, dividing the fusion team from achieving their joint mission objectives. Optimizing the Quadrant Enabled Delphi method (Alessa, 2018) at the tactical level is needed to construct the “Common Operating Picture” of how illicit transient activities have and will continue to impact information gathering and intelligence processing of border security threats such as transient criminality recruitment. Coupling the field reports from operators that currently work the “local problems” with CBP and US DOD, specifically, military forces’ operational intelligence summaries, and critical information management summations from Central and South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean will offer senior level federal border security decision-makers a clearer and more robust representation of the problem sets transient criminality recruitment is having on border security protection.

Foreign Influences. With the increase of the transient criminal enterprise’s representation in the local and national government levels of South America, Central America, and Mexican LE and military agencies, abuse and even the murder of local citizens renders little to no investigatory or arresting actions from the host nation. Thus,

illicit transient recruits recognize that the criminal enterprise's threats and promises to inflict pain and death to the recruit and their family members are real and will be enacted upon, in absolute contrast to the falsities of the corrupt politicians and governance that lie about their desire and ability to protect said citizens. Thus, it is often through the fear and intimidation of the unknown or plausible devastating outcome of defiance that many illicit transient recruits reluctantly join the criminal organization.

SECTION 4: TRAINING TO COUNTER TRANSIENT CRIMINAL RECRUITMENT.

Capabilities. The US is a powerhouse of capable and competent LE professionals with the capacities to destroy most border security threats. Its national defense strategies, tactics, and techniques in preparing and executing counter crime missions are often the cannon documents and case studies that other countries and security forces emulate. Yet, the transient criminal enterprise continues to pose a formidable threat to the robust domestic capabilities the US possesses. To this point, nonstate actors have and continue to prosper from the vast physical and legal fissures that abundantly exist throughout the US (Andreas in Cozine, 2016). Even with all of the US' border security forces and infrastructures, it is the human factor, the unpredictable actions and decisions of people during a disaster, in this case, the impact transient criminality recruitment has on the southern border of the US, that pose the greatest uncertainty to the US' ability to achieve protection of their defensible spaces (Drabek, 2013).

The US' current border security assets are organizationally structured to succeed in countering and combating the current and even the future threats associated with transient criminality recruitment. However, a deliberately concerted and enduring

financial commitment to improving the training pipeline associated with countering transient criminality must be agreed upon between primary stakeholders from all echelons of the border security and intelligence communities if homeland security expects to keep par with the future evolutionary cycles of the transient criminal enterprise's recruitment strategies. This agreeance must further develop into a sustainable training program that teaches, trains, and holds accountable tactical, operational, and strategic entities to the same roles and responsibilities associated with top-down/bottom-up (Cozine, 2020) information and intelligence gathering, development, and sharing.

An abundance of counter transient criminality-based training programs exists in LE throughout the US. These programs offer various methods to combat an array of illicit transient related threats. However, a collective lack of focused, unified, and practical training programs and pipelines specifically dedicated to combatting the transient criminality recruitment threat offers a tremendous opportunity to fill a gap in the US' homeland security mission of enhancing its border security.

Competencies. It must be reiterated that there is no lack of SMEs in the discipline of Homeland Security or in its subsector of border security. Hence, a greater concern and issue in developing a joint training program that is driven by social science competencies, tactics, and techniques may be narrowing the scope of the specific categories within the social science academic and practical disciplines that should be cornerstones of the new program's foundation. Another potential constraint is the age-old dilemma of willingness to share information and tricks of the trade with outsiders. Even though nearly all major contributors to the border security and intelligence communities claim that they are dedicated to sharing information and partnering with outside agencies to render the

greatest mission end state results, reality has supported these words and phrases inaccurate. All agencies have agendas. Many of these agendas are “secretive” in nature and unless the right or exact question is asked and the right or exact amount of deliberate pressure is placed on the border security/intelligence partner(s), rarely will timely and usable intelligence reach decision-makers and tactical assets in time to aggressively engage, deter, or destroy the known threat. Concluding that sometimes the adversary that limits progression and mission success is indeed “we” and not “they.” Thus, I argue that competencies will become the most difficult variable to predict and shape. Hence, a devoted effort to researching motivators of SMEs within the homeland security community is required in the future. Those motivators must be then enhanced by joint decision makers in order to optimize available resources to achieve mutual, unbiased training program development goals. Ultimately, becoming process convicted rather than personality compelled will be a critical competency transition point toward organizational continuity and joint operational success.

Social Science Influence. “Influencers” are not always obviously identifiable in the tactical environments in which border security LE patrol daily. Titles of authority and power, for example, are not necessarily indicative of the “leaders” of trust and confidence within a given culture or even subsection of the greater transient criminal enterprise. Likewise, border security infrastructure, as determined by US Homeland Security, may not be a “critical” influencer according to the transient criminal enterprise’s projected business plan/model. And, while the academic community often refers to the collective and macro level importance of applying social science theories into border security LE practicality, it is rarely implemented and even more uncommonly achieved. This leaves a

gaping hole in the intelligence gathering process and countering illicit transient threats, such as recruiting operations across the US' southern border.

Subject Matter Expertise. A significant number of SMEs are accessible to the border security protection cause at the local, state, and federal levels of LE. Due to the current separation and divide of the “field” and “classroom,” most expertise never reaches their collective academic-practicality potential. This leaves distinguishable gaps in both the academic and practical sectors of homeland security capabilities. These gaps are obvious areas of organizational and operational vulnerabilities and continue to be a root cause of adversarial transient criminality targeted attacks.

Homeland security SMEs offer a valuable tool in combating the transient criminality recruitment threat. These SMEs provide a significant tactical, operational, and strategic “think tank,” exponentially enhancing the competency levels in theory and application to border security. However, an equal potential exists for the transient criminal enterprise to exploit and even capitalize on the ever-existing lack of communication between academics and practitioners. This is a serious concern and a real threat to the US' homeland security mission of border security. If optimally exploited by the transient network, recruiting and organized criminality will find vulnerabilities in border security infrastructures and the American populaces from South America to Canada. This will render projected and plausible prosperity like the transient criminal enterprise has never experienced before and US border security LE has never attempted to fight.

Capacities. Border security infrastructures that currently exist throughout the US and especially on and near the southern US border are both accessible and lavishly

vulnerable to transient criminality utility. As such, these soft targets offer a primed opportunity to begin expanding the collective inter and intra agency, border security, social science-based technical training footprint. Expansion of future capabilities throughout the border security LE and intelligence agencies is the responsible response to countering transient criminal recruitment, as this effort will render border security's most immediate and robust returns on their investments.

Training Opportunities. The US' capitalistic design, combined with American "freedoms" offer the transient criminal enterprise a consistently prime geographical breeding ground for illicit recruiting. With such a rich history of successful transient criminality on the borders of the US, the training potential for US LE and private defense enablers is seemingly endless. Technology, social behavior analysis, counter messaging campaigns, and even tactical awareness of common transient criminal profiles merit a deliberate redesign of training programs and unification between border security forces to render meaningful improvements in countering the current transient criminality recruiting threat.

Sociopsych Influences. This study is fundamentally about people. It is about understanding why LEOs decide the professional life course they do and why other people choose a life of criminality. This study is also deeply rooted in warfare, but not the tangible kind. Instead, it is the comparable correlation between transient criminality and other wars of concepts that is most intriguing and accurately descriptive of this project's true value to the discipline of not only Homeland Security, but Sociology and Criminal Justice. While the US has celebrated victories of physical, mental, and even emotional aspects of wars and battles, the US rarely, if ever, has outright won a war of concepts. For

example, the war against the expanding transient enterprise can be equated to the war against drugs, against terrorism, and even against hunger (Sommerlad-Rogers, 2021). Each of these homeland security threats have for decades and are postured to continue to slowly drain financial, personnel, and systematic LE resources. And, while the US' LE consortium is able to show quantifiable measures of effectiveness, they individually and collectively cannot claim to the governmental directorates who pay them, and more importantly, to the people they are sworn to protect that they have successfully defeated these specific types of threats.

Civil Considerations to Recruitment. There are numerous social factors that, when analyzed through a theoretical lens, can begin to explain why people act the way they do. From raising and rearing to education and employment opportunities, societal stressors shift and shape daily human interaction in developing and first world countries. The transient criminality enterprise fully comprehends the valued advantage of optimizing the social environment to achieve their organizational recruitment goals. Understanding the socio-economic effect and what truly motivates and incentivizes recruits to join the transient criminal enterprise eliminates most of the variables surrounding geographical "recruitment pools." Deeper analysis into potential recruits' social vulnerabilities offers a comparative narrative that connects deviant adolescents, disenfranchised youths, and young adult criminal offenders to the globally recognized criminal organizational totalitarian recruitment pool.

Socio-Economic Effect on Recruitment. Is there a distinct sociological difference between a poverty-stricken, deviant 15 to 17-year-old being raised on either side of the Mexican-US border? DHS, through their actionable efforts in fortifying the

US' defensible space across the country's southern border, implies that there should be. Research, however, suggests that the concepts found in the above-mentioned sociological theories propose a greater truth that recommends border security resources and operations to shift focus from defensible space (Binns in Ramsay, Cozine, & Comiskey, 2021) to improving the civil instabilities of the disenfranchised and lower socio-economic status populace who are impacted by the transient criminal enterprise's drive for territorial and economic control. These civil instabilities are the social factors that connect transient criminality recruits to one another. The desire to imprint stability in one's security, shelter, nourishment, and affection are sought after by all humans and are energizing motivators for productive advancements in all socio-economic cultures. However, these same social stability factors that strengthen an individual's social identity and link them to their social networks can also be weaponized by an adversary, such as terrorists, gangs and transnational criminal organizations. The concept of poverty traps (Mauro, 2007), the natural or created financial pitfalls that are caused by socioeconomic disparities in a culture, are prime opportunities for the transient criminal enterprise to exploit vulnerable, soft targets for recruitment.

Additional to economic differences, social statuses, such as high school dropouts remain at a staggeringly high vulnerability rate for criminal recruitment (Lopez, 2019). Recruitment targets are often products of failed governmental education opportunities and increased exposure to societal violence within the adolescent subcultures' living environment. The relationship between criminal recruitment and poverty unifies through a striking inequality that existed in recruiting the poverty-stricken youth population over all other socioeconomic subgroups in southern to the US developing countries

(Bourguignon, 2001). The US' southern border states, specifically, their southernmost counties, have many of the same citizenry traits that are attractive to the transient criminal enterprise.

Greater efforts of analytical measurements must be required by the US' Congress and should require the DHS to provide regular reports with greater detail for current border security initiatives and programs intended to facilitate interagency collaboration in combating drug trafficking, money laundering, and firearms trafficking in border communities (Shirk, 2011). I attest that this concept be further developed; for there is a sense of "social currency," socially constructed value for an item, person, or service that holds monetary equivalency to that respective culture due to the unique social impact that valued entity creates, that must be addressed by DHS to infiltrate the transient criminality recruitment problem. Merely throwing money and resources at the problem will not deliver an enduring stabilization effect. Hence, the value of matching criminal recruitment tactics like street violence and the profits of the black market cannot be overlooked or underappreciated (Persaud, 2019 and Naim, 2012). Similarly, the importance of dominance in potential recruits' social circles must be consistently abetted so that the pendulum of access and control swings ever so naturally.

Motives and Means. Much like terrorist organizations, the transient criminal network is able to offer the disenfranchised fast money, combat training, and family-like comradery (Dudley, 2012). In contrast, if a recruit is not motivated by monetary or tangible incentives, forced recruitment through fear, threats, and demonstrations of physical pain, or even death becomes a secondary motivator for the illicit enterprise's recruitment (Tereschenko, 2014 and Racine, 2011). Additionally, transnational criminal

organizations, gangs, and terrorist groups psychologically wear down their recruits by distorting the recruit's social identity through the optimization of peer-to-peer intimidation and exposure to propaganda that visually and auditorily casts them into social stereotypes (Garcia, 2006). This same recruitment strategy has been determined successful in military and LE recruitment with high school juniors and seniors, youth sports teams, social clubs, and with gangs. A lack of life experience, an unfounded sense of purpose, and limited financial means to significantly alter one's life course, results in teen to early twenty-year-old males being prime soft targets for transient criminal recruitment.

The theories surrounding rational choice theory, also referred to as, risks versus rewards, offers the most relevant and systematic approach to understanding what motivates illicit transient recruits to choose a life of criminality. The ability to succeed and prosper as an illicit transient recruit is aided by the inability to deter crime, defend infrastructure, and destroy this transient border security threat. Simply put, the potential rewards of being an employee of the transient criminal enterprise exponentially outweighs the risks of being caught, punished, and permanently impacted by US and international homeland security policies and laws.

Response to Chaos and Disaster. While chaos and disaster are commonly discussed by academics and practitioners in both emergency management and homeland security, the concepts of how chaos and disaster weaken and/or strengthen the transient criminal enterprise's recruitment process is seemingly nonexistent. US critical infrastructure (CI) (physical places that hold significant value as cultural centers of gravity) vulnerabilities in both physical structure and intangible security constructs can

easily aid illicit business expansion (Jones, 2021). Moreover, primary, secondary, and tertiary effects caused by natural and manmade disasters degrade the American people's access and ability to benefit from the many present first world amenities (Jones, 2021 and Lewis, 2015). The characteristics of interpersonal networks to disaster responses are one of the most critical factors to whether or not a society successfully recovers from the collateral damage caused by the disaster event (Kenny, 2017). Hence, the degradation to US CI caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) and recent devastating storm systems throughout the gulf and east coasts have offered the transient criminal enterprise a primed opportunity to recruit from the displaced and desperate.

Globalization. Can border security intelligence actually make a difference in combating transient criminality recruitment in an ever-changing and evolving operational environment? Research actually meets practicality when speaking about the ambition for the transient criminal enterprise's future survival and probable prosperity. Like gangs and terrorist groups, the transient criminal enterprise recognizes that recruitment is vital to their opulence (Racine, 2011). Transitioning from a state-centric to a trans-border prolific threat (Cozine, 2016), the transient criminal enterprise is optimizing globalization to expand their transnational criminal reputation and prominence in the 21st century (Shelley, 2010). This globalization phenomenon encourages the expansion of the global illicit economy and helps provide financial resources for transnational criminal organizations to recruit new members, hire expertise, and broaden their operations. Recruitment is likely to continue its success as the globalization process unintentionally blurs the lines between the legal and illegal markets (Shelley, 2010). The spiderweb of link nodes that globalization naturally creates adds a unique layer of difficulty to border

security defense plans; as LE must consider that their public and private domestic and foreign partners may also be in cahoots with the transnational criminal enterprise.

Fighting through Fragmentation. Homeland security, specifically border security in the US, suffers from being fragmented (Cozine, 2016), organizationally disjointed in both of the country's border security and the intelligence missions. There is no secret within DHS that information and intelligence sharing is a broken system. Communication simply does not run smoothly. Therefore, the uniqueness of the US' law-enforcement hierarchal structures and authorities afford a rare opportunity for the top-down bottom-up approach to border security information and intelligence sharing to flow by, with and through the internal and external tactical, operational, and strategic levels concurrently. Hence, I believe that the revamped border security intelligence process (Cozine, 2016), that has been discussed as a reason for fragmentation, can actually become a critical attribute to border security intelligence's mission of improving the fortification of the US southern border against transient criminality recruiting.

CONCLUSION.

This literature review discusses several vitally important aspects of how the transient criminal enterprise succeeds at recruiting. It talks about how border security LE organizations and their individual officials are trained, equipped, and able to defend the US borders against transient criminal threats. However, this review is not a historical account of unactionable information. Instead, this review should serve as a living glidepath that assists in explaining how and why current issues like increases to social unrest are tempting resident Americans throughout the Americas to seek comfort from entities that can offer immediate and sustainable survivability.

A key facet to this project is training and awareness of social science influences. Influencers and enablers are the interlinking connection that conjoins border security to their foe of transient criminal recruitment. The current sociological and psychological dynamics that exist on and around the southern US border offer mutual opportunities for the transient criminal enterprise and recruits to seek out one another, and moreover, to form working relationships that would not otherwise have been possible or predicted. An unprecedented recruitment surge in the near future may very well overwhelm some areas of US border infrastructure. Moreover, these degraded infrastructures will afford both criminals/deviants and formally law-abiding citizens, the opportunity to commit increased acts of criminality. For various reasons, DHS does not have the manpower to track and/or pursue this expanding threat with any hope of reaching objective effectiveness. This is largely due to conservative legislation and policy implementations that handcuff border security agencies and their LE assets from making high risk/high reward decisions when operating in the gray area of the war against transient criminality.

The probable reality of collusion by political agendas bridle the impact border security Triple C's would have on transient criminal recruitment. Human rights and US citizens' freedoms also limit border security officials from aggressively attacking this threat (Smith, 2014). Psychologically, messaging campaigns and series that are made public have a probability of increasing organized crime arrest rates, seizures of tangible commodities, and violent acts to friends and family of recruits (Smith, 2014). These messaging campaigns must go viral in today's social media reliant culture for mass change to begin. Effective information gathering tactics and intelligence analyzing and dissemination techniques consistently reside in the "gray" domain of what is best for US

border security and what is questionably unconstitutional based on the US constitution and US citizens' freedoms. During these tough ethical decision-making moments, it must be remembered that this specific border security adversary does not play by the same rules as the US DHS. And, because of this very notion, the transient criminal enterprise will remain heavily favored as the likely victor in this struggle.

Another ethical conundrum revolves around intelligence gathering. Quality intelligence is a global commodity. Governmental leaders, along with privatized vigilantes and everyone in between will beg, steal, pay, and kill for intelligence that will lead them to victory and to prosperity over their competitors, their enemies. Attempting to eliminate this "human consideration" from the equation in order to achieve intelligence sharing for the "greater good" is a wonderful dream; yet, naïve. Border security's existence requires enemies to be at our gates.

This study concludes by beginning the professional discussion of transient criminality recruitment importance. It bridges the gaps in scholarly literature and standard operating procedures (SOP) that coexist between academics and practitioners. Its design is exploratory in nature; however, its results render significantly impactful outcomes to the greater Homeland Security division, specifically the component of border security. Moreover, this study explores, evaluates, and discusses the internal effectiveness of the US border security LE's transient criminality and recruitment training pipeline(s). The ultimate goal of this project is to identify training gaps and potential missed opportunities for border security agencies to reach their optimal potential cap in being confident in countering transient criminal recruitment. Recruitment is the first step in expanding any licit or illicit enterprise. When rapid growth rates of an enterprise exceed its ability to

identify, incentivize, and ultimately hire new talent, that enterprise stalls its expansion, disbands into smaller factions, and/or completely dissolves. Any of these three outcomes is a win for Homeland Security. Slowing down transient criminality provides border security the ability to develop proactive strategies to counter the threat once it regains momentum. If transient criminality reverts to its primitive design, fracturing its current joint transnational organizational partnerships, then Homeland Security is primed to combat each element and individual faction, diverting and driving that isolated threat to a predetermined border security-controlled battlespace. Finally, while hypothetical and historically unsupported, if the transient criminal enterprise faults in their ability to recruit an appropriate number of employees compared to their expansion rates, then the concept of self-destruction and internal collapse would result in a Homeland Security victory. However, the more probable outcome for the illicit network's inability to hire new "bad guys" would result in an organizational restructuring, to include a new, precipitously adaptable and evolving recruitment campaign. This would immediately shift Homeland Security tactical forces from offense to defense; and without a training revamp now, one that starts a new generation of agents thinking sociologically about the threat, border security subsequently will be destined to revert to their reactive LE strategies once again.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY. This study has a singular research theme: To further understand US border security LE's preparedness level in countering and combating the threat of transient criminality recruitment. To explore the overall readiness posture of border security in opposing this threat, this study addresses the following four research questions.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS (RQ).

RQ 1: How does the border security LE community (practitioners and academics) define transient criminality?

RQ 2: How does the border security LE community (practitioners and academics) train to identify transient criminality recruitment?

RQ 3: Why do border security LE agencies differ in their confidence levels to employ and deploy similar capabilities, competencies, and capacities to address transient criminality recruitment?

RQ 4: How can information gathering, and intelligence production processes be improved in order to lead to higher levels of joint border security operational confidence in combating transient criminality recruitment?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. This study used a qualitative methodological approach to answer the study's four research questions. The qualitative process known as conversational interviewing (Berg & Lune, 2016) allowed me to discover the gaps in scholarly literature directly from SMEs in the occupational/cultural field of examination. The strategy of dramatization during conversational interviewing, a process of actively

listening to the participant and then engaging the interviewee in a semi-impromptu fashion (Berg & Lune, 2016), offered the greatest potential returns on investments (ROI) for this research project. Additionally, this technique eased the tension between the stressors associated with the interview process for the interviewee and in the most naturalistic way, the flow of conversation increased the rate in which rapport was built; aiding me in the acquisition of the subject's trust (Berg & Lune, 2016).

TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS.

Population. This research project drew participants from a population of academics and practitioners who are directly associated with the Homeland Security discipline, specifically border security. Due to the diversity in roles and responsibilities throughout DHS, representation from three specific Homeland Security sectors were included to build the SME interviewee group:

1. Academia (Professor, Scholarly Researcher, and Policy/Legal Writer)
2. Intelligence Professionals (Public and Private Sector SME)
3. Border Security LE (Federal, State, Local LEOs/Agents)

10 SMEs from each of the 'academic-practitioner' groups were selected based on the following inclusion criteria:

Academics:

Professor:

1. A minimum of a doctoral degree in a social science related field to homeland security, criminology, sociology, or psychology
2. A minimum of 2 years of full-time or 3 years of adjunct teaching at a collegiate level in homeland security, criminology, sociology, or psychology

Scholars:

1. A minimum of a master's degree in homeland security, criminology, sociology, or psychology

And one or more of the following:

1. A minimum of one organized crime related scholarly publication
2. A minimum of 2 years of higher educational instruction of an organized crime related topic
3. A minimum of 2 years of prior border security associated practitioner experience or direct association with researching border security practitioners

Policy Writers:

1. A minimum of 2 years supporting LE or border security as a policy writer or legal reviewer
2. A minimum of 2 years of training program or border security LE standard operating procedures and/or policy writing

Intelligence Community (IC):

Must meet criteria for one or more of the following:

1. A minimum of 2 years as an intelligence analyst on border security related threats
2. A minimum of 2 years as a tactical or operational intelligence officer/agent/operator
3. A minimum of 2 years as an operational or strategic level intelligence advisor
4. A minimum of 2 years as an operational or strategic border security planner

Border Security LE:

1. Must be a sworn LEO/agent

And must meet criteria for one or more of the following:

1. A minimum of 2 years of experience patrolling and/or investigating organized crime
2. A minimum of 2 years as a certified border security or LE instructor

Sample. The sample for this study was 20 SMEs. Interviewees were purposefully selected by the researcher. Two interviewees from each category: 1) Academia; 2) Intelligence; and 3) Border Security LE were initially selected by the researcher. Each of the researcher's selected interviewees then recommended their colleagues, who met the interviewee criterion, to evenly fill the remaining interview sample participant slots; completing the snowball or chain method of sample selection (Naderifar, Goli, & Ghaljaie, 2017). The total number of 20 SME interviewees was purposefully selected so that each facet of the academic-practitioner border security community was equally represented.

THE INTERVIEW PROCESS. Conversational interviews were semi-structured (Adams, 2015), meaning that I asked several predetermined thematic questions; however, this interviewing technique afforded me the ability to allow the interview to naturally progress; thus, resulting in a large portion of the interview process being reactive and adaptive to each interviewee's individualistic personalities. I chose to borrow from an interview structure that is intimately familiar to my SMEs, a traditional governmental hiring interview. Thus, each interview had four generic stages. These stages were: 1) Introduction; 2) Broad, open-ended experience questions; 3) Directed, confirmation demographic questions, and 4) Conclusion. This seemingly rigid interview structure did

not take away my freedom to be adaptive during the interview; in fact, this conversant structure aided me in acclimatizing my interviewees during the interview process.

Each SME answered my developed and administered 48 predetermined thematic questions. The complete list of interview questions can be found in Appendix A. The first five interview questions asked about the SME's individual academic-practitioner border security experiences as they relate to transient criminality. Questions 6-8 discussed the interviewee's border security LE experiences. Questions 9-21 talked specifically about transient criminality. Questions 22-31 focused on inquiries related to transient criminality recruitment. Questions 32-34 asked about the SME's confidence in the border security LE's ability to employ and deploy their "Triple Cs." Next, questions 35-39 conversed about the intelligence process. Questions 40-43 requested feedback from the SME on the transient criminality training they have received or have provided to the practitioner force. The interview concluded with questions 44-47 being demographically designed and then 1 final question (question 48) that asked the participant to talk about anything that they feel was left out during the interview.

Time was not a factor in this interview process and each interviewee had the freedom to answer their respective questions without me guiding or leading their responses. All interviews were conducted via the internet based visual and audio digital platform Webex. All interviewees were asked to sign an informed consent form (see Appendix B). This informed consent form included the request for permission to video and audio record the interview.

The process in which I continually evaluated measures of effectiveness, as it relates to each step of this study's interview process, was based on Robert Brinkerhoff's

Success Case Method (SCM) (Brinkerhoff, 2003). The SCM is designed to identify the most and least successful cases in a program and examine, in detail, why these successes and failures exist (Brinkerhoff, 2003). The SCM allowed for a fluid, ever adapting ability for me to improve the study's systematic processes. Additionally, the SCM assisted me in identifying chokepoints in my interview techniques and in structural issues with the specific way in which I am wording my interview questions.

Upon completion of the interview, the recordings of the interviews were used for transcription/coding. Once the dissertation process is finalized, all video and audio files of the interviews will be destroyed. Each subject was also given a pseudonym, no real names were during the interview process (either on paper or during the actual interview).

VALIDITY. The validity of this study is explained through both theoretical and empirical validity constructs. The three validity assessment tools used in this study were: 1) Face validity, 2) Predictive validity, and 3) Construct validity. Definitions, structure, and relevance of these validity techniques are derived from Babbie's social science validity research findings (2016).

Face validity references the amount of confidence experts of the study's topic or field of study have in the way in which the researcher constructed their research. In simple terms, on its "face value" do SMEs agree that the study is unbiased and renders a logical and structurally sound framework for the research project that was conducted (Babbie, 2016). Predictive validity is described as the ability to use the measure of research to make accurate predictions (Babbie, 2016). Finally, construct validity explains that the measure of the study can determine the researcher's hypothesis and thus,

increasing the level of validity for the research that was performed (Babbie, 2016). It is my goal to demonstrate to the reader that the results of this study are indeed valid and explainable by the findings of this research project's design.

RELIABILITY. This study achieves both high levels of accuracy and reliability because it renders consistently recurrent results (Babbie, 2016). Furthermore, the research utilized the reliability test referred to as the internal consistency procedure (Babbie, 2016). This methodology increases reliability in the research project because it offers each participant the same opportunity to answer the study's interview questions.

STUDY PROCEDURES. This study implemented a three-phase collection, processing, and analyzing process. Phase I focused on collecting information from border security SMEs. The Webex Meetings software was utilized to provide SMEs... Phase II processed the SMEs' interview responses. Transcripts were created by the Webex Meetings Software and audio and video recordings of each interview allowed me to ensure that each SME interview transcript was triple checked for accuracy. Phase III analyzed the individual and collective SME responses. Atlas Ti .23 coding software provided significant thematic linkages, outliers, and trends. This thematic analysis became the driving force of structure for Chapter 4 and the narrative flow for Chapter 5.

LIMITATIONS. Several limitations did exist in this study. Yet, all of them generated opportunities to further explore and advance the disciplinary topic of transient criminality recruitment. First and most impactful was my initial attempt at organizing my participants into what I thought would be appropriate professional categories. I was wrong. My goal was to add diversity to my collective subject profile. This was achieved. I anticipated that my participants might cross-pollinate between categories and even

subsections. This was an acceptable risk because I believed that meeting two or more of my subject selection criterion would simply equate to deeper and richer responses to my research questions. My thought was that the more experience, especially on different fronts of the border security sector would equate to more mission stories, a greater exposure to policies and processes, and potentially a few one-stop-shop types of participants that could discuss firsthand experiences of two or even all three categories' responses to combatting transient criminality. Yet, I did not expect that nearly all my SMEs would categorize themselves differently than my selection criteria labeled them. For example: An academic in this study can be both a professor and a scholar. Meeting the minimum requirements of both a professor and a scholar however is irrelevant to the overall takeaway that the participant has achieved the requirements to be labeled an academic in this study. To complicate things even further, my categorical criteria offered prime opportunities for cross-categorical labeling. This means that multiple participants actually met this study's criteria for being considered academics and practitioners or academics and intelligencers, as well as, intelligencers and practitioners; rendering added significant value to discussions of, "What is an academic-practitioner?" and "What value does an academic-practitioner have in the development of Homeland Security as a discipline and in the fight against the transient criminality recruitment threat?" Adversely, it also validated that my designed selection criteria did not capture the lived realities of my SMEs. It indicated that I overvalued the importance and significance of the individual categories for this exploratory study, for it was the diversity profile of border security professionals that was most valuable.

Secondly, exploration of the topic of transient criminality recruitment suffers from a miniscule amount of scholarly works, both historical and modern. Moreover, the combined scholarly and “other” source materials simply do not speak directly to this research’s problem-sets. Next, this study suffers from not having a templated dataset. Both the lack of source materials and datasets were overcome by my purposeful design of interview questions that naturally, through conversation, informed border security SMEs about the shortcomings and pitfalls of these limitations. Post interview, each SME is now equipped with the knowledge and moreover, the connective comprehension of how their specific niche in the border security LE scheme is responsible, is trained, and should be confident in identifying and combatting transient criminality. Thus, these limitations should have a reduced impact or should be completely removed as limitations for future researchers of transient criminality, especially its recruitment. Finally, due to the miniscule size of border security LE centric SMEs in both the greater US homeland security and LE sectors, and the unfocused or lack of transient crime enforcement, the field remains homogenous, limited in diversity of experiences and thought.

DELIMITATIONS. I chose to proactively delimit two predictable constraints during this study’s planning phase. The “human” and “environmental” factors posed issues to consistency, replicability, and bias researcher behavior. For example, choosing one population over another could have rendered a biased selection of my interviewees. This was avoided by my decision to choose this study’s SMEs based on local, state, federal LE agencies creating a three categorical sub-population criterion for sample selection and by selecting interviewees based on their connection and experience as a border security professional associated with the five most polarized aspects of conducting LE operations

on transient criminality recruitment. These five concentrated areas of border security LE commitments focus on drug trafficking, people trafficking, fraud and financial crimes, identification of illicit trafficking pathways, and information gathering and intelligence sharing.

Social science research examines real-world problems that impact real people. This means that unquantifiable, ever-changing, constantly evolving, intricate social experiences shaped the way in which participants in this study chose to answer their interview questions. For example, if a researcher conducted a similar study about terrorism prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, interview results most likely would render significantly different relationship results to LE training and preparedness to combat the threat of terrorism. This study had the potential of suffering from that same delimitation. If a transient criminality surge took place during the interview portion of this research project, it would have led me to the assumption that these real-world events would indeed have had a direct impact on my subject's interview responses. However, this confounded variable was controllable, as I planned to ask my participants to answer their interview questions based on their training and confidence levels prior to any type of transient criminality surge event. However, this type of previously mentioned scenario, nor any other like scenario, did not occur during this research project.

ETHICAL ASSURANCES. The risk of ethical issues and potential concerns regarding this research project have been mitigated. First, introductory qualitative and quantitative research data on the topic of transient criminality, specifically transient criminality recruitment, was entirely obtained from open source, public records, and published

scholarly works. Therefore, the overall risk of ethical and moral collusion for the foundational level of this project was “low.”

This study did require informed consent and voluntary participation waivers. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) was consulted regarding the implementation of this study’s selected, limited interviews. IRB training was completed in order to ensure the most current and highest level of integrity when examining human subjects.

Additionally, confidentiality did not become a discriminatory factor in this research process; for the same characteristics that eliminated personal identifiable information from being an influence in this study’s sample group held true when discoursing the study’s findings during post interview analysis discussions.

Consent and volunteerism from the subject group secure confidentiality. Finally, rights to service were not applicable to the research, nor the outcome of this study. The sole nature of this research was exploratory and resulted in an evaluation study of current measures of effectiveness in identifying, defining, and categorizing border security related agencies’, departments’, and institutions’ levels of confidence in their ability to transfer timely, useable knowledge to one another in order to counter the threat of transient criminality recruitment.

SUMMARY. The value of the SME’s personal experiences, scholarly authorships, and professional recommendations drove the direction of this research project and significantly enhanced the validity of this study’s findings. In conclusion, this study’s findings offer the greater border security LE community, both academics and practitioners, future opportunities to research the transient criminality recruitment threat, test sociological and psychological techniques in the tactical environment, and improve

policies and procedures that will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of communications and intelligence sharing throughout border security LE.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter discusses the common themes my SMEs provided during their interviews. The purpose of this qualitative study is to identify border security SMEs' levels of confidence in their current abilities to counter and combat transient crime, specifically transient criminal recruitment. This study examines the SMEs' exposure levels to transient/organized criminality training. Moreover, this study seeks to understand if border security professionals are confident enough in their training to employ their Triple Cs to effectively combat transient criminal recruitment.

This section presents the data collected from twenty SME interviews in a digestible and serviceable way. It is my goal to ensure Homeland Security academics and practitioners from all experience levels equally share in a rewarding learning experience. I will achieve this by creating a systematic, natural, progressive flow of information, which will become the catalyst of developing a relationship between the reader and my interviewees. My chosen approach to the knowledge transfer process is quite simple. I will highlight and then emphasize the importance of descriptive holistic findings from the SMEs' responses to my interview questions; for it is by, with, and through these thematic trend analyses that we can truly begin to understand the level in which highly "trained" and "experienced" border security professionals are physically, mentally, and emotionally prepared to take on the battle against the next generation of transient criminals.

FUNNELING OF INFORMATION. The following diagram (Figure 1) conveys the aspects examined and analyzed during the border security SMEs' interview processes.




Figure 1: Border Security SMEs' Interview Funneled Glidepath

A WALKTHROUGH OF THE ADAPTIVE INTERVIEW GUIDE. Adaptability and active listening during the interview process led to the greatest knowledge transfer ROI during this study. The key to gaining significant and relevant responses from SMEs in this study was to ask the right directed question to the right SME at exactly the optimal time. As the interview process progressed, and trending themes started to take shape, I leaned heavily on the SMEs to expose supplementary gaps which my literature review did not identify. I capitalized on the opportunity to ask for further clarification and justification for why a SME decided to answer an interview question the way they did. The flexibility to formulate impromptu questions based on the SMEs' response to a structured interview question led to invaluable enhancements through experiential "storytelling" and furthermore, many of the impressive quotations the SMEs provided were direct results of this strategically calculated interview technique.

THE DATA ROADMAP. The following flowchart (Figure 2) provides a summarized glidepath to the structure of how I present the results from my SME interviews.




Figure 2: Roadmap for Information Flow on Presenting Empirical Data

PROFESSIONAL SELF-IDENTITY. This section explores “who” SMEs believe they are and “who” society expects them to be. Further development of how stereotypical labels incorrectly describe border security professionals are addressed. Explaining the composition of each SME’s professional profile this early in the description of data aids understanding of why border security academics and practitioners answer the remainder of this study’s questions the way that they do.

The Clash of Categorical Labels. One of the most interesting results that came from this study’s research was not based on a transient criminality interview question at all. Rather, the demographics section of the interview process taught me that SMEs from the collective fields and disciplines associated with border security do not categorize themselves based on the criteria in which I had originally designed as thresholds for each macro category of subjects.

When I interviewed the five “Academics,” only one considered themselves an Academic. All five considered themselves “Academic-Practitioners.” Yet, I had to provide a working definition of an Academic-Practitioner to three before they defined themselves as an Academic-Practitioner. I described an Academic-Practitioner as an accredited professional with experience in both academia as a professor, adjunct professor, instructor, or graduate of a masters or doctoral degree in Homeland Security or related discipline from an institution of higher education and in homeland security as a private or public sector tactical, operational, and/or strategic border security asset.

Similar trends existed in the “Border Security LE” macro category. Five out of six “LE” SMEs described themselves as Academic-Practitioners; leaving only one SMEs believing they were solely a “Practitioner.” I estimated that all of these SMEs would view

themselves as solely Practitioners. In the “Intelligencer” category, all nine SMEs viewed themselves as Academic-Practitioners.

I anticipated that my SMEs would respond to my interview questions according to their occupational labels. For example, Academics would have answer threads that remained true to the theme of higher education in the social science disciplines. Whereas subjects that met the criteria for LE would have focused primarily on LE tactics and resources used to fight crime throughout their jurisdictional areas of operations. I could not have been more wrong.

The SMEs’ Organizational Identities. The SMEs in this study were comprised from array of federal, state, and local LE and border security entities. The importance of the SME’s occupational identities and backgrounds have three results that are impactful to this study. First, the majority of the SMEs served in more than one border security job at the same time. They were either local, state, or federal border security practitioners or a full-time academic with additional part-time employment as a military reservist and/or an adjunct professor or guest lecturer for academia. Whether SME’s individual rationale for dual hatting in their professional field was motivated by a desire to serve the public in a greater capacity or if it was sheerly a decision to increase financial income is far less important for ROIs for this project; however, what is important is the reality that both the practitioner and academic components become enhanced by SMEs that are willing to be multidimensional border security assets. Their diverse experiences improve tactical decision-making in the field, knowledge transfer raises competencies and confidence amongst their border security teams, and instructional curriculums in both academia and border security LE level-up. Second, most of the SMEs in this study climbed the

traditional border security hierarchy ladder and reached supervisory, leadership, and decision-maker roles toward the latter parts of their career. It is important to note that the SMEs credited much of their career successes to learning critical border security skillsets, such as how to interact with the public and how to deescalate a heated situation without using physical force, at the beginning of their careers. Many of the SMEs learned these skills while assigned to a patrol division in local LE or during entry level military missions that involved patrolling in foreign countries. The value of being “life-long learners” and “storytellers” in the Homeland Security discipline cannot be overemphasized. Connecting to that same touchpoint introduces the final takeaway for this section. Diversity of thought comes from diversity of people and their experiences. This study benefitted from having 20 SMEs that, all met the same minimum subject selection criteria for participation, each brought their unique personal and professional life stories to the interview process. Understanding where an SME came from helped me tremendously in understanding why they chose to answer my interview questions the way that they did. It also assisted me in understanding emotional responses during our discussions. These collective notables will endure as aids for future researchers, as the demographics of occupational employment and even individual SME type can be replicated or departed from during future transient criminality related studies.

PREVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS. Table 1 presents the key findings for this study. It serves as a reference tool for readers to revisit during their journey through the rest of this chapter.

<u>Interview Topic</u>	<u>Critical Components</u>	<u>Key SME Provided Takeaways</u>
Occupational Experience	Why did the SMEs choose LE (LE) and border security as a career?	<p>They thought the occupation was interesting</p> <p>They had a drive to make a difference</p> <p>They wanted to be part of a team/family</p> <p>They believe the occupation field is honorable and good</p>
	How do border security personnel feel they make a difference?	<p>Most did not believe they made a significant difference</p> <p>Most SMEs believed they made a small, positive impact on the future</p>
	How do SMEs find the right fit in border security?	<p>Most said that they learned about their chosen border security career path simply through experience</p> <p>While all SMEs said they would choose a border security LE career again, most claimed they would have chosen a different agency and/or concentration within the occupation</p>
	What is a day like as a border security LEO?	<p>Systematic</p> <p>Routine</p> <p>Tactically heavy at the beginning of their career</p> <p>Administratively heavy at the end of their career</p>

	What is the best part of being a border security LEO?	<p>Helping people</p> <p>Working with a team/family</p> <p>Every day is different</p> <p>Job Security</p>
	What is the worst part of being a border security LEO?	<p>Bureaucracy</p> <p>Officer liability</p> <p>“The good ‘ol boy system</p> <p>Being limited in what they can do to protect and serve the public</p>
Border Security LE Knowledge	How does organized and transient criminalities compare to one another?	<p>Transient crimes can be organized</p> <p>Transient crimes can also be spontaneous</p> <p>Organized crime requires structure and planning</p>
	What are concepts of fighting transient crime?	<p>SMEs agreed that countering, deterring, diverting, and combatting are concepts that aid in fighting transient crime</p> <p>Most SMEs believe that countering, deterring, and divert transient crime should all fall under a macro category of combatting crime</p>
	Who do SMEs call on for help?	<p>Academics and practitioners they trust and that have a history of SME experience</p> <p>Professionals they have worked with and that have demonstrated their worth</p>
	How to build and maintain a network?	<p>Resource border security with the latest and greatest logistics</p> <p>Find the SMEs from the border</p>

		security sector and the civilians who know what is really happening on the streets and incentivize them with what they find important and desire
	What drives decision-making?	Gut feeling and instinct Experience Training
Transient Criminality Knowledge	What is the definition of “transient criminality?”	Illegal activities that move goods, people, or services between or across geographical borders and barriers
	What is the difference between “transient” and “transnational” criminalities?	Transient crime is more generic, as it can be committed across any geographical border or barrier Transnational crime requires criminality to cross a national/country border
Transient Criminal Recruitment Knowledge	Is US border security confident they can fight transient criminality?	They are confident they have the Triple Cs to compete with the transient criminal enterprise They are less confident that their equipment, systems, and processes, specifically: information gathering and intelligence sharing, are competitive with the transient criminal enterprise They are also not confident that they have been trained specifically to combat today’s transient criminal threats
	What is the transient criminal recruit’s profile?	Recruits are far too diverse in every aspect of life Recruits are unable to be singularly profiled
	How is the transient criminal enterprise recruiting?	Incentives of money, reputation, safety, etc

		Through fear
		Through actionable examples
	What can be learned from other criminal organization's recruitment methods?	Gangs provide recruits a family-like structure Terrorists link recruits to a common ideology and cause Mafias and cartels show recruits a history of illicit enterprise success
	How is US border security being trained to combat the transient criminal recruitment threat?	They are not being trained to combat transient criminality Training that is applicable to combatting transient criminality is not presented as such by academics or border security instructors
	What type of social science theories and concepts would help prepare border security to combat the transient criminal threat?	Cultural awareness Social media trending Motives and incentives Influencers and enablers Socioeconomic statuses
Knowledge of Triple Cs to Combat Transient Criminality	What Triple Cs does border security LE possess that could combat transient criminality?	Refer to Table 9 for a complete list of border security Triple Cs
Comprehension of the Information Gathering and Intelligence Production Processes	How is information gathered from the field?	Most SMEs claimed that HUMINT was the best way to gather information from the field
	Why is a multisource approach better for gathering information and producing intelligence?	Most SMEs claimed that a multisource effort in gathering information and producing intelligence is optimal They noted that a multisource approach provides an eclectic, verifying, and linked, full

		analysis of a situation/mission
Exposure of Inter and Intra Border Security Communication Proficiency Levels	Why is it important for border security agencies to share their information and intelligence?	The more information shared, the better intelligence products are created; ultimately, leading to decision-makers having the most comprehensive, timely, and accurate intelligence to aid their decisions
	Why are agency mission statements important to this study?	They notate an agency's promise to protect against the transient criminal threat Mission statements shape individual and joint mission objectives They provide other border security agencies a clear picture of what agency is funded, resourced, and should be in charge of combatting specific aspects of transient criminality
	Why is it so difficult for agencies to exchange information and intelligence?	Bureaucracy and politics Organizational Selfishness
Understanding of Border Security Training Development, Instruction, and Effectiveness to Combat Transient Criminality	What social science disciplines aid in preparing border security practitioners to combat transient criminality?	Sociology, psychology, and criminal justice See Chart 2 for specific courses that SMEs claim have benefitted them the most in their careers
	Who should attend transient crime prevention and crime fighting training courses?	SMEs were adamant that younger, rookie, patrol officer/agents/operators should attend these training courses SMEs claimed that higher ranking officials within border security LE departments often attend these training courses instead of the agencies' tactical level employees
	What is the training value	SMEs claimed that the most

	<p>of academics in the transient criminality preparedness equation?</p>	<p>valuable attribute to a border security professional is experience</p> <p>Currently, pure academics (from academia) do not meet the LE minimum standards to be certified instructors for initial training academies, annual in-service training, or advanced LE training courses and programs</p> <p>All SMEs said that there is no place in tactical border security LE for a pure academic</p> <p>Most SMEs acknowledged that academics have a significant value in preparing border security LE professionals to reach their practitioner potential caps</p>
	<p>What are the most ineffective and effective ways to train border security practitioners?</p>	<p>Effective: Practical exercises, interactive real-world scenarios, storytelling of real cases and experiences, and teaching through a multistylistic approach that uses the “crawl, walk, run” training method</p> <p>Ineffective: PowerPoint presentations and pure lectures</p>

Table 1: Critical Components and Key Takeaways from SME Responses

OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

DISCIPLINE. Time is an experience multiplier. The SMEs have a combined 467 years of border security and LE experience that ranges from patrolling local US streets to fighting crime abroad. The SMEs also have 345 cumulative years of teaching and instructional experience within the academic and practitioner social science fields of LE, border security, criminal justice, sociology, psychology, and homeland security. The 20

SMEs reported that they personally have been a key contributor to the creation of 77 border security LE centric policies. Additionally, these 20 SMEs are responsible for 22 scholarly publications within the social science disciplines. 10 of the 22 scholarly publications are attributed to the 2 full-time faculty members.

Why Choose Border Security LE. The majority of the SMEs chose this profession because they thought it would be “interesting” and they could “make a difference.” And, while it is important to learn why most border security professionals choose the career path they do, I found it more intriguing to know why they didn’t choose a path of criminality. I also found it fascinating that while the majority of SMEs spoke about wanting to make a positive difference, the majority of the SMEs (80%) did not believe they made a significant difference in the larger scheme of homeland security or even within their concentration of border security. Only 4 SMEs (20%) were satisfied by their accomplishments and impact level on homeland security/border security criminality. All 4 SMEs were federal border security assets and held significantly high leadership positions within their border security agencies. One of the 4 SMEs summarized why most LE practitioners struggle with being able to confidently discuss their border security crime fighting careers as “impactful” and “successful” by saying, “I am only one person fighting a battle against thousands of national and international criminals. How much of an impact do you think I can really make?”

Making a Difference. The initial response from 16 out of 20 SMEs was that they did not believe they had a direct meaningful impact on fighting transient criminality. Several SMEs spoke about making a “small dent” and positively “moving the needle” toward a brighter future. Yet, another SME countered the thought of making a brighter

future by saying, “How can you truly look at yourself in the mirror and think you made a big difference [in fighting border security criminality] when the transnational criminal enterprise is making more money now than ever. It is very discouraging.”

I revisited the question of the SMEs’ confidence level in making a difference in combatting transient criminality toward the end of each interview. Interestingly enough all 20 SMEs confidently responded that they in fact did believe they have had a meaningful impact on transient criminality. Most of the SMEs that changed their minds on this inquiry said that it wasn’t until this interview they had ever really thought of either transient criminality the way that this study lays it out or about their careers having a measurable level of impact on the transient criminal enterprise.” One SME explained that “when you’re a cop, you have a couple of different approaches to career survival. One, you just focus on making sure you go home after every shift or two, you go balls to the wall every time you put on your badge and strap on your gun. The first choice is how you make it for 20-30 years in this profession; but the second one is how you make a name for yourself and feel like you made a difference when you’re all done with this crazy ass job.” This SME added that the few LEOs they remembered by name for really making a significant difference while policing indeed followed the second path they previously mentioned. However, all three of those LEOs were killed in the line of duty. Thus, leaving their previous statement even more impactful; because these LEOs did not live long enough to know they individually made a difference in their efforts to combat crime.

Why Choose to Police. The SMEs spoke about a common theme surrounding “a sense of pride” for doing something with their careers and lives that was “honorable” and

“good.” These characteristics were spoken about in one way, shape, or form by all 20 SMEs at some point during their individual interviews. It seems that the concepts of “honor” and “goodness” aided in border security professionals successfully completing a lengthy, if not full, border security career. I discussed with the SMEs what they believed “honorability” had to do with combatting transient criminality. One SME said, “Everything. It is what separates us [border security LE] from them [transient criminals].” Another SME said that “choosing to be honorable is hard, but choosing the life of a criminal is easy.” This SME went on to explain that it is difficult to “live a LEO life beyond reproach.” They said that they are and should be “held to a higher and different standard than an average US person and especially a US criminal.” It is interesting that this SME chose to specify a “US” criminal and not the generic category of ‘criminals’ when expounding on their comments. I asked the SME if they differentiated between a US criminal and a criminal from different parts of the Americas or the world. The SME said, “Yes. Different parts of the world breed different types of criminals, but only a few places in the world have the diversity of criminals that the US creates.”

Finding the Right Fit. Each SME was asked why they chose their specific border security career path. The most common answers centered around the theme of “specific opportunistic experiences.” Many of the SMEs shared their childhood “moment,” the moment when they remembered that they wanted to be “the police.” Several of the SMEs told me that they fell in love with policing because of movies and television shows. The shows that they said inspired them varied greatly in style and content. These shows also spoke to the type of border security protector and server the SME wanted to become. For

example, 2 of the local sheriff deputies said they remembered watching countless episodes of the Andy Griffith Show. They spoke about their desire to help people and to serve their communities like Andy and Barney did. A younger SME said that they were inspired by reading books and researching the Italian Mafia during their middle school years. That SME said that they knew after that report that they were going to be an investigator or detective of some type of organized crime. This SME has spent a career with the DEA. Another SME became a federal agent because they grew up watching their friends go to jail or die. They were born a “minority in a minority neighborhood/[they] were poor/lowly educated/and given little to no chance of being successful by the “haves;” [they were] just another “have not”.”

After combining the SMEs’ collective responses to two interview discussion topics, 1) why choose a career in border security and 2) why choose a career or life in transient criminality, an interesting linkage between transient criminals and border security practitioners was discovered. The SMEs believe that practitioners and criminals mentally and emotionally find their inspiration and connection to their future “career” paths early in their lives, mostly between the ages of 10-18. If the SMEs are correct, this would indicate that both the “good guys” and the “bad guys” are more likely to explore, try, and find ways to set themselves up for a realistic chance of being the type of professional they want to be before they leave middle, but definitely by high school.

According to this study’s SME responses, it is vitally important that early childhood and adolescent intervention programs not only identify children that have a sociological and psychological predisposition to join a life of criminality, but these programs and their teachers, volunteers, and mentors must actively attempt to find individualistic ways to

inspire the at risk and potentially at risk or on the fence young men and women to turn their backs on criminality temptations and gravitate toward being a productive member of society.

Each SME was asked if they could start their careers all over again, would they choose the same occupation today. All SMEs said that they would, but several stated that if given the chance, they would choose a different agency, hierarchical level, or specific concentration within border security LE. Their reasoning for not wanting to stay with their current career path can be summed up by one SME's quote "I didn't know what I didn't know, and I made the best choice I could with the knowledge, experience, and mentors I had at the time." While the first portion of this quote answers to why an SME in this study may choose a different professional glidepath, if they had all the knowledge about border security LE that they do now; it was the latter part of this quote that added a connection to transient criminal recruitment. A common phrase around LE is "to be a great cop, you have to be able to think like a criminal." The rationale behind these words is that if you want to catch a criminal, a police officer or investigator must be able to think several steps ahead and predict where the criminal will commit crime next.

The Border Security Battle Rhythm. SMEs discussed what a day looks like for them and what they liked and disliked the most about their individual jobs. The majority of the SMEs spoke about receiving some sort of "in-brief" before their shift started. This in-brief, whether verbally announced by a higher-ranking officer or read via email, offered valuable, current information and intelligence that would shape the way in which they approached their border security LE work during that given shift. After the preparatory phase was complete, the majority of SMEs said that they focused their efforts

on aligning themselves with “networks” of people in “known crime areas” to gain more information about the most current criminal activities and trends.

Most of the SMEs added that during the latter portions (some still current) of their careers, many of their days were/are taken up with administrative tasks or instruction roles that have very little to do with actively fighting crimes. The passion for crime fighting toward the end of the SMEs’ careers shifted from “protector” to “server.” One SME said that their “days of chasing bad guys [was] sadly over, but I find a new sense of pride in knowing I am shaping the next generation of good guys.”

The Best Parts of Policing. When speaking about what SMEs in border security LE like the most about their jobs, the following themes, words, and phrases were most often talked about: “every day is different;” “job security;” “helping people;” “giving back to the community;” and “working with a team/family.” The majority of SMEs described themselves as people who thrive in ever changing and adaptive environments. Mundane tasks bore them and being forced to sit or work in one place, especially without the freedom to change their surroundings or approach in completing their job, induced anxiety and stress. The SMEs spoke about crime being constant and while criminal activities rarely change, the way crimes are committed and who commits the crimes alter enough that job security is guaranteed in LE and border security career choices. This gave the SMEs a sense of relief from worrying about their job and career becoming obsolete.

Helping others and giving back to the community is another theme. Most SMEs spoke about their desire to volunteer through mentorship programs, coaching, community outreach, with at-risk youth, with the homeless, etc. A strong sense of accomplishment

came from making a difference in their home community or the community in which they serve as a border security LE practitioner. One SME added that their children look up to them for the job they do. The SME said that they have heard their kids talk to their friends about how important of a job they have and how much of a difference their parents make in everyone's life. Another SME said that their kids, who are almost old enough to be eligible to join border security LE, have no drive or desire to follow in their footsteps; however, their kids have verbally told them that they respect the job their parent does. Moreover, the SME said that they are constantly told that their kids are "respective" "disciplined," "hardworking" and "kind." These are all qualities that are learned and honed in border security LE. I followed-up with this SME and asked what their thoughts were on how many transient criminals and transient criminal recruits are described similarly to his kids? The SME chuckled and said, "Probably very few, if any."

The Worst Parts of Policing. The SMEs also shared what they like the least about their jobs/professions. The overwhelming favorite word that came up 19 out of 20 times was "bureaucracy." Border security professionals hate yellow and red tape that is politically driven. They become quickly frustrated when a policy, program, or directive slows them down or completely derails their mission because of a bureaucratic agenda. The SMEs spoke about how they started their border security LE careers, some 15, 20 and even 30 years ago, without so many politically driven checks and balances and without liability clauses that seem to only protect the LE agency or the alleged criminal.

Other things that frustrated my sample group were "officer liability;" "the good 'ol boy system;" and "being limited" in what difference they can truly make. For all of the previously mentioned frustrations, the SMEs' discussions created a theme that explained

their discontent. Border security SMEs believe that bureaucracy and policing limitations are causing young officers to enter the LE career field scared and generally fearful to fight crime. One SME, who instructs LE academy at a local community college, said, “I give these cadets, these rookies a lot of credit. They have guts. They are coming into an era of policing where a lot of the public doesn’t trust them, the criminals think they are smarter than them and are extremely violent, and even their own agency or supervisor is only looking to protect themselves.” Another SME said, “It is just so hard to keep your mind clear during a shift. With so much put on the individual police officer and so little that the department is actually responsible for, I don’t know how an inexperienced cop, no matter how smart or skillful they may be, can make the split second, life-changing decisions the LEO jobs require of them every minute of every day they are on duty.”

These SME quotes speak to the observational dilemmas current LE leaders and trainers notice that the new generation of border security LEOs will have to face throughout their careers. The SMEs in this study spoke about the reality that their careers are coming (or have come) to an end and that many of the internal and external issues modern LE must deal with will not be their responsibilities. Furthering the SME’s concerns about the future of LE, they mentioned the level of difficulty they are experiencing with trying to prepare the new generation of LEOs to combat threats such as transient criminality recruitment. One SME added to this discussion by asking a rhetorical question. The SME asked, “How in the world do you begin to prepare a cadet or rookie to protect against threats that you, as the senior leader, the mentor, the coach, the training officer have never confronted?” This SME followed up their question with this explanation, “These new cops honestly know more about these new policing problems and groups of bad guys

than I do. Hell; they teach me and the officers my age, us lifers, what type of messages to send on social media and even what video game forums to login to, to get criminal intelligence. No training in my career taught me those things and I surely would never have thought to look for criminals in those places.”

Leading to the Best Experiences. The SMEs were asked to describe their “Gold Star” day, the day in their border security careers that stands out to them as a huge success, a great win, a once-in-a-lifetime type of achievement. The majority of SMEs used themes associated with “catching a criminal,” “solving a case,” or “helping” people in need to describe their best days as a transient crime fighter. Almost all the SMEs claimed that catching a high valued target or criminal or solving a major criminal case like a trafficking or smuggling ring, a series of connected murders, or even a multi-million dollar money laundering or tax evasion case is extremely rare. One SME also added clarity to this crime solving process by saying that “the “CSI Effect” is real. People think that we can solve crimes from start to finish in an hour, definitely in a day; but the reality is that solving criminal cases of this magnitude, with this many layers, suspects, and locations takes tons of LEOs, from several agencies and it takes time, lots and lots of time.” Thus, most of the “Gold Star” day responses I received spoke to the moment in which the border security practitioner realized they either “broke” the case, knew they finally had enough evidence to have criminal charges stick, or they found the criminal and physically made the arrest.

All 20 SMEs also agreed that they would not have been able to perform the way they did on their “Gold Star” day directly out of graduating from their initial border security training. This wasn’t a shocking conclusion by any means; however, the reasons for their

unanimous response to this question were insightful. Repeating the macro theme of “lack of experience,” the SMEs explained in detail the portions of “experience” that limited their abilities to perform at a “Gold Star” level right out of their border security LE academy. The concept of being “life immature” was a prevalent answer. One SME said that “even the best police academies in the world can’t take a corn-fed farm boy from the country and immediately make them an urban legend in Harlem.”

Another common micro theme regarding experience levels dealt with exposure to crime and the processes and procedures that are required to see a criminal case from start to finish. The SMEs that spoke about this topic explained that FTOs (Field Training Officers) (experienced LEOs that have been trained and certified to teach new LEOs how to police via SOPs and departmental regulations) and the SOPs from their departments limited their exposure to certain neighborhoods and crime areas because their agency deemed those high-risk crime areas as “too rough” or “too advanced” for a new patrol officer/agent. Even when a rookie made a traffic stop or criminal arrest, the SMEs said that the field training program only allowed them to crawl through one step at a time and often that meant that they had to watch their FTO conduct several traffic stops or intervene during their initial traffic stops and arrests. One SME said, “They taught us “about” a lot of the things that make up my “Gold Star” day in academy. They shared their stories of how they [the instructors] were the greatest cop since sliced bread, but they didn’t really teach us “how” to do any real policing stuff.”

Another SME approached their question about a gold star day quite differently than most of their peers. This SME claimed that they felt purposefully trained as a LEO to avoid searching and celebrating gold star days and moments. They explained that police

academy instructors and FTOs focus on teaching cadets and rookie LEOs to stay alive and to not get fired over finding sustainable or momentary policing triumph stories. This SME continued to connect the dots between the relationships between rookie LEOs and FTOs, border security training programs, and criminals, at least at the local level. This SME said, “The bad guys know what is going on in the streets. They know who the bad [corrupt] cops are, they know who the fair cops are, and they know what cops you just don’t fuck with. They also know when a new guy comes into the neighborhood. They know that FTOs are going to be wrapped up in trying to get this new kid ready to be on his own and that is the window of opportunity they must increase their criminal reputation or criminal activities.” The SME expanded on their thought by concluding that their gold star day for the border security LE profession would simply be when initial training instructors and FTOs start to prepare cadets and rookie LEOs “to prepare and expect to win, rather than to just hope to avoid losing.”

Causing the Worst Experiences. Common themes surrounding the SMEs worst moments on the job were politics, officer liability, and lack of communication. We have exhausted the concept of officer and agency liability facts and perceptions at this point in the study; however, lack of communication or the lack of the right amount of information being communicated will become enduring thematic topics throughout the rest of this study. Politics will remain an intertwining link node to nearly all of the SMEs’ accounts of systematic and individualistic issues, concerns, and failures.

All SMEs used the word “bureaucracy” to describe why their worst moments in border security LE took place. When asked to describe the characteristics of border security LE politics and bureaucracy that led to the SMEs’ worst moments, the SMEs

used “toxic work environment” and “disconnected organizational structure” to describe the command climate of the agency or department. They used “micro managers,” “master manipulators,” and “incompetent” or “too far removed from reality” to describe their senior leaders. As for describing politics at the first line leadership levels, the SMEs said that their initial supervisors were far less bureaucratic and fortunately hadn’t found their way into the inner circles or even the outer edges of the political spheres of influencers and enablers. However, a few of the SMEs did say that they and their colleagues knew who the more senior leaders were grooming for being the next sheriff, police chief, or special agent in charge. One SME said that they “wish[ed] there was Vegas bets back then on who would bullshit their way into wearing brass. I could have made millions. It was that obvious who played politics, who kissed ass, and who was the higher-ups' favorites.”

All SMEs also agreed that if given an opportunity to confront that same “Fucked Up Beyond Repair” (FUBAR) moment, day or case, they would have done certain things differently. One SME said, “If you think you did everything right even on your best day, you probably think you are a better cop than you actually are. But, if you can look yourself in the mirror on one of your worst days and say that you did everything right and wouldn’t change a thing; well...then, you are either having a mental break in reality or you’re a real-life superhero and I have never met or seen one of those.” Additionally, while their different tactics, techniques, and learned lessons would have assisted them individually on their unique “worst moment,” the common themes of additional training, improved communication, and needed experience overwhelmingly dominated their

collective responses. Like communication, the macro theme of training will soon become prevalent and will last as a point of interest for the remainder of this study.

Conclusion. Border security, both LE and military, practitioners zealously identify professional cops, officers, agents in their work and personal lives interchangeably. The physical, mental, and emotional aspects of training and operating as a public servant with the roles and responsibilities of defending the US borders make it difficult to “turn off” protecting and serving. Each border security practitioner is shaped by a combination of their best and worst moments while defending against criminal threats. More impactfully to the progression of the Homeland Security discipline is not the individual moment the practitioner experiences, rather it is what the individual learns, shares, and actions from their experiences in that moment.

BORDER SECURITY LE KNOWLEDGE. This section describes “what” border security LE knows about policing against transient criminality and organized criminal recruitment. SMEs explained what knowledge transfer from formal and informal trainings assisted them in their LE roles and responsibilities. They also identified unhelpful trainings and then explained why the knowledge presented during those specific training sessions was less effective in preparing them to counter their border security threats.

No SMEs claimed to have ever been formally educated on consortiums of organized criminal entities. All their gang and terrorist justifications were based on life experiences and by putting together knowledge gained from different classes on individual topics and criminal groups. One SME even commented with a chuckle, “Damn, it would have actually been nice to learn about how these criminals benefit from each other, maybe

then, [LE] could have worked on strategies and programs to just keeping them away from one another. That probably would have made a big difference over the last 20 years.”

Academics and the Intelligence Process. The SMEs adamantly disagreed with allowing for unbridled integration of pure academics to the border security LE’s information gathering and intelligence creation processes. SMEs said that having no left and right boundaries and limitations for professions who have “never worked in the field” is “dangerous” and “irresponsible” in a border security operation. The SMEs explained that military and paramilitary organizations require layers of checks and balances to ensure that SOPs are followed, citizen rights are not being violated, and that uniformity exists amongst border security agencies’ most basic foundational pillars, protecting and serving the people of their jurisdictional communities. The SMEs added that they could not provide a specific example of when academia or a pure academic committed an egregious violation to the previously mentioned boundaries and limitations. However, border security LE inherently is risk adverse and spends significant amounts of time and money war-gaming and evaluating risk potentials and probabilities. This reality explains why the SMEs admitted that border security LE agencies have not provided academia with an opportunity to confirm or prove wrong their hypothesis that pure academics would negatively impact the practical side of the Homeland Security discipline. Yet, the SMEs were also confident that change, allowing pure academics into the practical instruction facet of border security LE, was not a foreseeable outcome. One SME summed it up by adding that “there is a place for the pure academic, but it is a very specific place, with very specific boundaries.” When asked what specific boundaries or safeguards would be required before academics could be added to the border security

Triple Cs, the SME hesitated to answer and then answered that academics would have to relinquish all rights to share the knowledge they learn from working with border security LE. They would have to systematically be restricted to the same rules and regulations that restrict border security investigators.

The SMEs did not trust that pure academics could improve or keep up with the level of intelligence production that is required in the practical sector of border security LE. One SME questioned, “Even if [pure academics] were as good as one of us (practitioner/intelligencer) in building intelligence, why would we hire them, let them in, when they are just average?” The SMEs discussed the need to be proactively convinced that pure academics would significantly improve the intelligence creation process and that their integration would lead to greater levels of quality intelligence production. Yet, one SME spoke about entertaining the notion of experimenting with a pure academic in a high-tempo intelligence operational environment. The SME said, “It’s hard to say what impact an academic would have in a fusion cell, because I have never worked with one. Someone should give it a shot. Maybe the nerd will actually shock us all.”

I challenged my study’s 6 SME intelligencers with similar scenario-based questions after the previous SME quote was made. During their interview sessions I asked them about a pure academic’s potential to produce better quality intelligence products than what is currently produced by practitioners in the field. Several of these trained and experienced intelligencers actually looked offended by this suggested inquiry. One SME said, “There is not a single intelligence product that a pure academic can create that my colleagues and I cannot.” Another SME stated that based on their experiences of working with academics, the pure academic would slowdown the intelligence production

process because intelligencers would have to stop the production process to explain “fieldisms.”

Additionally, 16 SMEs said that they believe that pure academic integration would lead to less intelligence sharing than what is currently being done today. Their rationales once again revolved around “trust.” Several SMEs spoke about “working in the gray area” during this portion of our discussions. They talked about how difficult it is already to explain to someone who has never been in the field and now must decide whether to go against what is written in black and white or what potentially may be considered scratching the outer edge of being immoral or unethical according to US American societal and/or organizational standards. One SME directly stated, “If I am just being honest, there is no way in hell I would trust an academic in a real-world operational environment that holds American people’s lives in their hands.” Another SME who shared this disdain for academic involvement in the intelligence creation process explained that “most academics didn’t sign up for the shit we deal with on the streets. They simply wouldn’t understand why certain things have a lot of intelligence value and other things are just a waste of time.” Not one SME spoke negatively about a pure academic’s passion, work ethic, or motive to want to help and be part of an “intelligence production team.” Yet, they all agreed that without field experience and without the ability to understand and speak the tactical LE language, pure academics would simply have too high of a learning curve and it would take too much time to train them on the job to make the organizational potential reward to mission outweigh the probable risk they pose to people’s lives.

Conclusion. While the majority of this subsection featured discussions that held a persistent negative tone that was filled with frustrated headshakes, disappointed realities, and passionate complaints of how systems, processes, and people could have and should have done better, 16 SMEs did confess that they have never received “bad” intelligence during a real-world mission or operation. One SME added context to this claim by saying, “This is a win in my book. It’s one thing to know that I’m not going to get anything from them (intelligence department); but I’m thankful every day that they didn’t send me something that could have gotten me, or my friends killed.”

Quality inter and intra level communications through information and intelligence sharing have significant value to increasing border security confidence levels in offensively and defensively preparing and executing anti-transient criminality missions. This level of crosstalk communication proficiency is needed to enhance another critical aspect of combatting transient criminality: Training.

Additional reasons SMEs provided for why field experience outweighs academic research are listed below in Figure 3.



Reason 1: Street Cred Over Boo Smarts

If you don't want wear a badge, you don't know what you're talking about. There is an automatic defense posture for LEOs when they are taught or "talked to" by someone who has not been in the "trenches" or "on the beat like the rest of us (LEOs)." Several SMEs said that these defensive walls that LEOs put up are simply too much effort and will take too much time for pure academics to breakdown in order to get their message across. The SMEs said the effort is just not worth the potential reward for the handful of LEOs that finally open their minds to a new way of thinking and the probable frustration for the pure academic.



Reason : On o Training ersus academically Renowned

While both professions require years of dedication and hard work in honing their craft, law enforcement practitioners are adamant that a valued reputation in border security can only be achieved by what you physically do for the profession in the tactical and operational field environments. These LEOs would also rather be taught by strategic leaders that may have been removed from the reality of what is currently happening on the streets for a decade or two, rather than be taught by a pure academic with a worldwide reputation of being the smartest person alive about their specific border security topic. One SME added, "You are only a legend of your own circle and law enforcement is not the academic circle." This is more about reputational respect within the subgroup of border security law enforcement than it is about being the most brilliant person in the room of border security professionals.



Reason : hate everywhere Is Failure To Communicate

Not all LEOs want to be academically educated or can retain high levels of educational learning. The SMEs said that many of their peers, subordinates and even supervisors (to include the sheriffs and police chiefs) do not have higher educations and moreover, do not find value in obtaining one. Several SMEs also said that many of their fellow LEOs (at all levels) joined law enforcement because they “hated” school or “just wanted to start working.” One SME said that when applying for an entry level law enforcement job, the hiring LEO, a Deputy Chief at a Sheriff’s Office, told him, “If you make it to the interview stage of the hiring process, don’t talk about your master’s degree, the Sheriff ain’t got one of those and no one around here gives a shit about a damn degree.” Do we really think a pure academic is going to be welcomed or sought out to teach a block of instruction at that law enforcement agency?

Figure 3: Additional Reasons for Why Pure Academics Should Not Be LE Instructors

CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION TO DISCUSSIONS. The practitioners spoke extensively about the need for continued restrictions to academics in the instructor and intelligence processes. They claimed that these restrictions were “non-negotiable.” If this demeanor is a collective border security thought pattern, it will cause difficulties for academics and practitioners to find common ground and to compromise on a joint operational way forward. One of the greatest attributes academics bring to the fight is their freedom to learn, discuss, and teach. Without border security LE permissions to research and report freely, the practitioner sector will only receive a watered-down version of intelligence production and then a separate debate should be had of why academia would choose to help and join the border security LE sector, when they are minimized, micromanaged, and distrusted before they start their partnership efforts.

The findings from this study’s research lay a sturdy foundation for the next chapter’s discussions. Four thematic topics, transient criminality, recruitment, communication, and training, provide common linkages to the organizational structure for chapter five, which is divided by RQs and future research opportunities. The beginning of chapter five reconnects the reader with significant scholarly authors and works and re-establishes the importance of this study’s theoretical approaches. This connection between the scholarly literature and the sociological theories utilized become the underpinnings to how and why this research is dynamic to the growth of the homeland security discipline.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSIONS

INTRODUCTION.

Through the dramatized, conversational interview process, border security professionals shared their real-world experiences which transcended this qualitative exploratory study to enhance its evaluation of border security LE's posturing to counter transient criminality recruitment. Through comparative analysis of the interviewees' responses, discussions were had about the successes and pitfalls associated with currently used border security tactics designed to combat transient related criminality. These tactical responses employed against the transient criminality threat required more detailed conversations about individual and collaborative operational techniques, joint communication policies and procedures, training, and the operational information gathering and intelligence processes. The outcome of these talks led to the desire and need to galvanize a systematic, academic-practitioner outlay to how homeland security is preparing to identify, deter, divert, counter, and combat the future of recruitment of the transient criminal enterprise.

DISCUSSIONS: AN INVALUABLE COMPONENT TO EXPLORATORY RESEARCH.

Where we go from here is simple. From historical literary findings to SMEs' real-world experiences, this study codifies the current confidence and preparedness levels US border security LE possess when combatting transient criminality. Linking newly acquired knowledge about this topic with my personal academic-practitioner experiences, I am eager to discuss six key aspects of the relationship between US border security and

transient criminality. Our discussions begin with talking about border security practitioners' identities and reputations. Within that discussion we will converse about the importance of the SMEs' personal and professional experiences. Next, I will explain the dilemma homeland security continues to face with a disjointed definition of "transient criminality." This subsection concludes by assessing how comparable and distinctive terminology for organized criminality aids in developing an actionable definition of transient criminality. Additionally, ways to counter and combat organized crime spark a comparative conversation about how similar tactics and techniques can help defend against and offensively combat transient criminality. This section concludes with discussions about transient criminal recruitment tactics and how border security LE trains today and how they hope to train in the future.

The crux of this research's value is the findings and analyses of border security's individual and collective confidence levels to employ and deploy their triple Cs against their expansive mobile adversary. Hence, this study's final discussions are about information gathering techniques and intelligence production systems and processes. Explaining the impact inter and intra level communications on a border security asset's confidence to compete with the consortium of transient criminals and the extensive transient criminal enterprise concludes my study's findings and opens the door to talk about future research and practitioner information gathering border security opportunities.

REENGAGING THE LITERATURE.

Gaps in the literature were explored during this study. Some literature was refuted by the SMEs, while other literary gaps remain underdeveloped or completely

unresearched. Literature gaps, confirmations, debates, and recommendations for future research are utilized as enhancers to the analyzed findings throughout this chapter.

Literature Summation. Four key themes were addressed in the literature review:

1) The level of importance surrounding a unified criminality definition; 2) The current state of border security LE training on criminal recruitment; 3) Border security LE's confidence levels in employing their Triple C's against the transient criminal enterprise; and 4) The creation of an improved joint communicative border security LE sector built to increase Homeland Security's measures of effectiveness in combatting transient criminality.

Important Authors and Literature Touchpoints to Remember. Albanese's (2009; 2014; 2015 2017, 2019) success in creating a jointly usable definition of "organized criminality" for academics and practitioners alike became my template and glidepath to establishing an actionable definition for "transient crimes." Albanese also provided the scholarly linkage between "how" and "why" people choose a life of criminality. This essential information allowed me to weave this study's SME experiences with the underpinnings of my chosen sociological theories and frameworks. Albanese's work is supported by the works of Delisi (2016), Bergman (2018; 2020), Smith (2014), Lopez (2019), Mauro (2007), Tereschenko (2014), Garcia (2006), and Racine (2011) who discuss similar recruitment incentives, tactics, and techniques that lead to securing future criminals for the expanding criminal enterprise.

Theoretically, O'Sullivan (2021), Bajc (2011; 2013), de Lint (2011), and Goldstein (2010) provide cohesiveness between the scholasticisms of SIT, SNT, and SOST, to include distinctive characteristics of Rational Choice Theory, and the SMEs'

experiential explanations to what motivates people, criminals, to commit crime. Mauro (2007), Lopez (2019), and Bourguignon (2001) connect SES to the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks to further explain how criminal recruitment for organizations is achieved. Additional support to the impact SIT and SNT can have on transient recruiting is provided by SDT (Shaw & McKay, 1972). It is through SDT that primed opportunities can be created for the transient criminal enterprise to optimize people, places, and resources in a recruit's environment.

Shirk (2011), Morley (2015), Williams (1994), and Schneider (2010) exploit the comparative concepts of business in organized crime to what can be expected in how the transient criminal enterprise will operate, while Shelley (2010) speaks about the difficulties for border security to arrest and prosecute transient criminals because of the blurred lines that exist between legal and illegal markets in the modern globalized marketspace. This marketspace is examined by Binns (2021), Cozine (2014), and Drabek (2013) who collectively explicate how borders, barriers, and defensible space both hinder and aid the criminal enterprise in their expansion efforts. These authors also lay the foundational groundwork for examination of the limitations border security faces when attempting to conduct LE operations amidst these indistinct jurisdictional lines and borders. Additionally, Lewis (2015), Watts (2005), and Bersin (2021) explain why border security infrastructure protection is difficult in and around the US borders and why it must be prioritized by Homeland Security if border security LE expects to reduce the expansion rate of the transient criminal enterprise.

Cozine (2013; 2014; 2016; 2019) and Lowenthal (2022) are this study's information gathering and intelligence production processes and procedures gurus. Their

scholarly publications deliver a reality check on how information is gathered by border security assets from the operational field and then how that information is deciphered, analyzed, and shaped into practical intelligence. Logan (2018) and Winstead (2021) join Cozine and Lowenthal in clarifying how information and intelligence is shared and how communication is controlled across Homeland Security, internally and externally.

Finally, Alessa (2018) and Majeed (2017) explain the intricacies of legislative and LE rules, regulations, and policies that hinder border security from reaching their optimal transient crime fighting potential. Alessa provides her thoughts on “Operator Driven Policy,” which gives the border security tactical officer, agent, and operator a voice in this complex conversation. Barnett (2019) supports Alessa’s “Operator Driven Policy” and adds that consistent reevaluations of tactical, operational, and strategic networking acceptability, adaptability allowance, and risk-management tolerability will lead to greater successes in all three levels of mission success.

Conclusion. Many of these discussions support a linkage between the academics in my literature review and the SMEs in this study, who have spent a career fighting crime in the operational environment. Yet, there are a few outlier discussion topics that indicate discrepancies exist between what scholars claim research supports and what practitioners argue does or does not exist during real-world border security operations.

CHAPTER LAYOUT. This chapter discusses the analyzed information gathered during the study’s research project. It incorporates the underpinnings of this study’s theoretical frameworks and reintroduces key authors, while reengaging their respective literatures. Sections in this chapter are divided by RQ. Each RQ is answered through substantiated

SME insight. Hence, subsections in this chapter provide SME knowledge transfer through collective and connective thematical takeaways.

RESEARCH QUESTION 1.

The Question. How does the border security LE community (practitioners and academics) define transient criminality?

The Short Answer. No unified definition exists and border security entities from federal, state, and local agencies all use similar words to describe what they believe is the definition of transient criminality.

Key Takeaway. Through the combination of border security SME input and scholarly literature, this study achieved success in the creation of an actionable definition of transient criminality.

The Definition of Transient Criminality. This study's research coined **“Transient Criminality”** as **“illegal activities that move goods, people, or services between or across geographical borders and barriers.”**

Discussing the Definition of Transient Criminality and its Influence on US Border Security. SMEs were asked to describe what comes to their minds when they hear the words: “transient criminality.” Nearly all of the SMEs (18) began answering this question by asking me for my personal or my study's definition of these two words. This was predictable after the literature review revealed that there is not a unified, actionable definition of “transient criminality.” In response to the SMEs' inquiries, I explained to them that the development of this section and specifically this question was due to the inconsistencies in academia and in the field of border security LE on how to coin the definition for “transient criminality;” thus, their candid responses will determine the

definition of these words for this study and hopefully aid in the solidification of an actionable definition for the entire discipline of Homeland Security in the future.

Words and phrases associated with “movement” of “illegal” “goods,” “people,” and “services” were prevalent in all SME discussions. This matched the FBI’s categorical list of criminal activities (FBI, 2023); the combined organized crime attributes discussed by Albanese (2014, 2015) that ensures the illicit market prospers, and the real-world experiences my colleagues and I witnessed on and around known transient criminal trafficking pathways throughout the Americas. There was also a key agreement between the scholars (Albanese, 2014, 2015; Allum & Gilmour, 2012; Hudson, 2010) and SME interviews that transient criminality required a “criminal act” to have been committed to make an arrest for such a criminality category such as transient crimes; however, the SMEs’ responses to what crimes should be and should not be in this category varied. Directly connected to the movement of illegal goods and people, 16 SMEs used the word “trafficking” to describe transient criminality and an additional 15 SMEs said that transient criminality requires illegal “activities” to take place between “borders” or “barriers” (Cozine, Joyal, & Ors, 2014). Hence, connecting just these few words together gives us a solid foundation for a transient definition of criminality. **Transient criminality is categorized as illegal activities that move goods, people, or services between or across geographical borders and barriers.**

Unfortunately, the definition above is where border security academics’ and practitioners’ continuity of thought stopped. Most SMEs (18) agreed that from a theoretical perspective, many referencing Albanese’s categories for organized crimes (Albanese, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2017) and Alessa’s thoughts on HUMINT crime

knowledge transfer through her “Operator Driven Policy” (Alessa, 2018), transient criminality can be organized, planned, and even committed without a criminal being caught or investigated for a formal crime. The SMEs defended their claim by focusing on the concept of “breaking” or “violating” a societal rule or committing an act that is taboo to a certain culture.

Theoretical verbiage such as “concepts,” “organization,” and “conspiring” throw a wrench into the tangibility of attempting to unify a jointly accepted and moreover an “actionable,” useable definition, as these words bring ambiguity and subjectivity to the term, leaving us right back where we started. To clarify, “organization” and “conspiring” seem to be concrete, descriptive terms; however, their references in this section of my study cause disjointedness and confusion amongst inter and intra border security entities and colleagues, as each border security professional and group prefers to add and takeaway key words to the transient criminality definition based on their individual agendas and benefits for organizational profiteering and survival.

I asked the SMEs who brought up these types of divisive words questions that derived from Albanese’s (2014, 2015, 2019) terming of organized crime like: What are the criterions that determine if a transient criminal entity is ‘organized’ or not? What would be the left and right limits to a “concept” or “plan” meeting chargeable levels for the commission of a transient criminal activity? And, how would you measure criminality levels for “conspiring” to commit a transient criminal offense? When posed with these types of questions, each SME did confidently respond and had a self-justifying reason for choosing the words that they did. However, each SME’s rationale was individualistic in nature and even with their individual examples melded together, I was not able to capture

all the “what if” scenarios that could or may occur if theory was brought into an actionable definition of transient criminality. Thus, I reverted to the core pillars of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SNT (Hodges, 2015) to assist in structuring this study’s definition. Playing academically acclaimed theoretical concepts of how and why people choose to attach themselves to certain organizational frameworks and social groups, beliefs, etc in specific geographical areas against practitioner derived theoretical interpretations of what the SMEs perceived were justified reasons for why they decided to define transient criminality with key words and phrases allowed me to reach a jointly accepted definitional design. Moreover, SOST (Bajc, 2013) became the codifying agent for the final production of this study’s definition of transient criminality, as this theory validated each key word in the definition impacted both security and societal frameworks on and around the US borders.

Because transient related crimes are committed fluidly over time and locations, unintentional collusion of transient criminality occurs. These types of criminality coincidences often lead border security LE, especially those that serve investigation-based roles, to attempt to connect criminals and criminal acts together that have no connection outside of the type of crime that was committed. This creation of a false link analysis of the transient criminal enterprise wastes time and sends border security LE down rabbit holes that lead to the same conclusion as if the practitioner just addressed each individual transient crime separately. And, while not isolated to only transient criminality, the social and criminological chaos (Hodges, 2015) that naturally occurs through illicit transfer pathways (Watts, 2005) leads to an idiosyncratic transient criminality win over border security that can be explained through the lens of SNT

(Hodges, 2015). Theoretically, the transient criminal enterprise's internal and external networks are superior to DHS' and have begun to work like a self-licking ice cream cone. By doing the organizational and networking heavy lifting up-front, the transient criminal network has ensured that constant and continuous social pressure to combat transient criminality is ever present. This pressure for border security LE to validate to the public and to themselves through measures of performance (how a tactic or technique impacted transient criminal activities) and measures of effectiveness (what level a tactic or technique effectively postured border security LE for present and enduring combative operations against transient criminality) is vitally important to DHS' reputation (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and survivability (organizational purpose) (Lewis, 2015). Moreover, nearly all of the performance pressure falls on the shoulders of DHS, while the transient criminal enterprise experiences little to no stress via costs of efforts, resources, and personnel.

I believe there is merit in the SMEs' explanation of why historical literature and real-world border security continues to find resistance in achieving an integrated definition of transient criminality. I concur with the SMEs that connecting all the link nodes of even a city or state's transient criminal activity is a time consuming and daunting task. However, I argue that continuing down the path that the SMEs shared of taking on each transient criminal case when it occurs and solely focusing on that criminal offense without attempting to see if there is a larger connection to a crime syndicate is shortsighted and is stereotypically reactive policing. Moreover, and unfortunately, this reactive response to combating transient crime seems to also be repeating historical border security pitfalls that have left LE pervious to protecting against criminal street battles with gangs over

access and control of territory and with organized criminal wars with cartels and mafias over drugs and weapons (Albanese, 2015; Allum & Gilmour, 2012; Blake, 2012; Cruz, 2010). If modern border security continues down this reactive policing path, if they choose to ignore the need for a unified LE definition for transient criminality and furthermore, a transient crime categorical repository then they risk a predictable glidepath that accomplishes little for progressing the proactive shaping operations that are required to address and limit the predictable expansion of the transient criminal enterprise over the next few decades.

Border security should become more criminologically opportunistic in learning from their past processing and systematic ineptness. Organized crime has achieved a national and globally accepted definition (Albanese, 2014, 2015). This definition has aided all US hierarchal border security LE entities and even international border security LE consortiums in successfully countering and combatting organized criminal organizations and activities (Albanese, 2014, 2015, 2019, 2020; Main, 2021; Knezovic & Klepo, 2017). At the same time, many of these organized criminal plans and conducted criminal acts meet the criteria of this study's definition for transient criminality. Thus, the lessons learned from past policing mistakes and from LE successes must now be repurposed as teaching tools for today's transient criminal crime fighters. Digging deeper into exactly how organized crime gained its border security bureaucratic support during times of mafia and cartel expansion (Mallory, 2012; Glenny, 2008) and societal shaping influence (Drabek, 2013) may provide the roadmap to successfully navigate the political barriers that seem to constantly stand in DHS' way of achieving border security synergy (Morely, 2015) in defining and then defending against the transient criminal enterprise.

Common overlaps in both descriptive crime words and social, criminal theoretical concepts assisted in crafting transient criminality's definition. **Illegal activities** highlighted by countless scholarly authors, most notable for this study, Albanese (2014, 2015), Benson & Simpson (2009), and Bersin & Lawson (2021) add to the vast quantity of the SMEs' shared stories of crime fighting and criminal escapades. Barendse (2016), Blumstein (1995), Dudley (2012), and Liddick (2004) each discuss rising, evolving **commodities** and opportunities that transient criminals have profited from for over 30 years. These crimes of illegally **trafficking** drugs, weapons, and goods **across borders** are the same types of transient crimes this study's SMEs spoke about struggling to defend against today. Cozine, et al's, explications of how transient criminal networking fluidly expands throughout the Americas (2010, 2014) combined with Majeed & Malik's (2017) and Naim (2005) examples of why globalization and international business make it easy for transient crime to grow fuse with the SME's talking points about the modern border security world's difficulty in making it hard for transient criminals to **travel between borders and transport** illegal commodities throughout the world. Finally, the SMEs' issues regarding homeland security policies, regulations, and budgetary constraints and those that make logistical, and personnel decisions were supported by authors like Main (2021), Nichols (2016), and McQuaid & Gold (2017) who discuss border security LE's challenges in defending the US' **borders and barriers** in what they describe is a "borderless" world.

Distinguishing between Transient Criminality and Transnational Criminality. It is critically important to this study that the reader has a clear understanding of the differences between transient and transnational criminality. In order to ensure this clarity

is achieved I will provide three scenarios that explain the differences between the two types of criminal activities. The first two scenarios will distinguish between transient and transnational criminality and the third will explain how both criminalities have the ability to coexist simultaneously.

Scenario 1 – Transnational Criminality: A 16-year-old Latina from a Honduran village on the mountainous border of Honduras and Guatemala is kidnapped by the Guatemalan Cartel. She is held in isolation in her village by the cartel for a few days awaiting further leadership decisions on what to do with her next. The cartel ultimately decides to sell the Latina to the transnational criminal enterprise's sex commodity market. She is trafficked across the Honduran border through Guatemala and then to Mexico. She is further forced into prostitution in Guatemala and then trafficked for sex throughout Mexico and the southern Californian border of the US. In this scenario, the initial crime of kidnapping in Honduras is neither a transient nor transnational crime, as the criminal activity is committed in an isolated village in one country. No borders are crossed during this kidnapping. Thus, this crime violates local, regional, and Honduran national crimes and should be criminologically and judicially handled by Honduran authorities. However, once the kidnapped Latina is trafficked for illicit activities across the Honduran border to Guatemala and then to Mexico and the US, multiple transnational crimes occur.

Scenario 2 – Transient Criminality: A 15-year old Mexican-American boy from southern California is recruited into a local sect of the gang known as "MS-13." In order to become a full-fledged member of the gang he must steal a car and return it to the gang's headquarters. The leader of the local gang tells the boy that he does not want

negative attention on him or his gang and that the vehicle theft needs to be committed outside of Inglewood. The boy crosses into Compton and finds a parked car in an unlit area. He breaks the window of the vehicle, hot wires the car, and drives away. A Compton patrolman sees the crime take place and pursues the recruit. The delinquent drives through not only Compton, but also Lynwood and South Gate trying to lose the police. During his attempted escape the new gang-member causes significant damages to the city and personal properties in each Los Angeles geographical territory. The pursuit ends with the gang member crashing the stolen vehicle into a barrier of police cars on highway 110 at the crossroads of Lynwood, Compton, Hawthorne, and Inglewood. In this scenario multiple crimes were committed in several different geographically bordered areas, which have been created by US governmental entities and illicit organized criminal groups. Due to the fact that the criminal moved from one place to another within the same country (in this scenario, the same state and city), the crimes he committed would be categorized as transient but not transnational.

The SMEs struggled to differentiate between the terms “transient criminality” and “transnational criminality.” They often used the two words synonymously during our discussions. When asked about the differences between “transient criminality” and “transnational criminality” the most common response I received revolved around the concept of controllable geographic territory and the criminal activity being committed. In other words, “transient criminality,” as defined by the SMEs in this study, can coexist with “transnational criminality.” Both definitions involve the commission of crime that crosses geographical borders. However, the key distinction between these two terms is defined by what nation owns one side or the other side of the border in which the

criminal activity is crossing. If two different countries share the arrival and/or departure of the criminals committing a transient crime, then the criminal act should appropriately be categorized as “transient” by nature and “transnational” by location. Conversely, if the arrival and/or departure of the criminals committing a transient crime is committed solely among two or more continental states within the United States, then the criminal act should only be categorized as “transient.” In the following, third scenario, the coexistence of transient and transnational criminality is portrayed. This scenario also provides a real-world example of why border security professionals continue to struggle with discerning between who and what legal authorities have jurisdiction and responsibilities to interact with the illicit activities.

Scenario 3 – Simultaneous Transient and Transnational Criminality: A

Mexican couple pays for illegal transport from Mexico to the US for their family. The coyote is hired through the transnational criminal enterprise; however, he is also employed by a legitimate trucking business in Texas (US), where he operates a company owned 18-wheeler for his criminal activities. The human trafficker is also a drug smuggler for the Mexican Cartel and MS-13. Believing he is going to make double the profits on this trafficking run, he plans to transport the family to the US after he drops off the money he exchanged for the Cartel’s drugs. After the handoff of the drug money, the coyote picks up the family hoping to sneak into the US. Before entering the US, the driver and the family are apprehended by Mexican border security forces. In this scenario, the drugs that were moved from Mexico to the US and then the drug money that was transported from the US back to the Mexican Cartel meets the criteria for transnational crimes; however, the attempted human trafficking of the Mexican family to

the US never crossed international border lines and because the family did not make it to the US, that criminal act would be classified as transient.

Conclusion. Albanese not only coined an actionable definition for organized criminality (Albanese, 2014, 2015), he cracked the code on how to convince LE at all hierarchal levels to agree that organized crimes must be categorized and recorded in a federal database to effectively and efficiently combat the organized crime threat (Albanese, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2019). My study's outputs were not as successful as Albanese's. However, transient criminality, just like DHS is much younger in its maturation than organized crime was when Albanese achieved his success. The adaptations of transient crimes over the last 50 years have afforded this study to have a purpose in the greater discipline of Homeland Security and the field of border security. Like organized crimes, transient crimes now have a diverse catalog of criminal activities. Centered around everchanging commodities from across the world and tightly woven in the business fabric of the US, the geographical hub for import and export prosperity, transient criminal profiteering is tempting border security's political, LE, and financial professionals and investors to evolve. This evolution must start with a unified definition like the one created in this study. This definition must then become activated in the border security LE sector, leading to the creation of a transient criminality training program, a transient crime categorization, and a central transient criminal activity recording hub. Just as Albanese's criminality terming template suggests (Albanese, 2014, 2015), even uncoordinated between the two entities, constant and consistent academic and practitioner presence and pressure must simultaneously exist and endure during the

process of creating a unified criminality definition and a jointly accepted crime categorization catalog.

RESEARCH QUESTION 2.

The Question. How does the border security LE community (practitioners and academics) train to identify transient criminality recruitment?

The Short Answer. No transient criminal recruitment training exists at the federal, state, or local levels of border security LE, nor does it exist in academia.

Key Takeaway. There is a tremendous opportunity for both academia and border security LE to individually or jointly develop a robust training platform for identifying and combatting transient criminal recruitment.

Associating Organized and Transient Criminalities. Before diving headfirst into border security training to identify transient criminal recruitment, we must acknowledge two vitally important facts that were gained from post interview analysis of the SMEs' responses. First, prior to the SMEs' interviews for this study, border security practitioners often confused "organized" and "transient" criminalities. They either used them synonymously in conversation or they avoided using "transient" all together because talking about "organized" criminality was more collectively understood. Second, post interview analysis revealed that border security SMEs actually possess more knowledge about transient criminality than they realize. This knowledge comes from a combination of schoolhouse trainings and real-world border security experiences; both of which rarely qualify or quantify border security results with the categorical term "transient criminality."

Further Exploration of the Differences between Organized and Transient

Criminality. One of the critical facets to this exploratory study is to discuss and explain the differences between key terms and phrases that are often used in lieu of “transient criminality.” When asked if there is a difference between “organized criminality” and “transient criminality,” all SMEs claimed that there is a difference. Most SMEs (18) mentioned that while transient criminality should remain separated from organized criminality because not all transient criminality is organized (Albanese, 2014, 2015, 2019), but transient criminality does have a place in the macro crime category of “organized crime.” And, while transient crime was recorded as having a relative connection to organized crime, it must be noted that organized crime and crime that is organized have two very different associations to criminality. Crime that is organized can take shape in lesser than organized criminal circles such as gangs, mafias, cartels, and enterprises (Albanese, 2015). A transient crime that can be described as a crime that is organized is a one-time trafficking of drugs across a state or international border. This crime scenario often requires organization of resources, personnel, and locations to achieve success. Similar organizational planning and execution exists between this example of crime that is organized and organized criminal activity; however, the previous example of crime that is organized lacks the hierarchal “business” structure and is momentarily opportunistic for-profit gains now over enduring returns of territory, reputation, and money. Both organized crime and crime that is organized impact border security operational planning and effectiveness. These criminal experiences stress the logistical limits of border security LE; moreover, due to the nuances of their individualistic modus operandi, border security LEOs and agents may easily confuse the

categorical correctness of these crime categories; resulting in dataset inaccuracies of transient and organized crimes.

Border Security Knows More than they Think.

Recruiting from Other Criminal Organizations. This section discusses border security known organized criminal networks and target opportunities for the transient criminal enterprise to recruit. All SMEs agreed that the transnational criminal enterprise recruits and should recruit from gangs. The SMEs shared many similar thoughts to why gangs are an advantageous partner for transient criminals; yet, no other idea trumped the fact that gangs own ““territory” (Blake, 2012). All SMEs referenced in some way that gangs measure their power and control in a culture by how much territory and assets they own. Owning was a decisive facet to this portion of our conversations because the term of owning for the purposes of understanding gang value was summated by the SMEs as having an internal and external societal knowledge and acceptance that a gang is the undisputed power player and controlling force of what happens in that specific geographical area. One SME said, “When a gang has reached the reputational level that demands the fear of the police, that is when they have the right to claim a territory as their own.” Another SME added, “What makes gangs a scary addition for the transient criminal enterprise is that local and even national gangs do not have to change anything about the way they do business to help expand transient criminal activity. And even scarier is the fact that the transient criminal enterprise has little to no interest in taking over a gang’s turf; they just want to be able to use it or pass through it so that they can make even more money, more efficiently, and more often. It truly is a match made in criminal heaven.”

Only a handful of SMEs (5) thought that the transient criminal enterprise would benefit from recruiting terrorists or working with terrorist groups. The majority of the SMEs that did not agree with the transient criminal enterprise putting time and effort in recruiting terrorists said that the terrorists' primary motives of being driven by "ideology" (Cozine, 2013) or "religion" simply does not align with the fundamental financial motive of the transient criminal enterprise (Fredholm, 2018). Several other SMEs agreed that motive of ideology versus profit was noteworthy, but these SMEs said that the transient criminal enterprise's risk versus reward equation put them at too high of a risk for them to want to recruit or work with terrorists. And, while the majority of the 5 SMEs that said they could see why transient criminals actually would recruit and work with terrorists stated that they believed the transnational criminal organizations would find value in expanding their network for profit gains by tapping into the special populaces and unique accesses terrorists have and can acquire. Many of the SMEs that disagreed remained convinced that gangs, mafias, and cartels could provide the transient criminal network this same level of expansion (without nearly the amount of negative public releases, unwanted political attention, and risk of causing transient criminal routes of passage for profits to be impeded or completely shut down by US or international border security agencies (Cozine, Joyal, & Ors, 2014; Albanese, 2015).

Problems with Profiling. The last section discussed two groups that threaten border security, gangs and terrorist groups. Yet, just because border security LE is more familiar and has been trained to identify and combat gang and terrorist activities does not mean that every gang member or terrorist works for the transnational criminal enterprise. Identifying a transient criminal is tougher than stereotyping and profiling. Hence, this

section examines the profile of a modern transient criminal recruit through the perspectives of border security SMEs and criminological scholars. An overwhelming 18 SMEs said that there is “no way” to profile a modern transient criminal recruit because they can be any age, dressed in any way, come from any nationality, be raised in any social class, have various levels of education, and have significantly different reasons for wanting to join the transient criminal enterprise (Racine, 2011). The SMEs also talked about the diversity in transient criminal recruits’ profiles being caused by the reality that the transient criminal enterprise has recently expanded so much in territory used, partnerships with legitimate and illegitimate players created, and needed hierarchical specific people, such as common street criminals and local crime managers to senior level executives and even lawyers and doctors. One SME said, “It would be foolish to think the bad guys aren’t looking for the same people that LE and even Amazon and Google are trying to recruit. Everyone wants the brightest, the strongest, the best looking, and the most talented and unfortunately for [LE] they (the transient criminal enterprise) seem to have more to offer these potential employees.”

Sociological Stereotyping. The SMEs responded more decisively when asked about stereotyping a transient criminal recruit, rather than profiling them. The collective SMEs answers to the age range of a modern transient criminal recruit was 13 to 22. One SME said that they thought transient criminal recruitment could start as young as 8 years old, while several SMEs believed recruitment could last until a target is well into their late twenties. This matched many of the scholarly literature that spoke about the age ranges for gang, cartel, and even terrorism recruitment (Cruz, 2010; Racine, 2011).

Responding to another pointed question, most SMEs said that transient criminal recruits live in “poor” neighborhoods, with “bad schools” and “dangerous” streets. And while these SME answers aren’t shocking or unique, they are directly supported by juvenile delinquency statistics and documented literature of sociological precursors that lead to youth and then adult criminality (Wright, Tibbetts & Daigle, 2008). One SME may have said it best when they stated, “Not every recruit falls into this category, but you have to just use a little bit of common sense and have a little bit of street smarts about you. If a kid has no money, goes to a school where they feel like they aren’t wanted, and then goes home from that school to a place that scares the shit out of them and they truly don’t want to go to sleep, because they don’t know if they will be abused, robbed, or killed; how the hell can you think this kid is going to make something of himself? And, there are thousands of kids out there living this type of life.”

The SMEs were confident in their answers about what types of jobs a modern transient criminal recruit would have and what level of education they have completed. The SMEs focused on four categories of job statuses: “homeless,” “unemployed,” “day-to-day cash” jobs, or “minimum wage” jobs. Moreover, the SMEs connected these job statuses to the expectation that transient criminal recruits did not graduate high school or obtain their GED. They talked about how the sociological norms of their raising and rearing combined with the historical accounts of their parents’ and grandparents’ societal statuses and educational levels seemingly started the foundation for a perfect storm that gave the recruit a push toward transient criminality (Mauro & Carmeci, 2007).

More detailed than any other subsection in this study was the SMEs passionate responses to how important primary education (K-12th grade) is to keeping young people

from choosing a life of criminality. The SMEs told me that it wasn't the structured educational value that was important to shaping a kid's lifepath. In other words, understanding Shakespeare and quantum physics is far less important to the maturation of an at-risk criminal recruitment target than learning right from wrong and being shown how success can be found in so many walks of life. One SME shared, "I was that vulnerable kid. I was recruited. If it wasn't for my football coach, I probably would be a statistic in this study for all the wrong reasons." Another SME had a similar experience. They said, "It was a teacher that saved me. She had no reason or obligation to, but she did, and I am thankful every day that she saw something in me that I didn't, that my parents didn't, that no one else did. It only takes one of those amazing types of people to change the path of a kid going the wrong direction in life." The stories shared by the SMEs when it came to the value of school thematically swirled around one main topic: Opportunity. One SME said, "Many of these at-risk kids have opportunities to do great things, but they just need someone they trust to tell them, to show them that the opportunity exists and that they can achieve it." This SME used a very impactful word in their quote, "trust." And, as I spoke with the SMEs throughout their interviews, the concept of "trust" kept coming up. Another SME stated, "Trust is a two-way street. It has to be earned and sometimes, our (border security LE) history, reputation, and the perceptive negative impacts we (border security LE) have had on their (the recruit) and their family hurt us in reaching that level of mutual trust." One of the SMEs, who had a lengthy stint of their border security LE career working with youth populations, added, "We (border security LE) are bred to be in charge, to take charge, to enforce the law, arrest the bad guys. We know that but so do those kids, so do the bad guys. This doesn't

bode well for us (border security LE). We (border security LE) know that we must connect at a personal level with these kids, but everything we are taught during training sets us up to be unapproachable. Why would these kids trust us?”

Understanding family dynamics and the role a potential criminal recruit plays in their immediate and extended “families” can explain a great deal about their criminal vulnerability recruitment level. The SMEs in this study most often used the words “broken,” “disenfranchised,” and “criminal” to describe the family structure of a modern transient criminal recruit. Their rationale for using such words was derived from both real-world border security experiences and book smarts learned from higher education classes (Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Bourguignon, 2001).

The Homeless. A couple of SMEs said they could provide a profile for a modern transient recruit. These SMEs claimed that their profiles surround the traits and characteristics of the “homeless” and “needy.” Both SMEs worked the majority of their careers in local LE and held positions of patrol and patrol supervisors. One of the two SMEs said, “The homeless are the most vulnerable targets for any type of criminal recruitment. They (the homeless) lack a social identity. They (the homeless) don’t pose a threat to other criminals, the police don’t want to deal with them and most of the time ignore them, and everyone else thinks of them as the least important part of their community.” The other SME said, “If I were a criminal recruiter, I would absolutely recruit the have nots of society.” This SME explained that “it is so hard to find a cop that will arrest a homeless person. The homeless just pose too many threats to a cop to make it worth them (the cop) arresting them (the homeless). They (the homeless) bring sanitary issues, drug issues, behavioral health issues, identity issues, and there is no way to know

what a homeless person has or doesn't have. And, maybe most importantly to recognize is that they (the homeless) always seem to get released from jail and find their way right back to the streets where they remain homeless again." If even half of what this SME claims in their statement is accurate and with the support of Drabek (2003), I believe they are; then the homeless truly do provide a prime recruiting option for the transient criminal enterprise. One of the SMEs added a final thought on this topic by saying, "If a recruiter gives a homeless person \$100 to push drugs or to be a lookout for larger criminal activities and that homeless person gets arrested by the police, the recruiter doesn't really have anything to worry about. A cop isn't going to believe a homeless guy if he (the homeless) tells him (the cop) that he was paid by a transient criminal. To be honest, the homeless guy is probably just going to take the \$100 and not ask any question about who gave the money to them or why they want them to do whatever they asked them to do. This means that the recruiter can only win and has little to no reason to worry about getting ID'd or arrested."

Purposeful Profiling. Only 6 SMEs said that they had formally discussed transient criminal profiles in a training setting. They did not learn about the profiles from border security LE. It was higher educational institutions and the academic fields of sociology and criminal justice that taught them about transient criminal profiles. Several SMEs said that LE is fearful to talk about, especially publicly or in any written form the word "profiling." Profiling has become societally taboo because it is perceived as a corrupt, biased, and a rights violating tactic of assuming judgment of criminality based on how a person looks, where they live, who they hang out with, how much money they make, etc.

Children and Transient Crime. “Have-nots” are viewed by the transient criminal enterprise as “soft targets” because they are a vulnerable, disenfranchised social group (Brown, 2007). The SMEs openly discussed this topic and then provided their personal profiles for a child transient criminal recruit. The SMEs based their descriptions on collective accounts of training and border security experiences. Over half of the SMEs (14) said that they knew about children being targets of criminal recruitment. Eight of those SMEs said they learned this through real world experiences, while a little over a handful of SMEs (6) said that they learned this from undergraduate and graduate classes in sociology and criminal justice. Additionally, only a few SMEs (4) knew about children being used to recruit others to the transient criminal enterprise. One SME that had not been trained in children’s roles in the transient recruitment process said, “It just makes sense. My kids are influenced by their friends more than they are by me. Their friends like the same things, have all the cool, new things that my kids want. If that is happening with my kids, I would be a fool to think that gangs and transient criminal recruiters aren’t leveraging their kids to convince other kids to join that lifestyle.”

Connecting Girls and Women to Transient Criminal Recruitment. Driven by this study’s literature review of modern-day criminal recruitment trends and techniques (Lopez & Pairolero, 2019; Racine, 2011) I asked my SMEs about girls and women being used for transient criminal recruitment. Just over half (11) of the SMEs said they knew girls and women were being targets for recruitment for transient criminal activity. All eleven believed or have witnessed females being used for human and sex trafficking (Nichols, 2016). One SME said, “Now thinking about your question again, I don’t believe girls are being recruited to join the transient criminal network like boys.

However, I still believe girls are being recruited by transient criminals. I just think they are being asked, told, and forced to do things that consumers pay more money, more frequently for girls to do than guys, like sex.” This SME also added later in our discussion that “times are changing though; I predict that in 10 years boys will increase as a sex commodity for consumers of transient crimes and if this does happen, then the transient criminal enterprise will be prepared to recruit more boys for their profit gains.” It was very interesting to learn that only 3 SMEs said that they knew about girls and women being used to recruit for the transient criminal enterprise. With so much historical literature about the various use of prostitutes for additional criminal activities, women’s roles in the illegal drug industry, and the seduction methods used by organized criminals such as the Italian and Russian mafias and the Central and South American cartels (Majeed & Malik, 2017; Manwaring, 2007; Naim, 2005), I am very surprised that SMEs in this study did not naturally and immediately make a connection between other organized and street crimes and transient crimes.

Discussing Border Security LE Training.

Our discussion now moves from what border security LE knew about transient criminality to how they gained their knowledge. Similar to my personal academic-practitioner experiences, I expected that the SMEs in this study would have been taught and would have learned more about how social science theories, tactics, and techniques could be used to thwart the transient criminal threat from a higher educational institution rather than from a border security agency. The SMEs’ responses to my questions about SESs and other sociological and psychological concepts pertaining to juvenile delinquency, family violence, and motives to conduct crime confirmed that their

knowledge banks were filled from academia and not border security LE. The most common response to a class, course, or topic from academia that provided enduring value to our SMEs' practitioner careers was the sociological and psychological methods to understanding why people do things and think about things the way that they do (Garcia, 2006; Goldstein, 2010; Le, 2014).

Words have meaning and there is a difference between how words take form. For example, words like "Modus Operandi" described by a lawyer or a LE instructor during a presentation is different than answering a multiple-choice question on a test about "Modus Operandi." Yet, both aforementioned examples do not hold the "learned knowledge" weight of learning from a professor on what "Modus Operandi" means, how it is understood by society, and how it can be used in the field by practitioners. Based on the literature and the professionals in the border security field, a valid question of, "How can an academic teach border security practitioners how modus operandi is used in the field" exists (Shelley & Picarelli, 2010)? One SME added, "Training on how crime looks, smells, sounds, tastes, and feels cannot be achieved in a classroom." Based on this logic, trying to explain the reality that the five senses play tremendously valuable roles in a border security practitioner's ability to understand the operational environment and to soak in the gravity of the criminal elements of opportunity and vulnerability must also be unachievable in an institutional setting. If we expect border security practitioners to plan and execute shaping operations that divert, deter, counter, and combat transient criminality, especially recruiting, then having HUMINT through immersive integration of border security assets must become a no-fail submission in the fight against the transient criminal enterprise. All these approaches to border security are true; however, the onus of

responsibility in the knowledge transfer and applicability of such words like “Modus Operandi” must require a two-way learning street. This two-way street has multiple facets of roles and duties. First, the gatekeeper must unlock the training forum door for academics to teach border security LE. Once the academic gains access to their target population, that professor must teach the concepts, theories, and practices of their given subject matter. Next the border security LE student is responsible to grasp and retain the information they are provided by academia. Finally, the border security practitioner must optimize their position of authority to tryout and practice what they have learned. It is also the responsibility of the border security asset to deliver an after-action review (AAR) to their professor. This AAR should provide a list of what aspects of training worked in the operational environment. It should also point out what did not work. The final responsibility reverts to academia. Academia must take the AAR information and research, revamp the training curriculum to make their future presentations more accurate and more useably impactful. If this process is strictly adhered to by the collective border security discipline, the evolution of the definition for transient criminality, the addition of future transient crimes to the transient crime catalog, and time-sensitive applicable training improvements to transient crime fighting tactics and techniques will not only subsist, they will endure and become a recurrent commonality in the fabric of Homeland Security.

The ever-enduring attribute of “trust” must be present during border security learning strategies. The SMEs claim that trust, unfortunately, only exists during informal training opportunities. And while these trusted informal trainings are invaluable to practitioners, rarely do the “priceless” moments learned during these sessions reach the masses of

border security professionals. Leveling-up by having a non-judgement zone comprised of coaches, mentors, friends, and peers that allowed them to ask informal, off the record questions about real concerns, issues, and even mistakes they have made validates trust in the border security practitioner maturation process. The best learning environment must include a trusted and evident safe haven that ensures that no matter what is discussed in that learning environment, nothing punitive or damaging to their careers will become a byproduct of being honest. This level of a trusted environment does not happen overnight. It takes time to build rapport and trust and in border security LE time to make meaningful relationships often is not available or at least not on an agency's top priorities list (Cozine, 2010; Cozine, Joyal & Ors, 2014; Busch & Givens, 2014).

The military's training has structured glidepaths and gateway benchmarks that align junior employees with successful career matched senior leaders. The military's career progression plan requires, even forces, service members to attend continued Professional Military Education (PME) courses. The emphasis on PME supersedes the organization's priority of their employees completing their daily assigned duties. This training model is designed to align junior service members with opportunities to demonstrate their potential, by moving them to their supervisor's position while their supervisor goes to school to prepare for their next higher rank and position. The training glidepath results in a natural gain of experience through increased roles and responsibilities and it improves retention rates by demonstrating organizational commitment to the continuous development of the individual and collective employee's personal and professional worth and growth. Local, state, and federal border security LE SMEs did not share this career progression experience.

Several LEOs expressed their frustration in the pipelines to promotion and advancements in education. The collective summation of their responses indicated that LE is a “dog-eat-dog world,” “a good ‘ol boy system,” and “a who kisses the most ass organization.” For those SMEs that shared these comments, I comically asked about how they were able to reach the high level of position, rank, and authority they did. After a few awkward laughs, the SMEs said that they “had to play the game,” that they “screwed some people, even some friends over,” and “I made sure this dog ate and ate very well.”

Formalized Training Falls Short. It is noteworthy to mention that only 2 SMEs claimed, “formalized training” such as “academ[ies], “specialty schools and classes,” and “undergraduate and graduate college courses” taught them the necessary tactics and techniques to combat transient criminality. This is an interesting statement for a few reasons. First, when the SMEs’ data/responses were compiled, all 20 SMEs, at some point in their interview, spoke about “formalized training” being a key factor in their maturation process as a successful border security LE professional. The logical assumption is that if an SME met my minimum SME selection criteria for this study, they were able to reach their position status, rank, and time in service because they were not only trained to be border security LE, but they performed extremely well during their time in the border security field. However, when asked a direct question about how they learned to combat crime, most SMEs responded with every other reason than formalized training. This is overall concerning to the retention of the employees of the border security sector; for not all, not even a high percentage, of border security professionals will ever reach the ranks and positions of this study’s SMEs. Border security LE practitioners are trained to perform their duties by, with, and through doctrinal guidance,

internal SOPs, and job specific service training. Yet, through the voices of some of the most senior leaders, those that have started at the entry levels of the occupation, claim that all of that regulated, formalized, in black and white training they received remains merely a secondary option for what a border security practitioner leans on to manage their careers and to conduct border security operations in the field.

It Starts with Building a Network. A little over half of the SMEs (12) said that they learned the basic skills of how to begin building their networks during field training, by their FTO and not from any published training manual or formal class. This reality is simply not a good training model to go by. For one, it is not systematic, or process driven. Secondly, it does not have a standard or even a common guide to success. Of course, each border security location is different and so is each practitioner; however, the basic foundational pillars to networking have step-by-step instructions. Many of the formalized classes that teach these steps are dedicated to investigatory and analyst positions, which take a practitioner out of the tactical, patrolling job and are far too late in their careers to witness those skills reach their optimal potential levels.

Conclusion. Teaching a new border security LE practitioner not only the value of a backdoor network, but how to actually start to build one is something that needs to be a formalized part of initial training and then retrained and enhanced during initial field training. Adding refresher training or even advanced training to all border security LE as a required block of instruction during annual in-service training would also be a good idea; as without practice, networking for most people becomes a perishable skill.

Is Border Security LE Training like Champions.

Comparing Training of Professionals in LE to Professionals in Athletics. The majority of border security LE training was inter-occupationally conducted. This is not optimal, as inter-occupational curriculum design and instruction leads to one-dimensional thinking, stove piping (Cozine, 2021), about how and why border security practitioners do what they do. Much like an athlete who is trained by a conditioning coach during the offseason, a position coach for technical skills, a coordinator for specific player group strategies, and a head coach for motivation and direction of how each player fits into the greater scheme of becoming the best team possible, having a multidimensional training staff, from an array of internal and external to border security professionals will expose a practitioner to concepts and skills that they would not have learned from being taught by the current border security training pipeline.

SMEs claimed that their border security LE agency directed how all their border security training would be instructed. This means that the agency or the geographical state, not the officer, agent, or operator had the opportunity to design the training curriculum, create the lesson plan, or choose the instruction method for their delivery to the force. This micromanagement model of instruction does not maximize the concept of expansion of thought. Diversity in thought through shared experiences and opinions from others develops more well-rounded agents and officers. Returning to our sports comparisons, football and basketball coaches and players for decades have demonstrated that learning from their mistakes in the first half of the game, making adjustments based on their experiences from that first half of the game, and then executing a new plan that their coaches or fellow peers came up with leads to a better chance at success when

closing out the game. Now, success can obviously be subjective. Some may say that winning the second half as a team is a form of success. Others may claim that success is only found if the team comes back in the second half and wins the game. Even an individual's personal improvements from one half to the next may be viewed as a win. However, a much more macroscopic view of success parallels sports and border security in that both occupations have the ability to start their games and missions with a proactive plan, experience those plans fail, and moreover, both groups of professionals due to their "games" design, still have the opportunity to reactively challenge their opponent with adaptive countermeasures.

One last sports and border security comparison leads us to discuss an unfortunate reality difference between these two professional journeys to stardom. Most professional athletes optimize the process of revisiting their performance on the field by watching film and conducting visual study analyses of what worked for them, and many times their greatest growth moments come from studying what didn't work for them. A border security practitioner would also benefit greatly if they were able to watch, review, and analyze their last canvass interview, vehicle stop, arrest, or raid. However, unlike a professional athlete, who most of the time is given a second chance after a strikeout in baseball or after they missed the game winning field goal in football, a professional in border security LE usually finds themselves in trouble for even the most minor of mistakes, especially when their mistakes negatively impacted or were perceived to negatively affect US persons and illegal immigrants within the borders of the US. I discussed this concept with several of the SMEs and learned that there is a real sense of fear that exists in a border security professional's mind during the rapid decision-making

processes they are forced to go through while working in the field. I close out this debate by returning one final time to our professional sports associations. The educational strategy of learning by, with, and through “reflection” is an extremely valuable skill to hone. Some of the most iconic athletes of all-time, like Michael Jordan (Lewis, 2022), Michael Vick (2012), and Mike Tyson (Wilson, 2014) speak about reaching the level of being considered one of the greatest of all-time in their profession because they had the ability to reflect on their mistakes, their dark moments in life, and moreover, while difficult because of the profession they were in (sports) and because of the limelight that constantly hovered over them, they were still given second chances; second chances for conduct and behavior on and off the field that would have absolutely ended most, if not all, border security professionals in their respective occupational fields. The professional athlete versus border security practitioner comparisons summates to one stark difference in acceptance. If society would give border security practitioners, specifically LE a fair chance at being human, like society does for their million-dollar idols who cheat on their spouses, have publicly known gambling problems, and commit criminal offenses, then Gen Z may become more apt to serving the US as a good guy, rather than a bad one. Michael Vick fought dogs and went to jail (Vick, 2012). Just a few years later he was back in the National Football League as a starting quarterback and kids are wearing his jersey in the streets like he was the greatest role model in the world. Border security LE turns kids away every day that have dreamt their whole life of being a cop because they had a few speeding tickets when they were 16 or they got into a fight in high school defending their best friend who was being bullied. Even if a few of them make it to the “big leagues” and get to put on a uniform and a badge, do we really think society would

give them a second chance if they killed a dog, even in self-defense or what if they cheated on their spouse or were a deadbeat parent? I posed this question to several of the SMEs in this study. One of the SMEs responded with, “Hell no, society wouldn’t even have to condemn us, the Sheriff would just fire us because the bad PR (public releases of information) would hurt his reelection chances or the police chief would find a way to ‘prove’ that a bullshit policy that only protects the department was violated and then we (border security LE) would be fired.” This SME was obviously passionate about their comparative analysis of athletes and border security practitioners. Many of the SMEs in this study shared this level of passion for one aspect or another of border security LE during their interviews. Furthermore, it is these very passionately and emotionally charged convictions that led me to dig deeper into the SMEs’ psychosocial educational experiences.

Cognitive Categories of Learning. I determined that the SMEs in this study could be divided into three types of academic-practitioners, meaning that when the practitioner is focused on learning, formally or informally, they approach their cognitive development in certain similar macrolevel ways. These three categories are: 1) The Inquisitor; 2) The Doubter; and 3) The Action-Hero.

The Inquisitor will never stop asking questions and seeks to understand how the interworking of the systems, processes, and theories function. One SME from the Inquisitor category said, “I know our (border security LE) profession is brutal on instructors. We put them through the ringer each and every time they try to teach us anything. It’s kind of their fault though. I mean, from day one of academy they taught us not trust anyone, to interview and interrogate everyone, and to investigate until you can

prove what someone said or did is a fact. So, yeah, we are going to be hypercritical and question everything they tell us.”

The Doubter is devoted to proving that a theory, concept, tactic, or technique is either wrong, has a flaw or loophole, or is deficient and must be fixed or completed before they will accept the information as fact. An SME from the Doubter category added, “Unless you (the instructor) can prove to me that what you are saying can lead to an arrest, you are just wasting your breath. The good part for them (the instructor) is I have a very short attention span and that means they won’t have to waste too much of their breath before I just shut them off.”

Finally, the Action-Hero simply must try out whatever they have been trained in a real-time, real-world scenario before they believe and trust in what they were taught. An Action-Hero SME said, “I’ve done some stupid shit in my LE career, but I felt good about trying that shit because I was simply testing out all the ways my training instructors said would make me a great cop one day. Some of that ‘shit’ actually worked out really well for me... the other times, well, let’s just say they left me with some great stories to tell my grandkids.”

Learning from the Minds of the Scholars.

Attributes of the Academic. Moving from LE to academia, the SMEs specifically mentioned that the “mind” of the pure academic is not tainted by what happens through experience in the field of border security. This means that when a pure academic conducts research and interprets their findings, they are far more likely (according to the SMEs in this study) to have limited or no biases. Pure academics create purity in research

and those research results can provide practitioners with some of the most valuable, current information about border security threats on a local, national, or even global level.

Additionally, the SMEs claimed that in their collective experiences, the highly educated, from the academia sector and practitioners at the mid and higher leadership levels tend to be more “empathic,” “cultured,” “mature” and “adaptive” than a border security professional that meets the minimum educational standards for entry and then promotion through their border security agency. These are invaluable characteristics of a border security practitioner that seeks to build rapport in the community in which they serve and to gain the trust of the people they are protecting against the transient criminal enterprise. One SME said, “There are far better things learned about life in college than anything they try to teach you out of a book. The camaraderie with your classmates and cohorts and struggles that come along with trying to achieve a long-term educational goal like an undergraduate or graduate degree teaches you so much about perseverance and patience. These are all great attributes to learn if you are going to be a leader in LE.”

Needed Intent. One overarching theme for pure academic integration (with limitations) was making sure that the entity in charge of the operation provides crystal clear intent to the pure academic. This intent must explain the joint operational objectives, the way the objectives will be achieved, and what the left and right borders are for the operation. Most practitioners do not need this type of novice handholding preparation before a border security mission, but that is because they have been trained by field experienced professionals and have experienced first-hand the fallout of stepping too far into the unknown or the gray area without having the Triple Cs to protect them.

Difference between Research and Reality. There is a difference in border security professionals that have dedicated their careers to research and studying, rather than conducting border security operations in the field. To explain these differences, I will start by discussing what a “pure academic” is not. A pure academic is not a robotic, systematically developed and trained adherer of rules, regulations, and policies. Scholars are afforded the ability of academic freedom. These freedoms allow for the academic to research controversial social topics, politically fueled debates, and even subjects that may find fault in the decision-making processes of US leaders. Moreover, the academic has the freedom to publish their findings and to openly discuss, instruct, and profess the meanings behind each critical facet of their studies. These freedoms are not authorized for most of the practitioners in US homeland security and border security LE. No matter what agency or level of hierarchy a practitioner in border security LE comes from, the same type of initial standardized foundational training as the next border security practitioner takes place. First, they all have chosen a similar career that takes them into the field. They are instructed and trained by field tested senior practitioners on how to act and what to say during their work shifts in the field. Their jargon and even their report writing style or coding of crimes are similar enough that one practitioner can pick up where another practitioner left off and very little loss of speed and momentum will exist. Most importantly for this section of my study, the practitioner is occupationally bound to silence and even secrecy in some cases; depriving them of some of the most basic US citizen freedoms such as the freedom of speech and the ability to protest.

Returning to the pure academic, freedom to not only research and profess their findings, but to safely discuss and debate with other scholars the hot topics of their

discipline allows for the academic to separate themselves as a SME more easily than the career practitioner. And, while academics possess much of the newfangled approaches, concepts, and theories of their discipline, the academic rigor it takes to become a scholarly SME naturally seems to develop a likely knowledge transfer issue with practitioners. These two occupational groups simply do not communicate well. Thus, the inherent risk of practitioners not being able to comprehend what the academic is presenting to them and moreover, the potential risk that even if the practitioner understands the presented content, will they know what or how to do anything practical with the information they just gained becomes a real homeland security dilemma.

Communication Conflict Created by One-sided Distrust. Another concern the border security LE community has with pure academics is that practitioners are the ones expected to use the information and intelligence the pure academics create. However, all these shiny, loud bells and whistles do not add value to what the practitioners already bring to the table as information gatherers and intelligence producers (Cozine, 2021). This is not because the academic is incapable of providing intelligence professionals and field agents/officers with quality information and intelligence. It is because, as many of the SMEs claimed, the best intelligence created and briefed by a pure academic will not reach its optimal potential because it will not be trusted by most of the practitioners on the mission, especially the practitioners at the tactical level.

CONCLUSION. The final subtopic of discussion for this section centered around how border security learns versus the way they want to learn. It is of note to mention early in this conversation that the SMEs collectively hope more opportunities will become available for teenagers that are thinking of going into the border security occupation,

students in a social science undergraduate program, and most importantly for this study's purposes, for pure academics that seek to improve their occupational credibility and status as future instructors for border security and homeland security practitioners. We will talk about this recommendation more in the final section of this dissertation.

The SMEs were adamant that border security practitioners and field agencies should provide more support to pure academics when it comes to improving their occupational reputation. The literature and data from this study agree that border security LE agencies expect colleges and universities to bend over backward to accommodate border security practitioners' admission into their schools and programs. Yet, what does the border security practitioner sector provide to the academic sector? When will Homeland Security return the favor and promote the pure academic to be a learning and teaching partner within the field? As of now, the answer is never. We know that academia makes us better field agents, so why wouldn't field experience make a professor a better academic? Once again, the logical solution is present; just provide opportunities for pure academics to receive embedded field experience. However, logic seems to continually be trumped by fear of liability throughout the border security practitioner sector.

Switching focus from who trains to how border security LE trains is important. The training strategies associated with the technique of "crawl, walk, run" was most requested by practitioners. One dual military and LE SME said, "Unlike any other type of training I've experienced, when I finish a crawl, walk, run train-up, I'm confident I can do what I learned anywhere in the world. Also, the great part about completing a crawl, walk, run train-up with your team, is that you know the person to the left and to the right of you can do whatever you can too."

“Crawling” refers to teaching the basics, the foundational pillars and building blocks of a tactic, technique, or concept. Once the foundation of that topic is firmly grasped by the student, the instructional tempo rises to the “walk” phase of training. When “walking” the trainee gets their feet wet in a controlled, safe to make mistakes environment. Often, border security practitioners conduct firearms training and qualification at an indoor or outdoor gun range. They train how to master evasive driving and even how to make traffic stops on a closed to the public training roadway or track. Even interviewing and interrogation or polygraphy is taught through mock scenarios with role players. When a balance of confidence and competency is demonstrated to an instructor during the “walking” phase, the student is elevated to the final training phase of the process, “running.” During “running” the trainee is evaluated, tested in the operational field. With metaphorical “handcuffs” off, the trainee’s words and actions hold real world meaning and have real world consequences. FTOs and supervisors monitor the “running” phase closely to limit the risk of unrecoverable mistakes and potential departmental liability incidents. If a student can successfully perform in the “running” phase of this training methodology, then they are considered proficient at that trained skillset and most often becomes certified to use that trained on tool, tactic, or technique when they return to their duty position.

BRIDGING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 AND 3.

Introduction. The vast majority (16) of SMEs said they have never been taught formally or informally about the recruitment process of transient criminals. Out of the four SMEs that claimed to have been introduced to the recruitment process of transient criminals by border security LE entities, all were taught at the federal border security

level and were federal agents. One of the four federal SMEs that had been trained in the criminal recruitment processes and techniques said, “I am not the one that needs this training. By the time a transient criminal or organization makes it to my desk or makes it on [my agency’s] radar, they are already in the transient criminal enterprise.” Another one of those four SMEs said, “Even with the training on recruitment I received, I never once thought about when and where transient criminals came from. I just know they keep showing up in greater numbers and with new ways to commit transient crimes.”

Social Science Training Influence. At this point in the interviews my discussions became sociologically and psychologically driven. I sought to understand how social science theories and concepts could assist in explaining the interweaving of cultural reality threads amongst potential transient criminal recruits. The SMEs connected transient criminal recruits’ reasoning for considering the transition to criminality to “motives” (Shelley & Picarelli, 2010). Specifically, most of the SMEs (18) supported Wright, et al’s thought that transient criminal recruits are looking for a way to better their current lives (Wright, Tibbetts & Daigle, 2008). One SME said, “For most border security professionals, especially ones in the middle or end of their careers, we find the need for random people’s acceptance of our value seemingly irrelevant; however, for these young people, it truly is everything.” Another SME added, “What young recruits seek today is hard for government agencies to provide them. There is so much caution and even red tape when it comes to what type of online, virtual presence or life you are allowed to have. Because perception is reality in this profession (border security LE), even silly, stupid videos of an officer having a little bit of fun online can backfire and cost that officer their career.” These SME comments spoke of the blending of

“compensational value” between reputation and financial improvements for the recruit. Tangible items like cars, money, houses, jewelry, guns, phones, and clothes led the SMEs’ examples of what holds value to a recruit. And returning to social media, the SMEs claimed that “going viral” and being “promoted” on social media platforms added reputational currency (sometimes monetary) to the recruit.

Finally, the SMEs highlighted examples of human life’s most basic needs of nourishment, shelter, safety, and a sense of feeling wanted (Drabek, 2013) as a major categorical incentive the bad guys use to lure in their recruits. The majority of SMEs (14) said that the number one basic need that drives recruits to go to the “dark side” is based on the notion or supported acquisition of guaranteed “security” and “protection” from the transient criminal enterprise for the recruit and more often, for the recruit’s family. Very close to security, the SMEs (13) said that the concept of “family” and “acceptance” to being part of a group and not alone in the world motivates recruits to join criminality. One SME said that “this is an opportunity that LE can match the criminal enterprise. We (LE) can offer a kid (recruit) a chance to be part of a fraternity, a family. We can help them build a life, a career, a reputation that is honorable and good. But that’s just it, isn’t it? The kid (recruit) must want to be good and most of the time, being bad is more fun, more lucrative, and cooler than being a cop.”

Training on Socioeconomic Statuses (SES). Diving further into sociological inquiries, I learned that not a single SME had ever been taught about SES (the relationships between social behaviors and economics) class issues being a potential enhancement tool for criminal recruitment in a border security or LE setting. Exactly half of the SMEs (10) did say they had been taught about the topic of SES statuses. The

education they received about SES's impact on populations throughout their areas of operations was limited to what was critically important to the specific mission the SME was either on or was preparing for. Almost all of the SMEs (8 of the previously mentioned 10) that had been exposed to the theories of how SES could play a role in their missions said that they were briefed in a formal setting and that lecture and PowerPoint presentations were used to transfer knowledge from an intelligence practitioner to a field operator, officer, or agent. One SME that had served in both the military and in LE said, "These types of trainings are one's that you, as a field agent, have tons of questions you want to ask the SME, but the classes are unfortunately designed to discourage you from having in-depth discussions about what is really important." The military often uses the cliché phrase, "Train to standard, not time;" however, after speaking with the SMEs in this study, they claimed that most of the training they received in border security, from the time they were rookies until they became senior leaders or even retired, was driven by time and not comprehension of the topic being trained. One SME said, "Due to the fact that the border security mission never stops, it never slows down, and it is always shorthanded, no agency can afford to spend a lot of time training. Don't get me wrong. We desperately need training and quality training. But who is going to protect our borders while we are sitting in a classroom?"

Finding Other Training Value. SMEs (8) mentioned that while not deliberately designed to fight criminal recruitment, formal LE classes on interviews and interrogations did provide at least a foundational building block to understanding the value of knowing what motivates and entices people to act in and respond to their environments the way that they do (Bajc, 2013; Shelley & Picarelli, 2010). The SMEs that spoke to the value of

interviewing and interrogation techniques all held positions of investigators or detectives at the time that they were educated on these topics. This is comparably important in this study; because out of the 12 SMEs that did not claim to have received classes on what motivates and entices people to commit crime, all 12 did receive training on interviews and interrogations. 10 out of those 12 SMEs had conducted criminal investigations and have served in the role, with the title, of investigating officer, detective, or special agent. The inconsistency between those that have served in a border security LE position and have or have not been taught to identify what motivates or triggers a potential criminal to choose a life of criminality indicates that differences in training standards are present throughout the US and throughout the hierarchical levels of border security LE.

Three out of the eight SMEs that said they were trained adequately were hired by federal LE agencies and were provided interviews and interrogations training during their entry level academies. Yet, only one of those federal SMEs ever worked in the tactical environment and that SME said, “My interview and interrogation classes definitely helped me understand why people decided to commit crime; however, I was limited on how much of this training I could actually use. Because I was a new agent and my job was to work the streets, I was not authorized by my agency to interview, and I was definitely not authorized to interrogate a potential criminal. So, I guess I was really trained just to identify a problem, but not actually be part of any meaningful step in the solution.” This study benefits from this SME’s honesty about being trained holistically to handle a multitude of criminal activities. However, within this same statement, the SME supports what Logan (2018) described as a Homeland Security and Intelligence dilemma. Logan expressed his concern about underutilizing properly trained personnel on systems

and processes that would enhance and improve both DHS and the IC if given the chance. It is important for border security LE to be given the opportunity to practice what they have been taught in the operational environment. Being able to learn from mistakes, crosstalk with peers and supervisors, and reflect on how the training received was enough or was lacking in preparing the officer or agent for what they experienced in the real world is needed to advance the disciplinary training pipelines of Homeland Security (Fisher & Geller, 2009).

The remaining five SMEs did not receive their interviews and interrogations classes until they had three to five years on the force. All five SMEs served as patrol officers during these entry years. One SME said, “Unfortunately, LE is more impressed with what you can prove you did on paper, rather than what you retained from experience on the job. For this reason, officers that could actually use specialized training while they are in lower ranking and lesser paid positions rarely get the opportunity, nor do they want to go to these types of classes. The organizational structure and attitude about “smart rookies” is globally frowned upon in reality, but all the brass will say they want the brightest, strongest, and best young officers in the country.” The officers and agents that are offered the opportunity to train to identify transient criminality and its recruitment too early or too late in their careers face problematic situations. Thus, finding that sweet spot where a border security LEO is occupationally mature enough to grasp the gravity of how core concepts and theories associated with preparing them to identify transient criminality is critically important. However, equally essential is combining that knowledge and maturity with the energy, enthusiasm, and drive to optimally enhance ROIs throughout DHS.

Social Science Enhancements. Higher education degrees in social science related fields was the conclusive answer to how border security leadership changes become better educated to handle the modern and future transient criminal enterprise's threats. The same answer is believed by the SMEs to be the solution to how mid to upper-level supervisors become better instructors, teachers, and FTOs to the younger generation of border security LEOs that battle these transient criminal threats daily on the streets. This justification came from personal accounts of how the SMEs experienced learning from LE instructors with degrees and from those without. The 13 SMEs who obtained graduate degrees also spoke to their own maturation as an instructor, where they collectively felt more prepared, more confident, and received better results, both on evaluations from their LE students, and production from agency LE statistics related to the blocks of instruction they provided, after they graduated with a master's or doctoral degree. The combination of reputational currency that naturally evolves when an experienced border security LEO possesses years of tactical knowledge and possesses a high level of civilian education seems to be the recipe for success in gaining the preapproval and thus, the buy-in from the student LE crowd. Knowing the audience's preferred instructor profile is a critical piece of the desired transient criminality curriculum design. These requested professors and educators of "border security science" should be sought after to teach LEO and undergraduate students seeking a career in border security LE specific social science disciplines and topical seminar courses associated with transient criminality.

The SMEs explained that the following list (Figure 4) of courses and their descriptions were most valuable to their work in the field when dealing with crimes that were most like transient criminal recruitment.




Figure 4: List of Most Valuable Border Security LE Courses to Combatting Transient Criminal Recruitment

The SMEs unanimously stated to have never been taught by academics on sociological or psychological tactics and techniques associated with identifying transient criminal recruits or the recruitment process. In fact, the SMEs collectively noted they did not receive any such training by border security practitioners either. Yet they claimed to know about sociological and psychological tactics and techniques that could be used to fight the transient criminal recruitment threat based on job experience by mostly piecing together bits and pieces of higher education theories and concepts with border security tactics trainings, especially hearing stories of real-life border security policing from other practitioners in the field.

The Social Science Power Five. Certain academic disciplines held significant weight to the SMEs. As predicted, the social sciences, specifically sociology, criminal justice, psychology, intelligence, and homeland security provided natural parallels between theory and practicality. These were the same disciplines that Albanese (2014, 2015) used to create his definition and categories for organized criminality. However, uncommon to scholars, the SMEs spoke about the value of having higher education classes and teachings on education and business. And while the SMEs did not feel that education or business necessarily helped them in the tactical mission of fighting transient crimes in the trenches and streets, these external to social science disciplines aided them in managing systems and processes more efficiently and effectively. Supported by Bourguignon (2001), et al (Busch & Givens, 2014; Cullen, Cavender, Maakestad & Benson, 2006; Mauro & Carmeci, 2007), the notion of LE understanding the “business” aspects of organized and transient criminalities translated to enhancements and improvements in leading people, especially those that do not think or learn the same,

working as a team to achieve joint success, and learning how to be a better instructor through curriculum design strategies, varying teaching methodologies, and by improving classroom management skills. One SME said, “I had been a military instructor for years before I went back to school. I actually thought I was a pretty good instructor. But I was humbled when I took my first education course and realized the difference between being an instructor and a teacher. Teaching is hard!”

Sociology. Even with the visible frustration the SMEs showed me when they realized that they either had not been trained specifically to combat transient criminal recruitment or that they never put the pieces of their academic puzzles of training they did receive together to be a difference maker against this threat, they all still supported that their academia careers, the courses they were taught by professors in the fields of social sciences, significantly benefited their practitioner careers. One SME said, “I didn’t realize how valuable the stuff I learned in my sociology classes were until I started to work the streets.” They truly believed they had paid for their college education that merely taught them theoretical concepts that would never be helpful in LE. They hoped it would give them a pay increase in their occupational field and maybe one day that extra money made would pay off the debt they received from going to college.

From Theory to Life Saving Practicality. A border security practitioner shared one of their life changing experiences with me. They explained that it was their culturally based sociology classes, along with their juvenile delinquency and gang related classes in criminal justice that saved their and their partner’s lives while canvassing an area during a foot patrol operation at the beginning of their career. The SME said that their border security partner, a 15 plus year practitioner, approached a young boy that was standing at

the corner of a busy intersection in a high crime city in a Central American country. As the SME's partner got within a few feet of the boy, the boy yelled out a screeching noise and then ran down the street and into an alleyway. The SME said that when they heard the boy's screech, they turned around and saw a group of armed gang members starting to surround their partner. The SME said that without hesitation they ran to the gang member that remained the furthest back of their group. They spoke to that gang member about "being lost." The SME said that they apologized for being in the wrong place and for approaching the wrong person. They explained that they told the gang leader that they "respected that this area was his." The gang leader called out to his gang members and stopped their encroachment on the SME's partner. The gang leader and a few gang members walked the SME and his partner out of the conflict area. The SME concluded that even with all the real-world experiences and generalized and specialized classes his partner had, he was not prepared for the incident that occurred during that mission. However, it was the SME's cultural awareness training and gang training that the SME received during their higher education classes in academia that trained them to recognize who the subcultural leader was and moreover, it was the lessons they learned in these classes that provided them with the arsenal of "verbal judo" (the use of words rather than physical instruments of force to deescalate a potential conflict situation) they used during this potentially fatal encounter. The SME explained that in reflection their reactions "felt like it was second nature." They said that they were subconsciously confident in their competency, and they didn't second guess their capabilities in their moment of need.

More about Teaching over Instruction. The SME who shared their previous border security mission experience from Central America went on to explain that being a

border security military or LE instructor comes with certain instructor and student expectations. First, students will be respectful, disciplined, and will sit quietly and patiently until the instructor asks a question or dismisses the class. Second, the instructor will provide all the required information to the student so that they can achieve credit and/or a passing grade on a standardized test. Finally, there does not have to be a relationship between the instructor and the student. Both the instructor and the student have a job to do and as long as they both accomplish their job then both professionals can move on to their next assignment. The same SME said that they learned through their education professor and their fellow peers who were studying to be education professionals (teachers, administrators, or counselors), “that just presenting scripted information to people similar or just like you isn’t really teaching.” The SME concluded with, “Teaching requires a connection between the teacher and the student. Without this connection, knowledge cannot really be transferred. I believe information can flow between the two people (teacher and student), but without both people wanting to learn and grow, real knowledge that can be used in life is just not shared.” This is where the paradigm shift must occur. Advancement in the field of border security LE and the discipline of Homeland Security starts with the give and take of experiential and academic knowledge. The fusion of these two diverse, yet interwoven, facets to the homeland security master puzzle requires a similar systematic process as the one the IC uses to produce quality intelligence. The “top-down, bottom-up” (Cozine, 2022) management approach to sharing information from the field up and down the hierarchical chain throughout border security LE and laterally between the practitioner sector and academia (Lewis, 2015) will posture the discipline of Homeland Security optimally to

take on future transient crimes. It will also ease the tension that exists when relationships are forced because of disaster occurrences. When people, especially people in power positions, do not have the time to build rapport, gaining trust and understanding of their mission partners' agendas, then battles for control and status breed less than optimal results (Morley, 2015).

Psychology. I asked the SMEs that spoke about the topics associated to criminal profiteering and the criminal's business mindset to dive a little deeper into those subjects. During one interview, Shelley and Picarelli's (2010)'s article on motives of international criminal organizations was summarized brilliantly. The SME explained that "it's not enough to just superficially recognize the motives of today's criminals. You really have to get into the criminal's mind. You have to understand why they are committing crime. If you can start to think like the criminal and see the world like the criminal does, then you just might have a chance of catching the criminal." Another SME added, "I bet if you ask a hundred cops what they view success as, you will get probably 20 different categories of answers and probably 50 different examples. But I would wager that if you asked a hundred transient criminals what they view success as, I am pretty sure you would only get one category with maybe a few different examples. Everything to them (transient criminals) revolves around making money. That's it. How much money can they (transient criminals) make in the shortest amount of time?"

The SMEs conveyed that a transient criminal recruit's decision-making process is fueled by concepts of psychology. They contended that these criminal recruits are also heavily influenced by the cultures they are born to and the ones they choose to become members of (the sociological component) (Racine, 2011). And, while I agree with both of

their assessments, I challenge their simplistic explanation to the transformation process of a potential transient criminal recruit that becomes a member of the transient criminal enterprise. This reordering and recasting of core moral and ethical principles are far more psychologically and sociologically labyrinthine than this study's SMEs described. I coin and refer to this evolutionary criminal forming process as the Psychosocial Criminal Effect. This effect is defined by a person's notional thoughts that manifest into their, in this case, a transient criminal recruits', actual being (who they are, why they do what they do, how they work through the decision-making process) and ultimately, these manifestations drive the subject to choose a life of criminality. The complexity of psychosocial criminal realism rears its head when a person can no longer differentiate between what originated as a mere thought in their head and what is now a tangible piece of their identity fabric. When a person's rational choice balancing loses the urge to denounce criminal behavior because they have psychologically removed or significantly reduced the concept of fear of social or judicial repercussions and punishments, that individual is nearing the completion of the psychological phase of criminal transformation caused by the psychosocial criminal effect. Furthermore, when legal and cultural laws and values no longer exert influence on a person's decision to join a life of criminality, then the sociological phase of the criminal transformation caused by the psychosocial criminal effect is almost complete. The psychological or sociological transformation can occur in any order; however, once both phases of the psychosocial criminal effect are complete, that individual has reached their most vulnerable state for criminal recruitment. They are now the transient criminal enterprise's prime target of recruitment.

Border Security E 's Cultural Dilemmas.

It's not a Me Problem. Returning to the border security practitioner, another dilemma sparked from the previous discussion topic of choosing the right crime fighter to receive advanced and specialized LE training, two age-old excuses became apparent. First, the phrase and notion of, "That's just how things have always been done" offered the SMEs an easy avoidance to taking ownership to why they did or do not attempt to make changes to the identified issue of higher ups and brass attending professional development classes that do not add ROIs to their agency. In fact, many of the SMEs admitted that they took advantage of this opportunistic situation when they reached positions of power. One SME said, "It's not necessarily right, and as we discussed, there are a ton of other cops that would absolutely benefit from going to these classes more than me, but I missed out from going when I was younger, and I still made it to the end (of a LE career). They'll (junior LEOs) be alright." The second age-old response took on a similar selfish tone. Several SMEs spoke about LE rites of passage and the unspoken way toward career promotions in LE. One SME summated the key-takeaways from this topic by saying, "Our [LE] careers are defined by a dichotomy of momentary decisions. Some of those moments are loud, like when you have to choose whether or not to use deadly force. Other moments, the majority of defining moments, are much quieter; but they are equally impactful. These moments are about keeping your mouth shut and just playing the game." The game this SME referred to is the occupational glidepath current higher ranking LE leaders expect a junior LEO to take if that LEO is seeking a promotion and a career in LE leadership.

Both of the aforementioned realities of who and why certain types of LEOs are selected to attend advanced and specialty classes throughout their careers have a systemic and enduring negative impact on border security LE's Triple Cs, especially at the tactical level. Several SMEs explained that the decision to send higher ranking LEOs to these types of classes causes a cascading effect that snowballs simultaneously in multiple directions. This process poses a tactical dilemma, in that decades of patrol officers continue to be untrained to identify crime when it originates and thus, protecting the public from these criminals is less effective. Next, LE continues to cyclically promote the same type of LEOs to higher ranking positions. A combination of SME responses suggest that this cyclical promotion concept is not based so much on gender, race, ethnicity, or other equal opportunity categories; rather, the SMEs shared that there are types of LEO career profiles that have and continue to receive promotion to leadership positions. The SMEs' discussions developed three categories that describe LEOs that most often receive rank and responsibility promotions. The first category is being a "yes person." A yes person was described as a junior LEO that does not pushback or question the decision-making, directive instructions, or leadership intent, they simply agree with whatever they are told to do and make performance decisions based on what they believe their leaders want them to do. The second category is being a "good 'ol boy." A good 'ol boy was described as a LEO that is part of the in-crowd with the higher ranking LEOs. The SMEs claimed that this category often has an element of luck and timing. They explained that no matter how hard a junior LEO tries to be part of the good 'ol boy ingroup, the established ingroup ultimately has all the decision-making power to let a new LEO in or to keep them out. In either scenario, the conclusion seems to be the same. If a junior LEO

is a good 'ol boy, a friend with the higher ranking LEOs, that junior LEO is more likely to be promoted to higher ranking positions. The third category is being a "clean cop." According to the SMEs, this group of LEOs have the most control of their LE promotion destiny. Clean cops were described as LEO that have a career performance record that is essentially blemish-free. This type of LEO has aligned themselves for systematic promotion opportunities. In other words, the higher ranking LEOs with promotion approval authority have no reason to hold this type of junior LEO back. The SMEs also added that clean cops pose an inherit risk to LE leaders that shape organizational promotion decisions based on the yes person and good 'ol boy concepts. If LEO leaders promote a junior LEO from one of the first two categories over a clean cop, the LE agency increases their risk of being liable for an equal opportunity violation.

Finding the Composition for Border Security LE Confidence Building.

Academics are not Academia. This subsection reconnects RQ2 and RQ3 by tying in the value of LEOs having a higher education for the purposes of enhancing their knowledge bases in one or more components of their Triple Cs, while simultaneously increasing their confidence as a crime fighter. The SMEs value higher education for border security LE personnel. They strongly support that the "more educated" a border security professional becomes the "better decision makers" they turn out to be. They claimed that even pure academics have a significant value to the practitioners in border security LE. Yet, without hesitation all SMEs emphatically resumed their contention to allowing pure academics into their inner circles of border security LE professional development. Because the SMEs value field experience over book smarts, they wrote off pure academics as being qualified and ready to become border security instructors. One

SME explained that “the more experience in the field you have, the more stories you have and when you have stories, you have everyone’s attention.” Another SME enhanced this thought by adding that “reputational trust from having field experience results in a level of buy-in from other practitioners that is not afforded to any pure academic, no matter how great they say they are in person or on paper.” The conclusion to this conversational topic was that border security practitioners simply do not consider pure academics as a force multiplier in their annual and in-service LE training. The SMEs defended by saying that pure academics do not meet the minimum requirements to be a LE instructor. This is interesting because the SMEs also shared that there are differences in what is minimally required for federal, state, and local LE instructorship.

Learning Techniques. The SMEs want to train like they fight. This makes logical sense, because organized criminal research (Albanese, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2019, 2020; Mallory, 2012) claims that criminal groups such as transient criminals train their new generations while committing crime. Yet, “wants” are not always easily obtained in border security LE. Based on discussions with the SMEs, they rarely are trained like their adversarial threat. Instead, they are provided static training in classrooms. This training style is so abundant in the border security sector that all the SMEs adamantly expressed that they “despise” and “wish” PowerPoint “was never created.” They claimed that most (some SMEs said “all”) of their border security LE and higher educational academic classes and training sessions either provided “death by PowerPoint” or “lectures that never seemed to end.” One SME said, “The only thing worse than a LE or military PowerPoint presentation is when the instructor decides to lecture us by reading all the

words on the PowerPoint slides. And, I wish I could tell you that this only happens every once in a while, but no, it happens most of the time.”

Getting away from PowerPoint and becoming more Interactive. Not all border security LE training is presented in disappointing ways. “Storytelling” for example was a SME preferred method, as it “brings to life the real shit that happens in LE.” The value of storytelling in the military and LE “has a dual beneficial purpose. It provides those who lived it, those who were around it, and those who came after it, a connective historical account of where we all [border security practitioners]) came from. It also allows for generational knowledge transfer to become naturally achieved.” One SME added, “I bet you have a story that your parents or grandparents told you when you were a kid. I would put money on it that you remember at least the highlight moments, the really emotional, scary, heroic, happy, and sad moments of that story. That is exactly why storytelling teaching in the military and LE is vitally important. The stories of [practitioners], good and bad, will last with everyone in the room forever.”

All of the SMEs agreed that the highest instructional ROIs comes from real-world scenario training platforms. They claimed that practical exercises such as: ride-alongs, internships, field shadowing, and even embedded reporting opportunities are the best ways to train. Unfortunately, these optimal types of training experiences exist far too seldom in the border security field.

The Multisource Approach to Training. Finally, like using a multisource approach to information gathering and intelligence creation (Cozine, 2021; Logan, 2018), the SMEs claimed that a combination of lecture, controlled practical exercises, and real-world scenarios provides the most comprehensive and well-rounded way to be trained.

Yet, while nearly all of the SMEs admitted that eclectic learning is optimal, just over half of the SMEs (12) ever experienced such training. The most common method left out of the three-part equation for optimal training is the “real-world scenarios.” The SMEs explained this dilemma by chalking it up to first “budget issues.” They claimed that their agencies constantly tell them that they do not have enough money to send trainees to a real-world destination that offers the type of opportunity for the trainee to perform the skill they have mastered.

The SMEs also added that their agencies are “blind to opportunities because of potential liabilities.” They explained that border security agencies have become increasingly averse to taking risks during training. Risk assessments for every portion of training are required for most agencies and then checks and balances must be conducted before, during, and after training to avoid as much chance of anyone or any place filing a lawsuit against the agency. This risk versus reward style of thinking about training in a real-world scenario does not bode well for getting to “yes.” One SME explained that “the operational environment of a real-world training location is unpredictable and changes so fast. It is so hard to sell this type of training opportunity, and it is a great opportunity, to a decision-maker who is ultimately responsible for their personnel and the people in the training location.” Another SME added, “The structured process of getting a unique border security training opportunity, like in a real-world location, is simply designed to tell you “no.” By the time you fill out all the required paperwork to train, then the staff gets a chance to poke holes in your training plan, and then you can get on an action officer’s schedule to brief them your plan, you can almost guarantee you are not going to train in a real place with real people. And, no, you did nothing wrong. Welcome to

governmental training, where “good thought fairies” are shot down one at a time for sport.” After assessing the SMEs’ and my own border security training experiences, the previously discussed militaristic training method of “crawl, walk, run” seems to be the most beneficial and achievable training design for most border security LE entities. With a little creativity during instructional planning and execution of training, at least simulated practical exercises should be able to regain the practitioner’s interest, while leaving them with a memorable training takeaway.

It is important to reconnect the theoretical frameworks of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SOST (Bajc, 2013; Molotch, 2012) to the discussion of training styles. DHS seems to be content with their generalized, one-dimensional training glidepath for border security LE. This approach to training creates a singularly focused and linearly thought invoking organization of law enforcers. This type of organizationally forced identity does not place significant pressure on the tactical, operational, or strategic elements of the transient criminal enterprise, rather it creates advantageous opportunities for the DHS threat to navigate more easily through border and barrier restrictions that are linearly focused.

Confidence Finds a Replicable Process through Certain Classes.

Specific Social Science Coursework. When asked to list the specific classes and courses that were most valuable to the SME, all responses returned to the social science disciplines. The SMEs most often referenced juvenile delinquency, family violence, gangs, organized crimes, white collar crimes, recidivism, rehabilitation, criminal behavior, sociological methodologies, behavioral psychology, and social work as coursework that had both immediate and enduring positive impacts to their service

careers. These referenced academic subjects directly lineup with the backgrounds and published works on the topics of organized and transnational criminality. In fact, Albanese (2014) and Ramsay, Cozine, Cominsky (2021), et al (Brown, 2007; Williams & McShane, 2004), speak to the value of learning from the core concepts of the social science pillars (Sociology, Psychology, and Criminology), as well as supportive and topically connected niche subjects like gang activity, terrorism, and mafias. Returning momentarily to the tactical training style of “crawl, walk, run,” the field of border security benefits from this same style of learning during academic ventures. One SME stated that “the best classes were the ones that taught me theory and then told me a story about how that theory was used to impact a real [criminal] case.” Another SME said, “I really didn’t expect to get much useful information out of my graduate classes on white collar crime and recidivism; but truth be told, I use things I learned from both of those classes nearly every day during investigations, arrests, and when I testify.”

A very intriguing subsection of this study indicated that SMEs had a wish list of classes they desired from either a higher educational institution or their border security employer. This list of classes is located below (Figure 5).



Figure 5: Border Security practitioners' wishlist for Future Border Security Academic or In-Service Training Courses

Discussing the Training Course Wish List. Two certainties exist from the SMEs' training courses wish list. First, all of the courses requested are currently being taught, topics discussed, and practiced in the operational border security sector and/or in academic institutions. Yet this does not mean that the training pipeline and LE preparedness program is user friendly or works at all. These courses, training opportunities, and practical experiences are spread selectively and diversely across the US, limiting, if not excluding the majority of border security professionals from ever receiving the transient criminality training they desire. This reality leads us into the second dichotomous factor to training efficacy: standardization and program accreditation. While each of the desired courses are being taught in some sort of fashion throughout the border security academic-practitioner sectors, there remains no predictability for a practitioner to map out a career training plan that would lead them to becoming a transient criminality enforcement SME.

RESEARCH QUESTION 3.

The Question. Why do border security LE agencies differ in their confidence levels to employ and deploy similar capabilities, competencies, and capacities to address transient criminality recruitment?

The Short Answer. No border security LE has purposefully employed their Triple Cs on the transient criminality recruitment threat. As stated earlier, they could not define transient criminality, nor have they been trained to identify or combat transient criminal recruitment. Moreover, border security LE agencies and their agents, officers, and operators differ in their confidence levels to use their Triple Cs because of differences in each agency's 1) entry to advanced level border security internal training

standards, 2) broadening educational opportunities, 3) intensity and exposure to real world criminality during their field training programs, and 4) level of commitment to training on and utilizing their Triple Cs for the greater joint objectives of homeland security, rather than for their own, individual agency's success.

Key Takeaway. The lack of a standardized, specific training program dedicated to preparing border security practitioners to combat the macro and micro threats associated with transient criminality and its recruitment result in all three of their Triple Cs reaching less than optimal potential effectiveness.

The Composition of Confidence Levels.

Introduction. The emotions associated with a border security professional feeling underappreciated, unheard, and undervalued by their individual homeland security based agency or the greater discipline as a whole lowers confidence levels and demotivates the border security professional causing them to not want to give more effort toward a bigger inter or intra agency(ies) objective. The second most reported aspect to raising confidence levels in border security professionals was being valued as an “important,” “critical,” or “vital” part to one or multiple aspects of the border security operational process. Morley (2015) defends the SMEs’ notion of feeling valued as an interictal part of finding synergy amongst a practitioners’ colleagues. SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) concepts elevate the magnitude of the synergetic relationship between the practitioner and their agency and even the discipline. The SMEs explained that being valued could mean different things for different people. For example, one SME said that simply having been selected to be part of the “team” that was put together for an operation was enough to feel valued. Another SME said that an “at-a-boy” from anyone that was from a

supervisory or higher echelon position was what they were looking for. A couple of SMEs (2) that worked entry level patrol positions for a local LE agency had similar responses to what value meant to them. They explained that leaders have multiple times during a mission to make an entry level officer feel important. Several of these times were listed as: 1) after a higher ranking officer reads a patrol officer's report, just go and tell that patrol officer that something they wrote "made a difference;" 2) after the investigation or operation is over, the department lead or even the shift supervisor should make it at least internally public (through email, during a brief, etc.) that the patrol officer's actions and/or report assisted in mission success; 3) putting that officer in for a recognition award of some sort; or 4) making sure not to forget to note the patrol officer's impact to the operation in their evaluation. All of these techniques improve confidence in the first line responder to crime; assist in retention and future border security career growth; and maybe most importantly, it costs next to nothing financially for the department, while the lasting sentiment motivates the patrol officer to pay attention to the whispers of criminality going on in the streets a little more intently. The third confidence raising technique again surrounded the concept of "time." SMEs said that "timely" and "actionable" intelligence was invaluable to them feeling that the mission itself was truly important and that they were going into a potentially hostile situation with the most current and best knowledge of what the adversary is doing. This "quality intelligence" was said to "significantly enhance" the "mental, physical, and emotional decision-making processes of all border security professionals, but especially the young, hungry boots on the ground that can truly make an immediate difference."

Descriptions of Professional Lifelines. Confidence levels are built on feeling. That feeling can be in the practitioner's gut, through calmness created by professional experience and training, or by fear of being ill-prepared to face the next emerging threat. I asked each SME to describe characteristics and attributes of who they choose to call when they come across a transient criminal act, case, or situation that they have never experienced. The most commonly used words were associated with "trust." The SMEs also said that their phone-a-friends must be "knowledgeable" and "experienced." It was surprising to me that most of the SMEs (16) said that they must have worked with the practitioner in the past for that professional to become eligible to be part of the SME's close-knit confidence building circle of trusted colleagues. When asked to clarify why this was so important to them, most of the SMEs lumped personal interactions and professional relationships as part of the larger "experience" requirement.

Additionally, 12 of the 16 SMEs said that their networks must have demonstrated that they "care" about the profession of border security/LE when they worked with them. This commitment to the greater cause and "tryout" or "date" mentality was explained through two SME statements. One SME compared it to the sport of boxing by saying, "You can read about a boxer in the paper or even watch their highlights on Sportscenter, but you don't really know how hard that fighter punches unless you get in the ring with them. This is why it is so important for you to work with someone in the field. It is only then that you will know if their heart and mind are both in it to win it." Another SME explained why they needed confirmation that the potential SME cared by saying, "This profession is dangerous. It also asks us to make split-second decisions that could cause someone else or even ourselves to go to the hospital or even die. If I can't tell if the

person I am working with or asking for advice respects those dangers as much as I do, why would I ask them for help?”

The Importance of a Resourced Network. Confidence is enhanced by knowledge and tools provided by a practitioner’s resourced network. SMEs claimed to build their transient crime fighting network of resources by using their agency’s information and intelligence to acquire resources such as laptops, cellphones, internet sources, social media, and the dark web. Several SMEs said that they have watched border security resources change drastically over the years. However, consistency remained in that the border security practitioners always felt like they had adequate tools to combat and counter the transient criminals of that respective era. Moreover, several SMEs alluded that while they did feel resourced individually to compete with the transient criminals on the streets, they also believed that their organizations were outmatched by the transient criminal enterprise’s capabilities and capacities. Albanese (2014, 2015), et al (Naim, 2005; Glenny, 2008), provide multiple examples of how organized criminals and groups outwitted their adversarial authorities simply by being better connected to the networks of people and products that enhanced their mission objectives. One SME said, “The bad guys always seem to have cooler, better, more advanced weapons and stuff than we do.” Another SME frustratedly explained that “it is always too late when we finally get approved for the things that enemy had been kicking our ass with. We need that shit now; because if we get it six months to a year down the road, the enemy already has newer, more advanced shit to kick our ass with again.” Going back to this study’s common themes of “time” and “adaptability,” the SMEs concluded that border security

practitioners are open to being adaptable, they genuinely welcome change, if they can see how those changes benefit them or the department for the better.

Adding validity to Cozine (2013, 2016, 2021) and Logan (2018), nearly all the SMEs at some point in their interviews mentioned that information, intelligence, and resourcing processes must become quicker if any productive movements are realistically intended on showing measures of effectiveness. They concluded that the transient criminal enterprise is faster in their approval processes to enact change and adaptability and they are more resourced with advanced weaponry, systems, and external influencers and enablers than modern border security LE practitioners and their agencies. All of these realities significantly lowered the SMEs' confidence levels in their Triple Cs having effective counter-crime impact on transient criminality. However, the SMEs were confident that their recommended changes to the way systems, processes, and resource allocations are currently being done are achievable and that once those improvements are made, their confidence in combatting the transient criminal threat would immediately increase "exponentially."

Returning to Networking.

The Value of a Backdoor Network. Advancing the answers to RQ2 and RQ3, building networks, especially "backdoor" networks, the local, unofficial eyes and ears of what is really happening on the streets, was noted as a "necessity" and an "invaluable" "underrated" "requirement" for any border security professional that "hopes to make any significant dent in fighting transient crime." All SMEs said that they have used either legal or criminal informants in order to gain knowledge from the field to fill informational gaps for their intelligence professionals. And while all SMEs stressed the

importance of building a backdoor network, only four SMEs said that they received any formalized training during their initial academy on how to build a backdoor network. A little over half of the SMEs (12) said that they learned the basic skills of how to begin building their networks during field training, by their FTO and not from any published training manual or formal class. Almost all of the SMEs (18) said they learned the “art” of how to build their networks by trial and error through on-job-training. Jones (2022) referenced Lewis (2015) when discussing the probable pitfall of on-job-training while being required to increase border security. Jones claimed that protection of the network and its infrastructure must start with a devotion to detailed planning before plunging into the border security mission execution phase. Trying to conduct adaptive planning during the heat of border security defense is not only dangerous, it is hap-hazardously foolish. The SMEs claimed that this type of trial-and-error process costed them many arrests and placed them and their informants in danger. One SME said, “I messed up so many times when I first attempted to build my network that I had to be moved from my assigned patrol area to a new area and even their word had gotten around that I couldn’t be trusted. It took a long time for me to rebuild my own reputation in the community.”

Resourcing the Network. Confidence is improved when the practitioner’s network endures through a predictable and sustainable resource resupply system. I spoke with the SMEs about tangible equipment that helps them combat transient criminality. Most of the SMEs (15) claimed that agency specific tools, such as ATVs, drones, cameras, thermal and night vision, and lethal and non-lethal weapons assist them. However, all SMEs added that experience in the agency and specialized training was needed before they were given access or permission to use their agency’s resources.

Digging further into understanding what a border security practitioner must accomplish before their agency will train them or equip them with specialized tools, SMEs stated that most of their agencies require a minimum of 2 years and even up to 5 years with the agency before they can apply for specialty assignments. These assignments often times are the only way to receive specialized training and specialized equipment. Several of the SME said that their agencies use these specialty schools and opportunities to try out or join their high-speed specialty units like Special Response Teams (SRT), Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Narcotics (NARC), Special Operations Teams, K-9, and Special Operations Groups as ways to retain them for additional years within the agency. One SME claimed that “I did everything my department asked me to do. I went to every school, I accepted every assignment, I was a “yes man” when it benefitted them. But even after 5 years, they still wouldn’t let me go to any advanced training on narcotics. They told me that if they spent money on me to be trained on drugs than I had to be a NARC. I didn’t want to be a NARC, I just wanted to be a better patrolman. Ultimately, this is why I left local LE.”

Drivers of Decision-Making. Confidence is gained when the practitioner believes their hard work influences and impacts border security decision-makers. The SMEs told me that they rely heavily on a sense of intuition and a “gut” feeling to make difficult, adaptive border security LE decisions in the field. They added that leaders in DHS cannot grasp the value of intuition while sitting at a desk or when they are discussing a threat on the 20th floor of headquarters in a conference room. Yet, the SMEs did not seem to portray this previous statement in a negative or resentful way. Rather, the SMEs took pride in being able to provide their leaders with the account of what they “sensed” in the

field. They consider this information from the tactical environment critical and their “fingerprint” on improving the decision-making process.

Most of the SMEs (16) claimed they must rely on their formalized training, department SOPs, and regulatory policies to guide their individual decision making. Yet, the majority of those SMEs explained that once they have systematically exhausted their formalized training, SOPs, and policies’ guidance and approaches, they then refer to the use of intuition and experience to guide their decision making. They attributed this flexibility to decide how to respond during crises and amongst chaos to the ability to use “occupational discretion,” the process of making adaptive decisions based on the totality of variables from the current situation a border security LEO finds themselves. And, while the SMEs acknowledged that certain border security situations limit and even eliminate LEO discretion, meaning that a LEO “must” or “will” arrest, detain, search, etc because the LEO had probable cause that the alleged person violated specific laws that do not possess alternate LE interventions (citations, verbal warnings, teaching moments), the times in which LEOs were able to utilize LE discretion led to increases to LEO’s confidence and improved rapport building and reputations for the LEO in the communities they served.

Conclusion. This discussion answers RQ3 while supporting RQ2 and providing a segway to RQ4. Modern border security LE is extremely intelligent individually and organizationally. These practitioners are resourced, trained, and networked for success against homeland security known present and future threats. “Known” threats is a relative term, however. I believe a less popular explanation for this preparedness level is found when the term “known” is changed to “valued.” If transient criminality becomes a valued

interest across the homeland security subsectors of LE, then it can be anticipated that border security will raise its preparedness level to combat today's and tomorrow's transient criminality threats.

Discussing Transient Criminal Recruitment.

This subsection speaks directly to RQs 2, 3, and 4 on a comprehensive level. Border security LE practitioners made it abundantly clear that they are not familiar, nor trained, or missioned to look for or develop intelligence on identify and counter the transient criminal recruitment threat. Furthermore, the SMEs in this study discussed in detail their lack of formal or informal training regarding the recruitment process of transient criminals. This indicates a tremendous opportunity to improve awareness of the transient criminal recruitment threat through the macro discipline of Homeland Security. It is also a great opportunity for Homeland Security academics to work themselves into the border security LE training sector. Currently, border security LE tasks out local, state, and federal practitioners to build training programs or to instruct these programs. This task is also considered an additional duty and the SMEs explained that additional duties are rarely given the devoted attention and effort needed to enhance and move forward a task like training program development. Hence, I argue that the logical transition of power for training program development and instruction should be moved to academic SMEs of the Homeland Security discipline. Professors own the expertise in teaching, career advisement on program progression, and most importantly, curriculum design and development. I asked the SME practitioners about their confidence levels in academics being SME curriculum coordinators. All SMEs said that they “unquestionably trust” and

would gladly “pass the torch” of building a transient criminal training curriculum to academia.

There are several key thresholds that must be breached for a transient criminal training program to become a reality and a staple in border security LE. More funds and resources dedicated to educating the force will become a byproduct of aligning the transient criminal training campaign to Homeland Security. Albanese (2014, 2019) identified similar academic and practitioner constraints during his advancement of the now jointly accepted term and categories of organized criminality. Built momentum, both politically (governmental decision-making bodies) and publicly (citizens and society), was achieved through constant sociological awareness presence of organized crime and criminological pressure of the damages those organized crimes created. This continuous stress from the public on its protectors forced the political power players associated with US national security to recognize organized criminality as its own major categorical crime concern; thus, resulting in a reallocation of financial, educational, and personnel resourcing throughout the LE and DOD sectors of homeland security (Albanese, 2014). Transient criminality should follow Albanese’s organized criminality template to achieve similar success.

A complete restructuring of DHS is not needed for border security LE to improve their presence, posture, and proficiencies in tackling the transient criminality threat. Rather, a realignment of personnel post training and a sustainable flow of financial support to the training and resourcing of transient crime fighters must be agreed upon at the DHS and national security strategic levels. This alignment simultaneously accomplishes individual and joint agency goals which will achieve a greater overall buy-

in from private and public sector border security investors and supporters. The aforementioned consortium also saves all partners money through sharing fiduciary and resource roles and responsibilities. They improve their reputations by being associated with border security success stories and can avoid or mitigate potential public releases that would cause their organization damages if the burden of fault fell directly and solely on their shoulders during or after probable mistakes are made during the transient criminality training and maturation periods. Moreover, having an external team(s) assisting on joint priorities and objectives leads to less time away from what is prioritized as truly important to their individual agency. Thus, these types of mutual benefits drive improved communication and mission accomplishment, as all parties involved trust in that the end state result will profit their agendas. This level of financial, resource, and training commitment to border security threats has proven to be successful in joint military, LE gang and cartel operations in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (Blake, 2012; Cruz, 2012; Dudley, 2012; Manwaring, 2007); along with DEA countermeasures to the war on drugs from South America and the US (Shirk, 2011); the FBI's targeting of white collar criminals and organizations (Tonry & Router, 2020; Naim, 2005; Glenny, 2008); and the CIA's information gathering and intelligence production on terrorist activities (Cozine, 2010, 2013, 2014; Fredholm, 2018; Hudson, 2010).

Confidence Follows Training Alignment.

One Dimensional Training Concerns. Out of the four SMEs that were introduced to the recruitment process of transient criminals by border security LE entities, all were taught at the federal border security level and were federal agents. The positive to this reality is that time with the federal agency was not a discriminatory factor in whether

transient criminal recruitment training was offered. The federal SMEs did however explain that transient criminality and recruitment training was not part of any structured training program that they were aware of, and it was happenstance of “getting lucky to have an instructor who worked transient crimes and then wanted to talk about it when they were in charge of teaching.” This means that not every federal agent, even within these four SMEs agencies, receive transient criminal recruitment training; moreover, even in limitation, the expansion of transient criminal recruitment knowledge has been funneled to and through a miniscule one-dimensional channel. This limits the optimal impact recruitment training could have across the border security force. It also indicates that border security’s first line influencers have no awareness of what they should be looking for regarding potential criminal recruiting operations.

The Increasing Difficulty in Profiling and Stereotyping Transient Criminal Recruits. The above-mentioned reality has a silver lining. Academia gains an opportunity to demonstrate to the practitioner sector their operational value. SMEs consistently discussed that profiling in policing has become societally taboo because it is a corrupt, bias, and rights violating tactic used by LEOs. It conveys that the police are assuming judgment of criminality based on how a person looks, where they live, who they hang out with, how much money they make, etc. An abundant amount of academic literature and US constitutional case law speaks to the validity of the SMEs’ explicit denouncement of police profiling as an acceptable technique to combat transient criminal recruitment (Werthman & Piliavin, 1967, Smith, 1986, Smith & Holmes, 2014, Thompson & Lee, 2004, Mays, Cochran & Barnes, 2007; Gee & Ponce, 2010; Tyler, Fagan & Geller, 2014, Terrill & Reisig, 2003, US v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), Terry v. Ohio, 1968, Marshall v.

Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, 2003, *People v. DeBour*, 1976, *US v Martin-Fuerte*, 1976, *US v. Weaver*, 1992, *US v. Montero-Camargo*, 1999, *US v. Valenzuela*, 1982, *Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio*, 2013, *Floyd v. City of New York*, 2013, End Racial Profiling Act, 2011). These authors and judicial officials attest that profiling, even with “good” intentions to rid the US and the world from criminals, is a “violation of basic human rights that undermines the trust of the public and has severe consequences for the victims and for the society at large” (Weitzer & Tuch, 2002, Lundman & Kaufman, 2003). However, it is through academia that theories and concepts like SOST (Bajc, 2013; Molotch, 2012), SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), SNT (Milroy, 2000, Hodges, 2015), and SOCT (Crossman, 2019), rather than the tactics of profiling are acceptably taught and are digestible by the public as distributional information. SNT (Hodges, 2015) supports understanding the cultural and social rings in which a potential transient criminal recruit may live, work, or play. Valuing a potential criminal recruit’s “network” becomes an intelligence advantage, not a rights violation like racial profiling. Incorporating SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) adds an additional layer of validity to the foundation SNT (Hodges, 2015) provides to identifying transient criminal recruits and criminal recruiting pools (geolocations where criminal recruitment either happens at high frequency rates or has the potential to enable criminal recruitment with consistent efficacy). Profiling from an academic perspective means understanding why people choose to do what they do and to what level a person’s Triple Cs allow them to accomplish their goals. Having this type of knowledge at the first line border security practitioner level would improve the border security end state products of information

gathering, intelligence production, and proactive, offensive border security operations such as arrests of transient criminals and interdiction of transient criminal recruitment.

The first line border security officer is not immune to further tactically trained profiling issues if academia takes over the training pipeline of identifying potential transient criminal recruits. Due to the unfounded diversity of thought and differences in FTO proficiencies that exist throughout the US, some real problems for DHS must be discussed. For example, it is one thing to focus LE attention on the “dirty” and “poor” looking young people in a city or community. The adolescents that fit this description can be narrowed down to where they often are allowed by society to congregate. Yet, when you add the characteristic description of “trendy” to the recruit’s profile, so many additional doors fly open, and this leaves the officer wasting time. This is a less than optimal way to implement LE patrols on making a positive impact and difference on identifying transient criminal recruitment operations. One SME said, “I have been doing this LE thing for over 20 years and I have my own kids that are at the ages that would be enticing for criminal recruiters to try to get them converted. And, even with all that experience in my arsenal, I couldn’t tell you who was part of the transient criminal enterprise, who was being recruited by them, or who is a straight “A” student, even if you put them all in a line-up.” Another SME claimed that “Gen Z (generation of people born between 1997 and 2012) kids seem to be more accepting of all sorts of things that my generation would not have stood for. Some of those tolerances are great. Like, I truly believe that this generation of kids are far more accepting of special needs children than we were. But this generation also seems to be overly forgiving, merciful, and surprisingly understanding when one of their peers does something that violates the law or even

societal rules. They seem to rally around each other in those types of moments; even if they have nothing else in common except that they are all from Gen Z.” Finally, a third SME explained, “It is really strange and really scary to not know which of today’s kids are going to be probable criminals. In the past, you could guess and probably would be right 9 out of 10 times based solely on the way a kid dressed or the type of haircut they had. But now, today, a preppy looking kid, dressed in a \$500 sports coat could be selling fentanyl at school and over half of teenagers look grungy with graphic t-shirts from Walmart and distressed, ripped up jeans on. Most of those kids are probably great kids, from great homes, with great families and they probably make great grades and will make millions of legitimate dollars one day. But how then are we supposed to know which one kid out of that group is the bad seed?” This SME brings up an intriguing topic that deserves further development. Border security LE practitioners desire intelligence products and packages that target actual and potential threats, like transient criminal recruits, through criminal stereotyping (Cozine, 2013, Racine, 2011, Shelley & Picarelli, 2010, Wright, Tibbetts & Daigle, 2008). Basing LE decision-making on identifying probable crime areas and predicting criminals are afoot because “easy labels” (Sommerlad-Rogers, 2023) lead to easy arrests is dangerous and irresponsible. Juvenile delinquency literature explains that performing LE by relying on stereotyping is “extremely problematic” (Sommerlad-Rogers, 2023) and leads to LE practitioners creating self-fulfilling prophecies (Shaw & McKay, 1972) about who must be a criminal, rather than allowing reasonable suspicion to evidentially develop into probable cause; which leads to a “good arrest” (an arrest that is upheld in court because the LEO adhered to LE SOPs and constitutional rights of the arrestee). Sociologically speaking, a self-

fulfilling prophecy is a prediction that causes itself to become a reality and a way of life (Shaw & McKay, 1972). These self-fulfilling prophecies can manifest into either positive or negative realities for recruitment targets. Social theories such as SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SNT (Mallory, 2000) that are intensified by the attributable value associated with the concepts of social disorganization theory (SDT) which aid in explain how self-fulfilling prophecies guide recruits toward a life of criminality. SDT suggests that a deviant or criminal, even potential criminal, is most influenced by their environment and the organizational entities that surround them (Shaw & McKay, 1972). The transnational criminal enterprise and its recruiters actionize SDT to separate potential recruits from their identities, reputations, and social networks that raising and rearing created.

Disorganizing transient criminal recruits through creating social and infrastructural chaos (SOCT) (Crossroads, 2019) is a power play by the transnational enterprise which forces both the criminal recruit and border security LE to make decisive aggressive or defensive moves on their metaphorical chessboards. Ultimately, transient criminal recruiters use SDT to create what I refer to as “the prophetic push” into the world of crime. This “push” is a brilliant psychosocial shaping action that sociologically sets the recruit’s environment, enablers, and enhancers up to convince the recruit to join the transient criminal enterprise. The psychological pressures of social networking acceptance combined with not wanting to live with the constant thought of regret for what could have been often motivates the recruit to finally choose an opportunistic crime life over a life of legal normalcy and acceptance of social classisms.

Our discussion continues to address the profile of a transient criminal recruit in order to fill the gap of knowledge that exists while exploring RQs 2 and 3. Most SMEs found

that the years between 13 and 15 were prime ages for transient criminal recruiters to get teenagers to commit “small,” “petty” crimes that would lead to a “slap on the wrist” or a “juvenile sentence” if caught and convicted. The SMEs discussed the leniency the US Justice System has on juvenile offenders. They talked about how the current transient criminals are well-versed in not only US criminal law, juvenile sanctions, but also the loopholes that exist throughout the US’s legal and justice systems. Both takeaways from the interviews were supported by scholarly literature (Blumstein, 1995; Cruz, 2010; Racine, 2011). Additionally, one SME said that “recruiting young teenagers offered a unique protective tryout like opportunity for the criminal enterprise to test and see if a recruit has what it takes to be a “company man”.” The literature about gangs, terrorists, and other organized criminal entities agrees with the SMEs’ support that the transient criminal enterprise and their recruiters aren’t necessarily looking for a lot of lifelong transient criminal career guys and girls (Racine, 2011; Lopez & Pairolero, 2019; Smith, 2014). They will take talent and potential when they get it, but even if a recruit does not pass the transient criminal enterprise test of full-fledged acceptance, the enterprise will find a use for that recruit (Wright, Tibbetts & Daigle, 2008).

RQs 3 and 4 make clear the struggle DHS has in transferring specific transient criminal recruitment knowledge laterally throughout its tactical and operational ranks of border security professionals. My interviews with the SMEs reified two important truths. First, confidence to deploy competencies regarding transient criminal recruitment will remain nearly nonexistent throughout DHS if practitioners continue to believe they are not knowledgeable about transient criminality. The second actuality is that DHS ironically has an abundance of competent and experienced border security professionals

that know far more about transient criminality and its recruitment than they self-acknowledge. These two findings result in lower to mid-level management of the border security force not exuberating confidence in topics associated with transient criminality because they simply do not realize they own such knowledge. Moreover, their collective lack of confidence in believing they are competent to discuss transient criminality combat tactics and techniques emerges as a psychological degradation to intelligence transfer due to the previously discussed systematic peer-to-peer pressure of being afraid of being judged and labeled as incompetent or incorrect as a border security professional.

Influencers and Enablers. Returning for a moment to talk about influencers and enablers, the SMEs referenced SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SNT (Hodges, 2015) concepts to defend their beliefs that the school setting offered the most potential for positive role models and also opportunities for a potential criminal recruit to find a positive identity. The SMEs considered teachers, coaches, principals, police officers, counselors, peers, upperclassmen, and support staff like bus drivers and janitors as potential role models and mentors for the at-risk youth. In my professional experience, these role models lead and manage opportunistic programs like traditional educational programs (math, English, science, history, etc.), sports, band, art, academic curriculums like Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (S.T.E.M.), extra-curricular activities, and even volunteer service programs. They also offer an opportunity for kids to vent or share their life stories, their frustrations, and their fears. Non-verbally, they demonstrate levels of success in all social circles and social classes. The criminal recruit, if brought into these circles, will be saturated with positivity, promotional opportunities, and be

given a sense of belonging; all eerily similar opportunities in which the transient criminal enterprise offers these same youths.

One glaring difference the SMEs told me about between the school role models and the transient criminal enterprises' role models is "prestige." This concept is supported by scholarly gang authors like Racine (2011), Cruz (2010), and Blake (2012). The SMEs claimed that positive role models such as teachers and coaches don't make enough money to be "rich" and "famous." One SME said, "I remember growing up and thinking that being a cop or firefighter or a teacher was the job of a hero. Now adays, kids think gangbangers and vigilantes are Batman." The concepts of "anti-heroes" and "freedom fighters," societally accepted, not appointed, or legally hired protectors, is a growing modern phenomenon. This latest marvel not only shapes who may be intrigued to become a transient criminal or who may become a cop, it expands the motives to and networks (Mallory, 2000; Shelley & Picarelli, 2010) that commit transient crimes or that protect against these types of crimes. SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) also receives expansive value to this discussion topic through this fictional identity connection to superheroes and supervillains. Several SMEs discussed that who a potential recruit "can" become, both as a criminal or a cop, is now being threatened by the unrealistic thought of which superhero or supervillain they want to be like. The SMEs expounded on this topic by adding that "the youth of today have the competencies to make dynamic breakthroughs in technology such as augmented reality, robotics, and cyber advancements." These competencies, if used for the commission of crime, pose unknown possibilities and strengths to the transient criminal enterprise's future arsenal. The SMEs concluded with a fearful notion explaining that that border security does not have current or projected Triple Cs to

compete with advanced, technological threats of the previously mentioned magnitude; however, if successful transient recruitment of today's youth are being systematically and self-taught to master and hone these S.T.E.M. related skillsets then these recruits will have "the potential to bring border security LE to its knees."

Taking Advantage of Social Issues. The transient criminal enterprise has been given a primed opportunity to enhance their recruitment operations through the promotion and exploitation of being part of a 'causation' battle against current hot topics such as social injustice, gender and race inequality, job layoffs combined with inflation, deportation laws and policies, and police brutality. None of these aforementioned issues are new to criminal recruitment. In fact, illicit recruiters have levied upon their respective society's governmental and controlling entities frustration points since the beginning of recorded time. Examples can be found in ancient history with the revolt during the Shogun dynasty from "peasant" unrest (Davidson, 2022), the Grecian collapse from rebellions due to the poor treatment of the lower class by the rich social class (Browning, 1983), and the fall of Rome due to increases in commodities of prostitution and alcohol which reduced their country's military effectiveness and financial stability (Gill, 2020). More recently, and amongst US borders, the Revolutionary War saw their own citizens in the US succeed from their King due to inequalities of rights as Englishmen; the US Civil War witnessed biological kin, even brothers, go to war and kill one another due individual state, regions, and federal beliefs associated with the physical location they resided (History, 2023); and during the abolishing of slavery and creation of Civil Rights in the US (Newman, 2004), minority groups rose up against their majority "owners" for a cause greater than their individualistic self. Each of these examples started with a person,

a group that sparked an uprising for a cause. Many of these causes were deeply rooted in years, decades, even centuries of organizational dominance and social class control. The transnational criminal enterprise manages their messaging to their recruits similarly. They sway the recruit by creating a division between the recruit and legality, social conformity. Then, the enterprise links the feelings and desires of the recruit to their organizational objectives, promises, and hopes. The final stage in the recruitment process is based on the concepts of commitment and loyalty to the organization (Poole, 2022). This is where the recruit must choose whether they believe they have been wronged by those in power and control enough to become part of the criminal enterprise or whether they will retort back to being a part of the social control that provides uniformed rights to freedoms and protections for abiding by US governmental laws and cultural rules.

One SME said, “The transient criminal enterprise is not stupid. We (border security LE) like to pretend they are. But they are often smarter, better networked, have better weapons, and people, especially kids, want to be part of the best team. We (border security LE) are a good team. But I don’t know any 5-star athletes knocking down the doors of a good team; those good team coaches are begging that 5-star recruit to join their team. But, the best (sports) programs know they are the best and they are sitting back in their million-dollar offices waiting for those 5-stars to come knocking.” Staying on the topic of college, and while an outlier to the data collected about transient criminal recruits’ education levels, one SME claimed that the transient criminal enterprise is looking to recruit people with college educations, especially a professional degree in fields like medical, finance (Certified Public Accountants) or law. This tactic of recruiting “specialties” for what the organization needs to thrive as a business is not a

new concept for organized criminality. Albanese (2015), et al (Benson & Simpson, 2009, Cruz, 2010, Cullen, Cavender, Maakestad & Benson, 2006, Glenny, 2008), all provide examples of how mafias, cartels, and gangs increase their organizational stability and sustainability by adding the right type of professional to their team. Another SME added, “Being a street-smart criminal organization isn’t enough anymore. Protection of the organization must be run like a business. The more the business grows, the more experts they need. The needs to keep the criminal business going include lawyers, doctors, mechanics, and even cops.” Another SME said, “There is always a balance between good and evil. If the police are getting smarter, we must assume that criminals are getting smarter.” If these last two statements are truly a present reality, there needs to be a concerted effort placed not only on the training pipeline of identification and then combatting of this threat, but also on manning power allocations for border security personnel. Expanding the radius exponentially by both geographical width across territory and hierarchical height from blue to white collar professionals over exhausts the already understaffed border security LE force.

Diving Deeper into Profiling Categories. Adding one more recruitment profile to our current topic, one SME said, “The homeless are the most vulnerable targets for any type of transient criminal recruitment. They lack a social identity. They don’t pose a threat to other criminals. The police don’t want to deal with them and most of the time ignore them, and everyone else thinks of them as the least important part of their community.” For all these reasons mentioned by this SME, it makes complete sense why the homeless should be monitored for potential transient criminal recruitment. If a border security LEO can acknowledge their and their colleagues’ choices to disregard an at-risk

demographic, it should be assumed that the transient criminal enterprise's recruiters also know that the homeless and needy are going under the radar of the police and recognize the potential the homeless and needy offer their cause.

Digging deeper into the sociopsychological dimension of recruitment, this study's literature aligns again with border security practitioners who reference that their combined outside and inside the continental US experiences indicate that disenfranchised subsets of societies, like the homeless and the vulnerable youth from broken households, are purposefully targeted by criminal recruiters because of survivability reasons (Garcia, 2006, Lopez & Pairolero, 2019). Being physically, mentally, and emotionally disjointed from the norms of their communities provides a natural segway for the transient criminal enterprise to identify themselves as a recruit's replacement family (Racine, 2011, Shelley & Picarelli, 2010, Smith, 2014).

Additionally, the latter disjointed family structure offers the transient criminal enterprise to recruit vulnerable targets who come from families where their parents each work multiple jobs per day to put food on the table and pay rent; have one, if not both, of their parents in jail; are abused or neglected; forced to mature quicker than their peers; and are independently expected to adapt and survive without parental guidance and support. One SME that served similar roles in border security both outside the continental US and within the continental US said, "Of course, the landscape may look a little different. A third world or developing country may be filled with small villages that don't have air conditioning, plumbing for toilets, or even running water but is this really that much different from an inner city kid that has a dad in jail for being a gangbanger, a mom who is in the corner of their unpaid apartment with a needle in her arm and "friends"

waiting outside with guns in their waste bands hoping for an opportunity to hurt someone? I would say that the kid from the third world slums may have it better than our kid from a city of “freedom.”

Summary of Confidence, Training and the Transition to Discussing

Communication. In summation to RQs 2 and 3, the SMEs’ and this study’s literature agree that transient criminal recruiters fully comprehend that their potential recruits are looking for a way to better improve their quality of life. Yet, I wanted to further understand how a criminal recruit perceived their lives being positively changed by joining the transient criminal enterprise. The SME’s talked to me about the three different categories of motives for a transient recruit: 1) Reputation; 2) Financial; and 3) Basic needs. The SMEs acknowledged that the majority of transient recruits are pursued by the illicit enterprise during the recruit’s teenage years and early twenties. Under the category of “reputation” improvements to social statuses the SMEs explained that today’s recruits seek “likes” on social media through platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Tik-Tok. They chase fame through the amount of “followers,” “subscribers,” and “fans,” people that the recruit will most likely never actually meet. And, due to the limitless internet capabilities that are present and accessible to a transient criminal recruiter and potential recruit, along with the difficulty the cyber realm presents to border security LE, the transient criminal enterprise seems to have the upper hand in recruitment and criminal opportunities once again.

Moving on from this RQ addressing how border security agencies’ confidence levels differ in applying tactics and techniques of educating, training, and performing LE to combat transient criminal recruitment, another noteworthy finding came from the SME

interviews. I asked the SMEs if they could provide new tactics or techniques that would improve border security's force continuum against transient criminality. Interestingly enough, not a single SME was able to offer an additional tactic or technique. However, several SMEs did describe diversion and deterrence tactics as micro categories of proactive border security, whereas countering was described as a reactive tactic. Several SMEs also added that countering transient criminality should be viewed as "offensive" or "aggressive" tactics and diversion and deterrence should be listed as "defensive" or "posturing" tactics. I questioned the SMEs that brought up these thoughts by asking if they then believed "combatting" was tactically "offensive" or "defensive"?" All of the SMEs that were posed with this question said that "combatting" is associated with "offensive" maneuvering. One SME with a military combat background said that "all efforts, whether offensive or defensive in nature, are designed to eventually attack the enemy." This SME was explaining that diversion, deterrence, and countering techniques are all tools in a border security practitioner's arsenal and no matter what tool is needed to combat a specific transient crime, the end state goal of combatting this threat is to reduce its negative impact on society, eliminate its relevance in a culture, or to destroy its existence all together.

Tactics and techniques will only aid a practitioner so much in the battle for border security supremacy. Hence, I firmly agree with the SMEs that a third "t" in the trifecta of the Homeland Security's triforme must be directly associated with "trust." SMEs admitted that the older they get in age and the longer they are in their career, the more disconnected they become to the young criminals on the streets. They discussed the difficulties they have in keeping up with the rapidly changing and increasing

technological advancements such as smart phone capabilities, cybercrime tactics, and even social media evolving platforms. All of these discussions led to a common thread of thought that equates the difficulties senior border security practitioners experience in connecting and understanding younger criminals and the same difficulties the senior border security practitioners face with connecting and understand younger border security practitioners. One SME said, “I think the younger generation of officers and agents have more similarities with the new generation of bad guys than I have with them.”

Acknowledging this statement globally across both the younger and older generations of border security is the first step in closing the knowledge, communication, and productivity gaps that exist across the Homeland Security discipline. However, future efforts to build merging continuity-based programs between these two border security generations must be made a priority now because the transient criminal enterprise is not going to standby and wait for border security LE to figure out how to better work together and how to better set themselves up for crime fighting success. Liddick (2004), et al (Majeed & Malik, 2017, McQuaid & Gold, 2017, Tonry & Reuter, 2020) use historical accounts of organized criminal entities to suggest that rather than slowing down, the transient criminal enterprise will seek to exploit this internal border security LE disconnection and will become more aggressive in their criminal expansion through recruitment and commission of an array of transient criminal activities.

Conclusion. Being prepared for one or a few aspects of a border security threat is not an effective plan or practice to ensure homeland security. Defense starts with planning (Jones, 2022) and it extends through the intelligence creation process (Cozine, 2013, 2021). Moreover, it never ends. It is cyclical for a specific reason. The thought of

completely new and unique criminalities emerging is highly unlikely, thus, maintaining a foundational baseline that is known, understood, and trusted improves confidence and composure in border security professionals' reaction time to the threat, immediate development of intra level communications amongst the DHS LE community, and adaptive decision making by individual and joint leadership partners. The evolution of the transient criminal threat poses organizational preparedness stress on DHS. However, until a new transient criminal tactic or technique is present, DHS, specifically border security LE, should focus their efforts on improving their communication proficiencies.

RESEARCH QUESTION 4.

The Question. How can information gathering and intelligence production processes be improved in order to lead to higher levels of joint border security operational confidence in combating transient criminality recruitment?

The Short Answer. Border security LE and their respective agencies just need to start talking to each other. Open and honest communication must increase in frequency and totality. Transparency is key. Finding common ground through joint mission objective success that also achieves both or all agencies' objectives. Additionally, agencies must overtly and genuinely promote inter and intra level communication by their employees. This promotion of sharing information and intelligence must also be started or at least be followed up with actionable examples by leaders and then codified by partnerships and consortiums that offer border security employees a channel to share this information without the fear of reprisal. The systems and processes of border security communication must become system and process driven, eliminating individual personality dependency.

Key Takeaway. Less than optimal information and intelligence transfer between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of DHS suffers from communication deficiencies and not a lack of information gathered from the field or intelligence products created. Most of these communication issues exist because leaders and organizations purposefully have chosen not to all-inclusively share their information and intelligence with internal and external border security “partners.”

Introduction. Cozine, an intelligence legacy practitioner and leader in the academic community offers a clear explanation for why intelligence rarely reaches the people who need it the most at the time when they could use it the most (2021). He summates, while supporting the SMEs’ argument from this study, that untrained border security patrol personnel begin the degradation of intelligence dissemination process. Cozine attributes this issue to the “vacuum cleaner effect” (Cozine, 2021), where the first line information gatherer (most often local LEOs) overwhelms the intelligencers by not understanding the difference between “noise” and “signals;” thus, sending more raw information from the field than the IC can timely or accurately process. And, while I fully agree and support Cozine’s analysis of the vacuum cleaner effect on SOST (Bajc, 2013), I would expand the scope of this known IC and DHS concern by challenging future researchers to examine not only “What is the noise?” and “What is the signal?,” but also, “What or who is causing the noises and signals?” It is within these centers of gravity that the information and intelligence transfers of useful signals can be created.

Comprehension of Information Gathering and Intelligence Production

Processes. This study’s literature speaks to the decades of less-than-optimal border security information gathering and intelligence creation tactics and techniques (Cozine,

2013; Logan, 2018). The history of information gathering indicates that more information is gathered when intelligencers employ the multisource approach to researching and acquiring information from the field (Cozine, 2013, 2021). However, the multisource approach from a multitude of differently trained and objectively driven intelligencers also means more “noise” is created for intelligencers at the operational level of intelligence analysis and creation. This section examines the SMEs’ experiences with gathering information and creating intelligence through the previously mentioned complexities of the intelligence process.

Gathering Information from the Field. This section is devoted to understanding how transient criminality information is gathered from the field and how that information is analyzed and ultimately turned into intelligence. The majority (18) of the SMEs said that their preferred method to gathering information relevant to transient crimes is through HUMINT, the technique of learning directly from a culture through firsthand experiences (Cozine, 2021). They explained that while they are aware that the methods and techniques associated with HUMINT gathering requires a significant amount of time and money, the benefit of using this method provides an unmatched “intimate intelligence experience” compared to any other individual information or intelligence gathering strategy. Additionally, the SMEs connected HUMINT to SNT (Mallory, 2000) as an attributable enhancer because HUMINT links people, cultures, and the practitioners to “real-time information,” “firsthand experiences,” and “face-to-face encounters.” They explained that people who live, work, and frequent the areas of transient criminal operations have the best knowledge of who, what, when, where, and why criminality occurs. One SME specifically mentioned that “HUMINT allowed for all five of my

senses to gather information simultaneously, and that is just not possible with any other [intelligence gathering] method.” Moreover, continuity of thought between practitioners and academics on the value of HUMINT information gathering was discernible. The 2 SMEs that believed other methods than HUMINT possessed more valued information gathering worth came from intelligencers. These intelligence analysts did not believe that quality intelligence can be created from merely one border security defender technique in the field. They adamantly stood by the need for the existence of an as close to real-time, simultaneous HUMINT and OSINT information gathering operational relationship. Their concept was to ensure that potential HUMINT noise could be researched, verified, and validated for creditability during mass raw information overloads to the intelligence process’ capabilities and capacities. Yet, even these two SMEs conveyed that uniting academics with practitioners on the desirability to attain HUMINT to both influence practical decision-making and advancements in curriculum design and educational instruction is essential and should be considered present in all information gathering missions.

We may be putting the cart slightly before the horse; because the collective literature was supported by the SMEs when discussing the homeland security discipline’s lack of directed intent to their field agents and the field agents’ limited intimate knowledge of the intelligence gathering technique desired by intelligencers for their respective information gathering missions. Even in the most robust border security agencies (mainly federal three letter agencies), where the agencies have adequate personnel and resources to conduct a multisource information mining investigation, each specific intelligence gathering approach requires specialized training of the systems, processes, and techniques

associated with that individual intelligence gathering type. Hence, the difficulty in gathering intelligence is not related to finding information from the field. All agents and officers in the field talk to people, observe things, hear things, and conduct assessments. The hard part for intelligence analysts is siphoning through all that field information to find out what really has intelligence value. One SME posed a sarcastically serious rhetorical question when they said, “If only there was a way for all the different intelligence gatherers to know what each other are gathering intelligence on. Maybe some type of linking program or database that smart people can set up so that field agents can receive a dumbed down version of what the analysts find important and what they still need to learn. Hmmm. Do you think that will ever happen? No. No. It probably won’t.” This SME was explaining that they were not looking to learn or understand all the different types of intelligence gathering techniques. Instead, they were requesting a better way for each intelligencer SME of their individual method to sync with each other in as close to real time.

The following example provides clarity on how this process would work. If a HUMINT gatherer, a SIGINT gatherer, GEOINT gatherer and an Open Source gatherer are all working on the same transient related crime, such as human trafficking, then there should be a way for each intelligence gatherer to quickly and efficiently understand what the other two gatherers have found and all three should know what the higher level analysts wants to know. This would reduce the amount of time spent gathering information on the same target, danger faced (in some cases, mostly for HUMINT) by being in the field and around issues that have already been investigated by another intelligencer, and confusion created by the collective lack of effective communication

between intelligencers. Maybe a bit more eloquently explained, one SME mentioned, “There truly might be a system out there, actually, I am convinced that there is a system out there that can tell me anything I need to know about what information has already been gathered and what information still needs to be found. But, I just haven’t been told where that system is and from my generation to today’s generation, I have not met another agent that has ever seen that system either.”

During my experience as Deadpool Company’s Commander and CENTAM AOB’s CA and PO Planner, I lived through the same type of struggles mentioned by the SMEs above. Even with a high level security clearance and a “need to know,” quality intelligence took time to create and due to regulatory requirements related to encryption and security of sensitive and secret levels of intelligence, the systems and programs my teams and I used became cumbersome; resulting in less than optimal information and intelligence sharing. In many cases, my teams would choose to not only gather their own information based on leads they assigned themselves, but they would also discuss their findings from their assessments and mapping missions to develop basic, intuitive intelligence packages. This extra step at the tactical level conveyed a clear message to me as both their Commander and Operations Planner. My teams were not getting the intelligence they required or desired from the fusion cell at the AOB and when they shared “all” or even “most” of the information they gathered from the field, the intelligence creation process at the operational level required my Soldiers to come to the AOB, either in person or via secure video and audio program to conduct an in-brief (high level discussion about potentially classified information gathered from the field). My teams quickly lost faith in this process because they felt as if they were putting in all,

100% of the time and effort into the intelligence process and the intelligencers only took information from them and never gave back any intelligence products they could actually use to improve or enhance their missions. I remember one of my team chiefs telling me during our redeployment AAR that he and his team always felt like the fusion cell had a different mission and a different agenda than they did. The team chief said this in disappointment and suggested that joint objective clarity by, with, and through the AOB Commander and staff should be built into the weekly battle rhythm, rather than simply assuming that the tactical forces always know exactly what they are supposed to be gathering from the field. The team chief's major point was that communication of intent, arguably the most fundamental and important facet of a military operational order, was significantly lacking in clarity and consistency across the border security force. This caused each team, each department, each individual to question what their peers, supervisors, and even the senior level decision-makers were actually doing. Trust became an earned individual Soldier and team badge of honor rather than a systematic and process driven attribute.

Back to the Multisource Advantage. There are ways to unify a team through the information gathering and intelligence creation processes. One way to accomplish this is to ensure each step of the intelligence process utilizes a multisource approach. Cozine (2013, 2021), Logan (2018), and the SMEs again agree that a multisource approach to gathering information is the overall optimal way to ensure that the intelligence sector of border security has as much accurate information to conduct intelligence analysis as possible. SOST (Bajc, 2013) suggests security of constructs such as borders and barriers, and concepts like centers of gravity, requires that information be societally important to

have a lasting positive or negative impact. The SMEs claimed that a multisource approach is the most complete way to gather information because it allows for information to “eclectically” “link” and “verify” to what DHS decides is important now. Yet, based on my experience, a gap in the scholars’ and SMEs’ multisource assessment can be improved, if not filled. During each step of the intelligence process, hierarchical teams, from a top-down, bottom-up (Cozine, 2021; Morley, 2015; Busch & Givens, 2014) should be created. These teams should be assigned a specific intelligence technique. SOPs must then force battle rhythm synchronization between all like intelligence technique personnel. The SOPs should conclude with a combined hierarchal update brief to a decision-maker that ensures that each layer of the information gathering and intelligence creation process is represented by an intelligence technique team that has worked together to develop the intelligence being presented.

Another issue with gathering border security information is found in using a multisource information gathering and intelligence creation approach. Even in the most robust border security agencies (mainly federal three letter agencies), where the agencies have adequate personnel and resources to conduct a multisource information mining investigation, each specific intelligence gathering approach requires specialized training of the systems, processes, and techniques associated with that individual intelligence gathering type. Hence, the difficulty in gathering intelligence is not related to finding information from the field. All agents and officers in the field talk to people, observe things, hear things, and conduct assessments. The hard part for intelligence analysts is siphoning through all that field information to find out what really has intelligence value. One SME posed a sarcastically serious rhetorical question when they said, “If only there

was a way for all the different intelligence gatherers to know what each other are gathering intelligence on. Maybe some type of linking program or database that smart people can set up so that field agents can receive a dumbed down version of what the analysts find important and what they still need to learn. Hmmm. Do you think that will ever happen? No. No. It probably won't." This SME was explaining that they were not looking to learn or understand all the different types of intelligence gathering techniques. Instead, they were requesting a better way for each intelligencer SME of their individual method to sync with each other in as close to real time. The following example provides clarity on how this process would work. If a HUMINT gatherer, a SIGINT gatherer, GEOINT gatherer and an Open Source gatherer are all working on the same transient related crime, such as human trafficking, then there should be a way for each intelligence gatherer to quickly and efficiently understand what the other two gatherers have found and all three should know what the higher level analysts wants to know. This would reduce the amount of time spent gathering information on the same target, danger faced (in some cases, mostly for HUMINT) by being in the field and around issues that have already been investigated by another intelligencer, and confusion created by the collective lack of effective communication between intelligencers. Maybe a bit more eloquently explained, one SME mentioned, "There truly might be a system out there, actually, I am convinced that there is a system out there that can tell me anything I need to know about what information has already been gathered and what information still needs to be found. But, I just haven't been told where that system is and from my generation to today's generation, I have not met another agent that has ever seen that system either."

SOST (Bajc, 2013) implies that quality information gathering and intelligence creation must have a repeatable starting point nucleus. Border security practitioners attested that this is a critical flaw in their collective intelligence process. They indicated that due to their reactive information gathering nature, border security LE often is responding post a transient criminal activity. They also added that due to limited overall LEOs and moreover, even fewer experienced and trained LEOs, being in the right place and the right time when a premeditated transient criminal event occurs is mostly “coincidental” or “lucky.” The SMEs stating that open source searching via the internet should be the first step in all proactive transient criminal intelligence operations, as it leads to the greatest initial criminal information gathering results. One SME said, “I started my career when technology was primitive. It was really tough to catch a bad guy during those days; but you didn’t know that. You just figured that that was the way the game of cops and robbers was played. But now, today, the internet has become a gamechanger.” An even playing field has been created by modern globalization advancements such as technology; however, the SMEs’ experienced responses about this topic and the transient criminal enterprise’s steady profit increases over the last several decades (Albanese, 2001, 2009, 2015, 2018) indicate that transient criminals are expanding their social networks and increasing their cyber capabilities at significantly higher and more success rates. The SMEs claimed that the reason for the disparity between border security LE and the transient criminal enterprise is based on two very simple realities. First, the transient criminal enterprise invests more resources from their Triple Cs and second, they train during real world missions (the commission of crime) significantly more than border security LE. While this specific example of transient

criminal dominance over border security is focused on technology, the same concepts the SMEs stated are the reasons the transient criminal enterprise seems to be winning the battles and war over transient crime expansion holds true in the facets of financial growth, business organizational structure, marketing of commodities, and overall customer service.

Moving from Info to Intel. As this chapter transitions from information gathering to intelligence production, there is a glaring chokepoint that must be addressed now and researched more intensely in the future. How can DHS expect to compete with a globalized, mobile networked threat when they lack continuity in the most basic phase of the intelligence process, the distribution of gathered information to the initial intelligence analyst? This cyclical relationship between information gathering and intelligence production centers around verbal and written communication proficiency levels. These proficiencies across the discipline determine the level of confidence practitioners have in not only their abilities to combat transient criminality, but also their confidence in the intelligence production process. The majority of SMEs (13) in this study could not identify where their gathered information goes to be culminated or analyzed within their own agency, nor in the greater border security and homeland security sectors. Less than half of the SMEs (7) claimed to know exactly where their field information goes once it is submitted within their agency. And even more concerning was the fact that a mere 4 of those 7 SMEs said they only learned where their field information goes and what those analysts do with that field information because they promoted into the position that receives the information during a latter part of their careers. The lack of border security knowledge of their internal information transfer processes sets the stage early for a

dysfunctional inter and intra communicative organizational plan. This seems to mean that working silos (Cozine, 2021) unintentionally exist in two of the most critical facets of border security information and intelligence transferring, initial reporting and influences on products presented to decision-making authorities. These two products are vitally important steps in the intelligence process (Cozine, 2013, 2021). Moreover, the intelligence process is one of the core pillars to combatting organized crimes (Albanese, 2015, 2019) such as transient criminality.

Reporting. One of the continuity issues of information transfer from the tactical to the operational levels during the intelligence process was identified in how the information from the field was documented, presented, and delivered to the intelligence analysts. Morley (2015) discusses this same dilemma throughout DHS from a business perspective. He explains that synergy is created through open, honest, and thorough communication (Morley, 2015). Cozine, et al (2021), expounds, specifically through the IC's point of view, on Morley's synergic notion by adding that the IC suffers from communicating in often untimely, partial truths which leads to distrust throughout the industry. These scholars' thoughts led me to ask the SMEs about how they attempt to combat poor communication and a lack of trust from their internal and external border security partners. The majority of the SMEs (18) stated that reports, written records of what they observed, felt, and experienced would elevate the disconnect between sender and receiver during the information to intelligence transfer process. Yet, as I dug deeper into this topic with the SMEs, more than half of them (11) claimed that they send digital field reports to their internal agency's repository and have no personal interaction with the receiver of their reports. Additionally, they experienced the same type of training and

SOP requirements to report writing that I did. Border security LE reports are templated, designed for conciseness and factual correctness, which reduces or eliminates any emotion or opinion on what the practitioner thought about the situation.

Report Reviewing and Editing. Outside of SMEs with a military background (which caused a variation of responses due their individual missions and deployment experiences), the other border security LE SMEs summated that after their immediate supervisors review and finally approve their field reports, they believe the repositories and databases in which their reports are sent to, are observed, and are archived are by civilian agency employees, not sworn LE. One SME said, “I assume someone who is working with a badge and gun is not the ones looking at my reports, because I never hear anything back after I submit a report and I am pretty sure that anyone who has worn a badge and has worked the streets would have the professional curtesy to let me know when my report either made a difference or it (the SME’s report) was absolute trash. Either way, it just would be nice to get some feedback every once in a while.” And, while this previous SME comment is quite an assumption, the perceptive feeling behind the SME’s words link to a common point a frustration amongst nearly all the SMEs in this study. Most of the SMEs did not value civilian (non-sworn) employees in LE agencies. This is very similar to the way in which the SMEs label and stereotype pure academics in the training and education sectors of border security. The SMEs claimed that civilians supporting LEOs lack professional LE understanding of “what it’s like to be a cop,” real-world LE daily stressors and expectations, and even the civilians that once were sworn LE, either “think they still hold their old rank” or “they have no idea what today’s LE is

like because they have been removed from the line (tactical environment) for far too long.”

Summaries rather than Reports. A little over a handful of SMEs (7) used a different submission method for their gathered field information. These SMEs submitted informational summaries, also known as intelligence summaries, to joint agency fusion cells and intelligence departments. All but one of these seven SMEs worked border security for a military, joint, outside the continental US agency. Hence, a common trend was discovered that linked military trained and deployed service members to being trained to combat transient criminality and to communicate more effectively between DOD, DHS, and other border security LE partner agencies than local, state, and federal border security LEOs that have only worked within the borders of the continental US.

As the CENTAM AOB CA and PO Planner I regularly built my Common Operating Picture based on both the unclassified information and classified intelligence summaries that were sent from the tactical operators in the field. Due to the geo-dispersion that existed amongst my teams, which extended throughout all countries of Central America and the Caribbean, these templated, specialized summaries afforded me tremendously valuable snapshots of individual moments from various strategic level centers of gravity. These summaries improved my timeliness in extracting trends, themes, and abnormal, even asymmetrical actions involving people, places, and things within our area of operations. And, while I conducted my analysis of these summaries through my mission scope lens, subdepartments within the overall fusion cell dissected these same summaries, answering specific, required questions about the operational environment from their mission perspective. These specific questions, while individualistically

imperative to accomplishing that specific intelligencer's mission fell under the same supervisors, and most importantly had the same ultimate mission objective. Collective objective syncing through a single leadership directive and intent became the forcing function for improved inter and intra level communications.

Issues with Inputting Data. Only two federal SMEs stated that they inputted their informational findings directly into an interagency database. These federal SMEs were the only SMEs to say that they ever received feedback and intelligence back post their initial field information submission. The more weighted portion of their insight to receiving intelligence back from the operational level is that neither SMEs found the “intelligence” reliable, useful, and/or timely enough to make it useful in practicality. The SMEs reference to time in the previous statement is exactly what Cozine (2013, 2021) referred to as the measure of effectiveness for an intelligence product. Cozine (2021) stated that “time” is the variable that determines if intelligence has practical value and if the ROI was worth the efforts of the information gatherers and the intelligence analysts.

Scholarly literature, Logan (2018), et al (Lowenthal, 2022; Cozine, 2013, 2016) implied that intelligence products lack potency in being effective in the field because the intelligence does not reach the right practitioner at the time in which they truly need it. The SMEs supported that ideal and further explained that they do not believe there is a perfect intelligence package for fighting transient crime. The majority of SMEs had simplistic expectations for quality intelligence. They only desired “timeliness” and “accuracy.” One federal field agent SME stated, “Just give me a 90%, hell, I would take a 60% confirmed intel hit while I am in the field as long as it is when I need it.” Another SME conferred with the previous statement by adding, “In my experience 100%

intelligence is only found in reports and summaries when someone in the field dies. A dead agent is pretty conclusive. That's easy to get right.”

I asked the SMEs to explain why they believe that a perfect intelligence package cannot be created when combatting transient crime. A border patrol SME summated their colleagues' thoughts on this question while also agreeing with Albanese (2015, 2020) by answering, “Transient crime is always evolving, adapting, and changing. It's rapid and aggressive and for these reasons it is simply unfair for us (border security field practitioners) to have an expectation that the wizards in the red room can get us perfect intel when we need it.”

Impact on Decision Making. The intelligence production process is conducted to ultimately inform decision-makers on what is important to the current mission (Lowenthal, 2022; Cozine, 2021). The SMEs claimed that these intelligence products provide leaders with updates to the 5Ws, significant changes to the operational environment or target, or social, cultural, or political developments that either make their LE personnel's job more difficult and/or the threat's goal more achievable. Yet, while intelligence products have the goal of filling the decision-makers' requests for information, the SME's did not believe that intelligencers should solely be responsible for actionable intelligence reaching the practitioners in the field. The SMEs explained that decision-makers, even at the highest, most strategic levels of border security, should be able to make quality decisions with less than 100% of the information from the field being turned into intelligence. One of the most experienced SMEs (by time and positions) said that when leaders do not make decisions because they claim that they “do not have all or enough information,” they are often “lacking in confidence, experience, intestinal

fortitude or a combination of the three.” This SME went on to say that “more often than not, making a decision with the most current and best intelligence you have before the final hour leads to mission success and saving lives.” Another SME added more insight to this discussion topic by bringing to life Cozine’s (2013, 2021) concept of why timeliness of intelligence is so critically important to border security operations. Cozine argues that timeliness is not just linear, meaning that timely intelligence is not categorized by the most current chronological information gathered from the field. Rather, Cozine speaks to timely intelligence as ensuring the right homeland security practitioner has the most relevant information from the gambit of potential information available when needed. Hence, timeliness is all about getting the right information in the hands of the person who needs it the most and can use it the best at a given moment (Cozine, 2013, 2021).

With this being said, the SME added, “Real lives are at risk every second. Real people are on the battlefield waiting for someone “important” in an office or conference room to decide whether or not those real people come home to their real spouses, their real kids, their real families.” The concept of intelligence being only intelligent when it is relevant is the key takeaway here. Several SMEs summated that decision-makers can wait until they have all the information from the field. They can wait until all that information is analyzed, synthesized, and turned into beautifully formatted intelligence products. However, for every second that is wasted conducting double and triple checks for information relevancy and finding a small pebble of useful information amongst the mountain of distractions and “noise” (Cozine, 2021), the transient criminal threat becomes closer to their goal and as they get closer to winning, what was once quality

information and valuable intelligence may now be outdated and obsolete to those in the tactical, everchanging, adaptive environment.

Discussing Border Security Crosstalk and Counter-Criminal Communications.

More abundant than any other topic in this study is relevant literature discussing the lack of communication proficiencies between Homeland Security and border security LE individuals and agencies (Duncan, 2019; Fisher & Geller, 2009; Winstead, 2021). The SMEs in my study corroborated the literature that indicated inter and intra level communications related to border security agencies sharing information and intelligence to combat transient criminality is less than optimally efficient and effective. This is fortunately a systematic and process driven deficiency. I say “fortunately” because systems and processes are simpler to fix than problems created by individually or culturally driven personalities.

Overall Concepts of Inter and Intra Level Communication. The phrase and notion of, “I wish I would have known that yesterday” is a reality that can truly lead to mission success or failure and life or death decisions made by many tactical border security practitioners and operational level intelligencers. Because synergy through communicative means is such a rare commodity throughout all of DHS (Morley, 2015), I have chosen to break down this subsection into border security hierarchical facets. My intention is to provide a clear depiction of each hierarchical level of border security’s value to the joint battle against transient criminality. I will conclude this discussion with a brief synopsis of how improvements to the inter and intra communications would increase border security’s collective information and intelligence sharing, leading to a

more efficient and effective tactical to strategic response to the recruitment and expansion of the transient criminal enterprise.

The State LE Agencies. Let's dissect this failure to communicate dilemma one hierarchical jurisdiction at a time. The state LEOs and agencies had the greatest percentage drop of any SME category when comparing inter and intra level information sharing. Yet, due to their limited tactical and strategic level border security impact, having leadership that does not promote crosstalk or information sharing at the state level of border security LE does not seem to significantly or even mildly degrade border security operations in combatting transient criminality. The local LE offices, departments and federal border security agencies collectively cover all jurisdictional lines in which the border criminals cross, and the federal LE entities have equal to more resources to support any local LE agency than the state agencies do. This unfortunately leaves the state reps as the odd entity out in the larger scheme of operational and strategic planning to counter and combat active border security threats. However, my analysis of the state's net worth is not completely helpless to border security operations. While I do not find a great deal of value in their ability to help with present border security threats that are currently taking place, I do see the state agencies providing proactive support in planning and resourcing strategic state and joint state level diversion and deterrent operations. I also see the states' LE agencies leveling up the fight against border security threats by reactively taking on cold cases and using their statewide jurisdictional databases and freedom of movement to connect the dots between old crimes and new ones. These generated leads may very well help local and federal agencies solve current and future border crimes.

The Local LE Offices and Departments. Local sheriffs' offices and police departments need and desire the greatest improvements to intra level communications and information sharing amongst all border security LE hierarchies. With the most total LEOs in tactical roles, the first responder and first line leaders of the boots on the ground information gathering and fight against transient criminality starts with them. One of my SME detectives said that "I was only as good as the information I had, so I wanted it all, from everyone, all the time." This SME also added that they had to go behind their department leadership's verbal direction to not work with other agencies in order to successfully do their job. And while the SME acknowledged that their decision to work with other agencies violated their leadership's directive, they explained that they "looked in the mirror every night and knew that [they] made a positive difference." They added that they internally convinced themselves that their choice to work outside the SOPs of their department and direct orders of their senior leaders was based on the "greater good." They said that they "morally and ethically" believed that "solving crime and arresting bad guys outweighed any political, personal agendas." This had to be a difficult decision for a border security LEO. From day one of police academy or any entry level border security training, border security professionals are taught to not challenge, defy, or question a supervisor's direct orders. This concept of hierarchical leadership is engrained as a core value in a border security professional and while one detective may decide to go against this way of policing life, it takes at least two border security professionals to agree to share information for this process to work and become effective in practicality. When the detective SME was asked about how they convinced border security professionals from other agencies, especially other local agencies that had leadership that also did not

promote intra-agency information sharing, they said that they “simply did not bring up the fact that I wasn’t supposed to talk with [the other LEO].” They added that they “stayed off department issued phones and computers” when working with other officers and “built relationships like [they] did with informants on the streets.” They concluded that “it really wasn’t that hard” to get other officers to work with them, they said that “there was a common goal and that was to catch criminals/nothing else really mattered.”

The Federal Agents. The federal border security agents and agencies have the greatest opportunity to be the gamechangers for information and intelligence sharing systems and processes improvements for border security LE across the country and the world. Their jurisdictional authorities combined with their national and international partnerships reach beyond the borders that need to be secured for the US to be safe from transient criminality. However, even with all this resourceful power and presence, the US federal border security sector struggles to share information with not only local and state border security LE agencies, but they do a lackluster job in sharing this vital information and intelligence with their brother and sister federal border security agencies as well. Proprietary systems, sole responsibility of those systems’ analyses, and prideful reputations, along with financial incentives motivate individual federal border security LE agencies to withhold or not share information and intelligence with the rest of the force. I argue that change must start with the federal agencies. It must systematically change through current departmental policy amendments and future consortium agreements.

The Military. Yes, the military falls under the federal government’s umbrella of border security assets. However, the SMEs’ responses to specifically how the military

promotes and executes their inter and intra level communications significantly differs from other three letter federal border security LE entities. Yet, even though the military as a whole communicates more effectively than other levels of border security LE, an internal to the military question arose post interview data analysis. I now question, “Why would only the Army say that their military branch promotes intra-agency information sharing? What makes the Army’s structure or mission different from the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Space Force?” Before discussing what the Army SMEs said, it must be noted that all 5 Army SMEs that said the Army promotes sharing information between agencies claimed that the commands they served that promoted this type of sharing was part of a joint military command.

Joint military commands are comprised of multiple military branches serving together and often working out of a Joint Operations Command (JOC) cell. The JOC is designed so that operational military and civilian analysts, planners, and strategists can combine their military branch specific skillsets and resources so that all tactical military assets, no matter what branch they come from, receive the most optimal resourced support possible for their missions. The 12 military SMEs collectively served in over 100 different military units during their careers. 4 out of 5 Army SMEs that worked for units that promoted intra-agency information sharing said that they did not experience the command/unit promotion of intra-agency info sharing while part of a traditional, line unit (i.e., infantry, military police). They all claimed that it was not until they reclassified (to a new Army job, specifically to civil affairs, psychological operations, or special forces (the special operations umbrella)) and were trained in unconventional warfare tactics that they experienced the promotion of sharing information with other agencies. The lone

remaining Army SME was a pure military intelligence branched Army Officer and said that information sharing between all agencies was a specific topic of their initial training. Another common attribute that all 5 Army SMEs had when they were part of an intra-agency sharing unit was that they all had “Top Secret” military clearances. The military intelligence Army Officer said that when a civilian or military personnel, no matter which branch they are from, has a top secret clearance, especially if they are “read in” (missioned with a need-to-know, ability to utilize, and briefed about intelligence that if released to threat entities would pose a probable national security threat) and have a “TS/SCI,” (Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information) there is a “innate trust in the clearance issuance process” that allows for intelligencers to “comfortably and without delay share information with those that have a need-to-know.”

The Private Sector. Another interesting theme was learned when the SMEs spoke about how their private sector employer (individual leader and collective company) didn’t promote intra-agency information sharing. The leadership approach and message were much less direct than in the public sector of border security LE. The private sector leaders talked about “disappointment” and “shame” of being the person who negatively impacted the company by sharing information. There was also a trend in how information was deemed as “value” by private sector leadership and while promotion of sharing information was not overtly present, the practice of giving a little info to someone else was acceptable, as long as you gained more intelligence in return. The culture created by the private sector, through always looking for profit gains, in financial and in informational ways, naturally deterred most employees from seeking out other agencies and professionals in the same field for assistance or collaboration. One SME said, “It was

just a lot less stressful to figure out what I needed to know on my own, then to try to work around all the caution tape that the company put up.” I found it interesting that the SME used the words, “caution tape” rather than “red tape.” The private sector SMEs conveyed a clear message that the private sector, due to its unique perspective on border security success, which was more about making money than catching criminals, rarely gave direct orders to not do an action. The private sector also rarely put in writing that a certain action or relationship with other companies, people, and places were off limits. Most of their guidance was during internal meetings and through verbal messaging. This seemed to leave purposeful “loopholes” for employees to find and exploit to increase profit gains, if the situation was to arise. The SMEs of the private sector did speak about certain off limit sharing topics. These topics included “proprietary” information about tactics, techniques, or tangible resources, contract agreements and required outputs in which the company is required to achieve, and information that would jeopardize the “survival” of the business. The latter “survival” of the business topic became the catch-all that linked the private and public sector SMEs to choosing to avoid working with each other. The ease of using perspective, subjectivity, and even the ‘unknown’ was just too high of a risk for most private and public sector border security professionals to engage in external partnerships for information exchanges.

The private sector employees embraced their directives to keep information and intelligence internal to themselves and their company. They rallied around the notion that this was their job, their roles and responsibilities that separated them from public sector employees. And, unlike many public border security LE employees who have job descriptions that are vague and generalized, the private sector hires its employees to do

very specific jobs and to complete very specific tasks. SMEs from the private sector said that they are “groomed to be SMEs in their particular job.” For example: a private sector contractor that is in contracting acquisitions has a certain geographical area in which they are tasked to gain resigning and new contracts. This is like having a public sector LE jurisdictional boundary. However, unlike a LE boundary that has an inherent expectation to be overstepped if a crime starts inside a certain jurisdiction and extends into another, allowing the LEO to continue their pursuit of the criminal, the contractor of the private company knows that they will not cross that boundary, no matter what the potential reward may be. The concept of “thought” was a key decision-making factor that separated the public and private sector when examining roles and responsibilities. The private sector employees rarely gave an unassigned duty a second thought, whereas the public sector employee experienced a great deal of mental and emotional stress from having to decide whether or not the unassigned duty fell into the “gray area” of their roles and responsibilities to “serve and protect.” A few common phrases used by the private sector SMEs regarding this concept was, “It’s not my job” and “I don’t get paid for doing that.” In contrast, the phrases, “If I don’t help, who will” and “This is what I signed up to do” were used to describe the way the public sector employees think about the topic.

A Deeper Dive into Interagency Level Communications. Interagency communications hold significant value to local daily border security LE operations; however, communication proficiency and moreover, confidence in interagency communication can prove too invaluable for shaping operations at the operational and strategic levels. Unfortunately, only 50% of SMEs (10) said that their border security agency promoted internal information and intelligence sharing. With this equal

dichotomy of a response, further analysis specifically “who” works for an agency that promotes sharing and “who” belongs to an agency that does not like to share is needed.

Federal Sector. Let’s start federally during this subsection. Four out of six SMEs who had worked at the federal level in border security (other than military) said that their agencies promoted inter informational and intelligence sharing. Those four SMEs also added that their internal agency sharing led them to be more confident in their abilities to counter transient criminal recruitment related threats. The two SMEs that did not agree were the only two border patrol SMEs in my subject group. One SME was at the tactical level and the other worked at the operational level. The most important takeaway from this subgroup of LEOs is that confidence rises when communication between fellow federal agents exists. This may superficially sound obvious; however, due to the overwhelming amount of influence the federal LE sector has on the combat operations against transient criminality, any enhancement to the collective federal sector of LE’s should receive additional future research and attention, while concurrently being furtherly cultivated.

State Sector. Only one out of three SMEs that had worked at the state level said that their agency promoted inter sharing and that raised their confidence level. This SME worked for their state’s bureau of investigation (SBI). The SBI agent explained that in their state, the SBI was a reactive agency and was called upon by local LE agencies when the case exceeded that local agency’s resources or experience. Thus, interagency sharing existed through “force of occupational survival.” In other words, for an SBI agent to be successful in their career, because of the unique design and mission-set of the department, they must seek out and sort of investigate other SBI agent’s casework to

continue to elevate their expertise so that they are relevant as SMEs to the local agencies that ask for their help. The SBI agent also said that their agency does not necessarily verbalize or even put into written policy that information sharing is authorized or will exist; however, the SBI database allows for all SBI agents to access all cases and subfolders within those cases. Additionally, the database lists witnesses, victims, and points of contact for parties involved in the case.

The other two SMEs that did not agree worked for their state's justice department in the standards and policy writing division and as a state trooper in their state's highway patrol department. The SME from their state's standard and policy writing division explained that their agency operates in "silos" (Cozine, 2021). The SME further described the reason for lack of sharing within their agency by telling me that each agent is given a task or objective, a subject to focus their work efforts on. With this type of personnel and operations design and relationship, the SME said that they rarely if ever speak with any other agent within their agency. They simply focus on their assignments and then if they are told to co-author a policy or jointly write a curriculum, then they will work with another agent (which the agency chooses). One of the real takeaways from speaking with this SME was when they said, "I am so used to working by myself at this point in my LE career, that I truly haven't thought about information sharing. I just assume that I do my job and the other LEOs out there are doing theirs." This SME also stated that they were not sure how effective their agency is in the larger scheme of LEO development, which is one of their agency's mission cornerstones. They added that once they complete writing a new state policy or develop a state curriculum for a certain topic or objective, they rarely are the teachers of that new standard or program. They pass the

published product digitally to all the local and state LE instructors and “hope they teach it right.”

Local Sector. The further we get to the boots on the ground, the fewer SMEs stated that their agency promoted interagency information sharing. Zero (out of four) local level SMEs claimed that their police department or sheriff’s office promoted inter agency sharing. This is a very important statistic to digest. If my sample of local SMEs all agree that local level LE throughout all cities and all counties do not promote information sharing amongst themselves, then this means they also do not promote the information they gather from the streets and from the citizens who live in the neighborhoods in which they patrol. The stereotypical bad-blood relationship between “the elected” sheriff and “the appointed” police chief could not be more on display than here with the lack of information sharing. Additionally, and maybe even more importantly, all four local SMEs claimed that this lack of internal information sharing negatively impacted their level of confidence in day-to-day border security LE operations. One of the local SMEs claimed that they could remember when they were in field training and the FTO told them that they “just need to keep [their] head down and make it through [their] shift.” In summation, that SME said that the FTO explained that crime was never going to go away and that at the local level, LEOs will continue to arrest the same type of people, if not the same exact person, for their entire careers; so, why then does it matter if LEOs at the local level waste their time sharing information.

While all four SMEs said that their departments do not promote interlevel information sharing, all four did say that they started their local LE shifts with in-briefs which provided them detailed information of what their immediate supervisors or the

department wanted them to look for or work on during that specific shift. When asked if that is not a natural way to promote information sharing, all four SMEs said, “No.” One of those SMEs said that the only reason those in-briefs exist is because “that’s just the way it always has been done.” The SME explained that they do not think any grander, more strategic thought was put in by their leaders when their in-briefs were established and continued as a part of their SOP. Another SME shared that they felt like every time they went on shift, they had to start their patrol of an area from scratch. They explained that they also felt that the community and especially the criminals knew this and would have an additional leg up in the game of cops and robbers.

Private Sector. Five out of seven SMEs who have worked in the private sector said that their company promoted inter level sharing. So why does the private sector have the highest percentage out of internal information sharing? All five SMEs said they believe the promotion of sharing information internally was present because of their employers’ sole focus on “making money.” Several of the SMEs explained that “making money” in this niche of the border security industry is “finding ways to stay relevant” and to get “renewed contracts.” One SME said that they specifically remember a time early in their private sector career when they were told to “stop overthinking it” and to “stop trying to make things better.” The SME further explained that their supervisor was talking about how contracting works for private sector, contracted border security companies. The supervisor said that when a private company is contracted to do a job or to provide a resource or service, that is all they do. They do the bare minimum of what their contract states they will do. It is up to the executives, the decision-makers toward the end of the contract, during the renewal process, to promote additional services in

which their company can perform. This SME spent a full career in federal public service before going to the private sector. Thus, this concept of “holding back” and “purposefully not reaching your potential” was foreign to this SME. The SME said that this fundamental difference in thought processing is the reason the SME left the private sector of border security.

Both of the SMEs that said their company did not promote inter sharing said that it did not negatively impact their confidence level or ability to do their jobs effectively. These two SMEs agreed, along with all of the other private sector SMEs, that their individual jobs did not require collaboration of efforts. Thus, both the SME and the private company were content with their glidepaths toward success without the need for time and money spent on finding ways or improved ways of sharing information.

Military Sector. 12 SMEs worked for a US military agency (either active duty or reserve). All 12 SMEs said their DOD agency promoted inter level sharing. The SMEs that worked for the Army and the Marines all spoke about the “absolute necessity” of their military branch sharing information. Each of these SMEs started their careers as boots on the ground Soldiers and Marines. At low ranks and in tactical environments these SMEs said that lack of information sharing was a “death sentence” and “would certainly get people seriously hurt or killed.” An Army SME said that even as a strategic leader in the latter part of their career, their assessment of proficiency levels of Soldiers being able to “shoot and move” came down to whether or not they could “effectively communicate.” All 12 SMEs claimed that this sharing of information increased their confidence to combat transient criminal recruitment related threats. And, while their increased confidence level matches most of the other categories of SME border security

professionals, the military SMEs were the only collective group that all spoke about sharing information as a means of “survivability” and “an expected” attribute of the job. This group also talked about “measures of effectiveness;” as if sharing information and communication was not an option, rather the focus was on how well an individual DOD asset or unit did at sharing information and communicating in training and in the operational environment.

This group also spoke about training to share information and communicate. They explained that their “validations” and “readiness” standards to deploy required them to show proficiency in certain aspects of information sharing and communicating that information up and down the hierarchical chain of command. Moreover, the majority of the military SMEs discussed an additional sub-aspect of confidence levels, as it relates to sharing information. They all agreed with the other SMEs that confidence mentally is increased when information sharing is working well, but this group of SMEs, especially with the stereotype of “machoism” in the military, spoke about the “emotional” increase to confidence across the fighting force when information sharing is promoted. One senior level military SME said that “emotional confidence increases during a real-world mission may just be the last missing piece that gives the Soldier on the ground that needed push to take the hill and to bring their brothers and sisters home.”

A Closer Look at Intra-Level Communications. Every agency, from all border security levels and sectors said that their agency promotes intra level info and intel sharing less than they do internally. Based on the aforementioned subsections of this chapter, the previous statement makes sense from both a logical and business perspective. Reiterating that the vast majority of SMEs said that their agency even went to the extent

of verbalizing to their employees that their agency objectives come first and that they will only share information if they get “useful” information or intelligence in return is of value in setting up the following SME shared experience. The SME claimed that working for a directly elected border security LE entity lowers confidence in crime fighting and raises stressors related to job security and operational day-to-day LEO safety. The SME worked in a sheriff’s office and shared that either the Sheriff or a senior ranking officer that was appointed by their sheriff told them their left and right limits of how much information they could share with other local, state, and even federal entities.

The SME added that they feared for their job when considering sharing information with city cops that worked within their county jurisdiction. This SME said that they would have to use personal phones or meet in person at their jurisdictional borders to share information about criminals, cases, and even just to catch up on how each other was doing personally and professionally. The SME added that the stress created by “secretly sharing information” was often “more worrisome than conducting a known felony stop.” That SME also said that they did not share information with other agencies out of spite because they disagreed with how their sheriff’s office handled this aspect of policing, they did it out of “necessity of being effective as a cop.” They said, “I could either risk getting my ass chewed out for sharing information and catching the bad guys or get punished or fired for not making an arrest. So, I was damned if I did and damned if I didn’t.”

Again, a detailed intra-agency communication profile from each sector of border security distinguishes between assumption, perspective, and reality. This profile is designed to mirror the above profile established for interagency communication. Hence,

creating a comparison tool for quick and easy future research replication and/or specifically concentrated topic analysis.

Federal Sector. Half of the SMEs (6) who had worked at the federal level said that their agency promoted intra informational and intelligence sharing and all three claimed to have more confidence in their abilities to counter transient criminal recruitment related threats. The other three SMEs that did not have agencies that promoted intra sharing were less confident. These three SMEs came from CBP and the DEA. The common themes from CBP and DEA SMEs were agency selfishness, arrogance, pride, and lack of time and money. The latter response, lack of time and money, was expounded upon by one SME when they added, “We [border patrol] are told that we aren’t paid to do other agencies’ jobs and we do not have enough border agents to even do our own jobs, so no, we will not take time and people away from a border mission to help with local or other three letter agency problems.”

The SMEs that did have agencies that promoted intra sharing were from the Department of Diplomatic Security (DSS), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Secret Service. All of these SMEs agreed that they could not succeed in their jobs without the help of other agencies. DSS and Secret Service spoke to me extensively about how they plan and execute their required missions. For both agencies, whether inside or outside the US, they need local LE experts that “intimately know the lay of the land.” One of the SMEs posed a rhetorical question to me when explaining this previous statement. They said, “How can I be expected to plan a security detail that protects a VIP (Very Important Person) when I have never even been to the place where the VIP is going to need a security detail?” The SME’s point was that if they individually and solely

believe they are able to protect their assigned VIP they are greatly mistaken. They added that “it takes a team of professionals that are dedicated to the same mission objective, that is to protect this person or this group of people. It doesn’t matter why they choose to protect them, but as long as they are truly dedicated to being part of the team, then the protection of the VIP is probably going to be successful.”

State Sector. Zero SMEs (out of three) that had worked at the state level said that their agency promoted intra sharing and that led to lower confidence levels. This group of SMEs thematically spoke as if they were the redheaded stepchildren of the border security LE’s game of telephone. One SME said that if a local agency realized that their case reached federal jurisdiction, they (as a state agency and agent) would probably never know about the case, even if that local agency was directly located in one of the counties or cities, they have oversight of. Another SME said that they feel like the “middleman” and sometimes the “mediator” for when local officers and federal agents cannot or refuse to communicate with each other.

Local Sector. No local level SMEs (out of four) claimed that their police department or sheriff’s office promoted intra agency sharing. This is no different from an answer from local SMEs stating they didn’t receive support for interagency sharing. However, the interesting difference in their response to lack of intra-agency information sharing was found in the one local SME that claimed that lack of intra-level sharing negatively impacted their ability to do their jobs. This SME worked as a police detective, while the other three SMEs worked as patrol officers.

Private Sector. None of the SMEs (out of seven) who have worked in the private sector said that their company promoted intra level sharing. This is the biggest overall

drop by any SME subcategory of professionals. These SMEs spoke extensively about their leadership's focus on "making money" and future "job security." Yet, only two of the SMEs said the lack of intra level sharing negatively impacted their confidence level to do their jobs effectively.

Military Sector. Out of the 12 DOD military SMEs, only five claimed that their agency promoted intra sharing. This is a drastic decline from the military SMEs all agreeing that their individual service branches promoted interagency information sharing. Additionally, all five military SMEs that stated their agency promoted sharing information with other border security agencies all came from US Army backgrounds. It is noteworthy to add that while five Army SMEs affirmed that the Army promoted intra-agency information sharing, the additional five SMEs that served in the Army did not have Army experiences that promoted intra-agency information sharing. Yet all five of these SMEs were either part of the Army Reserve or Army National Guard.

Overall Communications and Comparative Summary. The intra and interagency SME communication data listed above is merely a barometer for determining the confidence level border security has in their ability to share valuable intelligence. However, this data remains stoic without a connection to how it impacts the overall operational border security force. RQ4 discussed if border security communicates well. Most SMEs (15) claimed that "yes," their overall agency communicates well with all interagency departments. This does not sound too bad compared to previous statements the SMEs made earlier about agencies and even master categories of border security professionals lack of trust and honesty regarding sharing and communicating information. However, when you get into the minutia of what the SMEs considered

“communicates well,” means it is quickly apparent that while similarities in measured effects and expectations are present, there is a lower-than-expected standard of what I anticipated would be coined as quality communication. To provide more clarity, the SMEs were content with saying their agency promoted, supported, and enabled crosstalk and joint level communication between departments within the greater agency if the agency 1) didn’t have a policy or SOP that inhibited crosstalk or 2) the agency made a verbal comment or sent an email that said it would be a good idea if departments within the agency worked together. One SME said, “It is better for all of us in this job sometimes to get the job done the way you need to and then ask for forgiveness later.” This SME was referring to working with other agents within their agency in cases where they did not have the experience or bandwidth of personnel to complete their mission alone. They explained that no standing policy and no leader published a directive that stated to or not to work with other agents from other departments within their agency. Therefore, this SME took it upon themselves to work in the gray area of the profession and do what they had to do to complete their mission on time and to the agency’s expected standard. Another SME added, “While not explicitly publicized by the agency, it is common practice, especially after your rookie years but before you start really moving up in the agency, that you start networking with other officers who have the types of jobs you eventually want. This is just a smart career move.” This and many more SMEs in this study spoke extensively about the value of building a network of professionals, some within their agency and others outside of their agency, that enable and enhance a border security practitioner to be able to reach their optimal potential and positional career goals. The majority of military experienced SMEs claimed to have an

easier time establishing this mentorship network. They explained that the military not only promotes this type of career maturation, but they make it easy for a service member at all ranks and experience levels to ask for guidance, support, and mentorship about their job duties, roles and responsibilities of their current job and rank and the next rank and positions they plan on having. One of the Army SMEs stated, “The structure of the Army’s promotion process and selection for assignments process are solid. From the time you speak to your recruiter to the time you get to your first duty station you know what your next position is, you are being trained by the person that is currently in that position, and you are being supervised by the leader that is in the position two levels higher than you. At any point in your military career, you can be asked to step into a position two levels higher than your rank. But because this is a “known-known” for all Soldiers from the time they are in basic training, no one is shocked or unable to step up to the challenge. The structure of the Army is set up for you to win and the Army wants you to win. That’s how it (the Army) remains ready for today and tomorrow’s wars.”

Less than a handful of SMEs (4) stated that information from the field is shared timely and accurately within their agency. This is very concerning when attempting to justify that an agency “communicates well” or “promotes” crosstalk and collaboration to achieve their missions. As mentioned, several times earlier in this study, the concept of “noise” (Cozine, 2021) is once again present here. Usually, intelligencers will limit their usage of the term “noise” to information from the field that is not relevant or does not assist them in developing quality, useful intelligence products. However, in this case, I firmly believe that the term “noise” is accurately employed, as it epitomizes the façade of how being physically and verbally engaged with a colleague or supervisor in a ‘safe

place' of learning and professional maturation does not automatically improve the end state achievement of a mission, nor does it guarantee that good habits or a quality experience that will add growth to the border security professional is accomplished. And, unlike "noise" from the operational field is detected and discarded by operational level intelligence analysts, "noise" from interdepartmental colleagues and supervisors, especially in person from FTOs, is much more difficult to detect, avoid, and mostly stop; for the structure and discipline engrained in a border security LEO from the time they join the force is to remain present until dismissed, listen until told to speak, and to unwaveringly not question those that outrank or are more experienced than they are (unless the direct order given to you is immoral or unethical). An analyst has the proper working environment, the separation of position from the information gatherer, and the hierarchical detachment from the tactical reporter to eliminate "noise" quicker and much more efficiently than the tactical border security asset who is standing at the position of attention in front of their boss in order to explain what they heard, saw, and did on the battlefield.

Connecting Communication Experiences with Concepts and Theories.

Border Security Communication Proficiency Levels. Communication has historical roots in being a thematic decisive point to why LE and other border security related missions struggle to achieve their best possible outcomes (Morley, 2015; Fisher & Geller, 2009). In this subsection I assessed the SMEs' experiences and responses to how their respective agencies promote or demote inter and intra level communications. During this section I also explored the individual and collective impacts information and

intelligence sharing plays in enhancing a border security practitioner(s) confidence level(s) in combatting transient criminality.

The Value of Show and Tell. During one of my Civil Affairs missions, I learned the value of what I refer to as effective triple-layered communication. Effective triple-layered communication balances active listening with your communication partner, ensuring two-way verbal and nonverbal communication has shared time during the discussion, and impactful physical participation is present, proving you listened to what is important to the person or group you communicate with. During my mission I met with a tribal chief of a small village, whose geographical location was very important to the US DOD and to the transnational criminal enterprise. The village resided in a one-way corridor of easily traversed land that allowed those who had freedom to move through that passageway a direct route to the only port access for over 100 miles. The chief was in his mid-thirties and was very proud to welcome me into his home and to introduce me to his “people,” his family. He explained to me that I was not the first US Army American or “white leader” he and his people had met. In fact, less than a year prior to my visit, the chief claimed that a group of US Soldiers came to his village and told him that they could make he and his tribe’s lives better. He continued by showing me the area in the village that the US Soldiers were referring to. It was a stretch of land that was dense with foliage and extended a few miles before you reached the end of either side of a swamp area. On the far side of the swamp (from the village) was a watering hole where the women of the tribe would spend between two and half and three hours each day walking to and from gathering the water for the 35 to 40 villagers’ daily cooking and washing needs. The US Army engineers and the NGO they visited the village with offered to build a bridge over

the swamp. The bridge was estimated to reduce the total travel time to and from the watering hole to less than an hour. As I listened and watched the chief's emotional rises and falls persist during his summation of his encounter with my US Army colleagues, I quickly realized that he and his tribe were happy with their way of life and they did not need me or anyone else to come in and disrupt their culture, even if our intentions were sincere in offering to "improve" their efficiency to accomplish daily tasks. The chief went on to teach me that the women in his village have led the raising and rearing of all the boys who one day become the men of the village for thousands of years. These women have never-ending tasks, duties, and responsibilities and their daily travel to and from the water hole is their only solace, their only time to socialize with the other women in the tribe. Through translation the chief taught me that increases to morale, behavioral health, and the strengthening of relationships between husbands and wives, children and their fathers, and mothers and their children all positively benefitted from the women taking their daily walk to the watering hole. After thanking the chief for sharing such a valuable life lesson with me, I asked him why he was willing to work with the US, the Army and not the transnational criminal enterprise? Why would he continue to allow new US Army leaders to come into his village, his home if he and his people do not need our resources, our builders, and our Soldiers? He looked at me with an enormous, jovial smile, laughed and explained that the "evil ones are always watching and always listening." He continued by adding that the transnational criminal organization only cares about themselves, and they do not even pretend to value what is important to the village and the people of the tribe. Concluding, the chief told me that the conversation we had that day would some day protect us both, and maybe all of our peoples, from the transnational

criminal enterprise and the “hope of that prophecy coming true” is worth taking a risk on partnering with the US Army.

The SMEs in this study identified key friction points to communication encounters like the one I described above. They explained that there is difficulty in communicating with inter and intra partners because building rapport is time consuming and can be irritably frustrating. However, the SMEs also unanimously claimed that there is significant operational value in putting in the time and effort to enhancing cross-level communication, as the better communication becomes, the more confident practitioners are in performing their border security Triple Cs. An SME who served as a federal strategic level senior advisor to the highest-level decision maker in their chain of command said, “The brass wearing, ring-knockers hold the keys to the armory of the future. Without their blessing and support, especially their financial support, you can forget about getting new, more advanced, and potentially game-changing equipment. Sometimes you just have to play the game. Especially if a little time wasted upfront pays off exponentially when you really need it to in the future.” And while this SME’s insight is indeed noteworthy, the SMEs collectively (20) informed me that the level of communication, as described above, simply does not exist within their agencies; moreover, it does not exist jointly across the different agencies and institutions of border security LE and social science academia.

The vast majority of the SMEs (18) blamed this communication debacle on three macro categories: 1) Trust; 2) Objectives; and 3) Exchange of Information. These are the same characteristics which Cozine (2013, 2021), et al (Morley, 2015; Lowenthal, 2022; Dunan, 2019) attest lead DHS and the IC toward cross-level organizational

communication deficiencies. The SMEs stated that “trust” posed the highest threat to both the entry and senior level border security LE personnel. Trust issues of sharing information with “complete honesty,” “transparency,” and even letting their fellow border security officers know what resources they bring to the fight are reoccurring hurdles in which most joint border security missions must find a way to overcome. Most of the time they do not find a way.

Mission Statements and Objectives. Every border security agency has a mission statement that spells out the agency’s single or multiplicity of objectives. The issue this presents for information and intelligence sharing comes down to first, “a need to know” and second, a “what’s in it for me” mentality. When two or more agencies share an objective, especially an objective that is directly tied to an entity’s mission goals, then increases in communicating important information and intelligence is much more likely to occur (Morley, 2015). This is just logical, for both agencies have a “win-win” scenario. Yet, most SMEs (18) claimed that their agency would, behind closed doors, tell them to “make sure that [they] remembered who [they] worked for.” This defeats the logic just mentioned. The SMEs did not deny that a ‘win-win’ scenario can exist and does create improvements to communication and teamwork. However, the SMEs also explained that symbiosis (Morley, 2015) had never been reached during any joint mission that they collectively have conducted. They added that synergy levels were also limited because, as one SME stated, “There is a big difference between a little “t” in trust and a big “T” in Trust. When you work for a three-letter agency, you don’t big “Trust” with anyone, even another three-letter agency.”

Information and Intelligence Exchanges. One of the SMEs described the levels of information and intelligence exchanges as “even with really good communication in a joint environment, only partial or limited information and intelligence sharing should be expected.” This type of occupational expectation management was noted in one shape or form by all the SMEs in this study. The SMEs thematically concluded that there are only two top reasons for rationalizing why the entire border security sector of homeland security silently accepts to play this anti-disclosure of information game. The SMEs said that both politics/bureaucracy and selfishness are abundant throughout all levels of border security simultaneously. One of the most experienced SMEs said, “I have truly had a storybook career. I have saved lives, helped my share of people reach their dreams and I have made friends that make life worth living for, but there are unfortunately more days than those that I left work (in border security) frustrated and disappointed that the system and the politics of this job kept me from doing more and from making more friends.”

Inter-Departmental Level Communications. SMEs (17) believed their specific department within their specific agency communicates well. They elaborated by explaining that unofficial, unwritten rules and privileges exist within a department of a border security agency. The SMEs shared examples of how interdepartmental communication freedoms work and differ from inter and intra level communications throughout the border security sector. One SME explained, “The NARCs talk to each other. They spitball ideas around before a buy or a raid. This is how they stay alive in most cases. The more you know about the streets, the better NARC you become.” Another SME agreed with Albanese (2017) when they talked about crosstalk between detectives. They said, “The days of Sherlock Holmes are over. Today’s crimes are smart

and mobile, transient we'll say for this conversational purpose, and if a detective thinks they can solve these complex crimes alone, by themselves, they are foolish and definitely won't last long in that niche of our profession.”

Interdepartmental communication success is the greatest achievement reported by our SMEs during this study. All other forms of inter and intra level communications are degraded from here on out. For instance, the majority of SMEs (15) claimed that their overall agency communicates well with all interagency departments. However, only four SMEs stated that information from the field is shared timely and accurately within their agency. Lastly, no SMEs claimed that information from the field is shared timely and accurately between external agencies. This lack of intra-level border security sharing not only substantiates literature reviewed for this study from scholars like Cozine (2010, 2013, 2021), Joyal, Ors (2014) and Lowenthal (2022), but it also indicates a stark reality of why border security, and homeland security continue to struggle in combating threats like transient criminal recruitment.

The SMEs spoke about this struggle by using some very pointed words and phrases. They returned to the existences of information and intelligence silos, (Cozine, 2021; Lowenthal, 2022) but during this discussion they claimed that these silos are encouraged by the agency leaders and that this encouragement falls into the thematical border security LE categorical excuse of “this is just the way it has always been done.” Additionally, the SMEs were convinced that border security LE suffers from departmental specific criminality “tunnel vision.” It was a local LE SME that explained this type of tunnel vision best when they said, “I remember that there were so many times when I was on patrol that we (the SME and their patrol shift peers) were told by our

patrol sergeant to focus exclusively on x, y, and z crimes during our shift. We (the SME and their patrol shift peers) knew there were bigger issues, worse crimes going on in our patrol areas, but we were trained to do what we were told to do. We were also scared to get in trouble and possibly lose our jobs. And, we just were too young in our careers to know how to handle, how to question “why” we weren’t going after the other crimes that we saw going on when we were on patrol.”

Practicing What has been Preached about Improving Communication.

What I didn’t see coming.

This study taught me so much about the difficulties in battling assumptions based on personal and professional experiences. When you have walked in nearly the same shoes as many of the SMEs that you interview, it is easy to fall into the trap of thinking or guessing what the SME will say next and how they will answer your questions. Even if you are right and the SME confirms your hypothesis, this is still not an advantageous strategy for qualitative research. I will be completely transparent: it took a few interviews during this study to find my way into being a pure academic. Removing my metaphorical practitioner hat allowed for a level of learning and an increase in dialogical communications that I never expected. This was my greatest academic maturation moment during this study.

In addition to growing as an academic, I also learned that labeling SMEs is a dangerous game and a game that I, as the researcher, will lose 9 out of 10 times. Even with the methodological selection of participants coming from the established snowball sampling technique, those that I originally labeled for the categories of Academics, Intelligencers, and Border Security LE rendered far from accurate predictions. What I

learned was that a SME coined themselves as a certain type of pseudo-academic-practitioner. Even with rigid criterion for participant selection, SMEs constructed their decisions of how they perceived their reputational titling based on their experiential accomplishments and failures. In all but one cases, the SMEs in this study were hesitant, if not resistant, to refer to themselves as an Academic. Even the title of Academic-Practitioner was a debatable hot topic of discussion. What I summated from my conversations with the SMEs is that self-confidence in the field of border security LE is largely impacted by how the individual SME perceives they will be either accepted or rejected by their peers. If the border security professional does not believe they are at the competency level of a pure academic in the discipline of Homeland Security, then they are cautious in claiming the title of being an academic SME. Likewise, if that same border security professional feels they have the professional experience along with the training and academic background to be in the same room as the top-tier border security officer, agents, and operators from all other local, state, and federal agencies, then they will confidently take their seat at the table of honor and claim the title of SME. And yet, even if that border security professional admits to being amongst the SMEs in their field, there seems to be an ongoing mental and sometimes even verbal competition which results in a measuring contest of “who is the real SME” among this group of border security elites.

Discussing US Border Security’s Identities, Reputations, and Experiences.

I thought this would be a bigger deal. The SMEs in my study have achieved individual and agency successes that firmly affix them amongst the upper echelons of their professions. Their academic records and practitioner experiences have afforded

them the opportunities to become professors in academia and instructors, supervisors, and even directors in border security LE. However, when speaking with the SMEs about their identities and reputations, they all humbly refuse to be considered among the greats of their craft. I was not expecting this to occur. In fact, the literature overwhelmingly supports border security officers, agents, and operators with high levels of education and experience as owning the persona of being arrogantly confident with a professional bravado that bleeds over into their personal lives. After completing my interviews with 20 SMEs from nearly all agencies and hierarchical levels of border security LE, not one SME presented the reputational characteristics previously described.

This new understanding of how a border security SME identifies themselves offered an invaluable, unpredicted discussion opportunity. As mentioned earlier in this study, the SMEs not only believed they were not the best in border security, but they also did not identify as Academics, Intelligencers, or Border Security LE Academic-Practitioners, as my study's subject selection criteria labeled them. Why did these contradictions happen? Let's approach answering this question through deductive reasoning. Confidence in occupational competency did not lead to the SMEs believing they were not the best in their employment field. Lack of experience in the field was not an issue. Deficiencies in training opportunities was not limited either. Inadequate proficiency levels to utilize their Triple Cs concluded the reasons SMEs did not believe caused them from having the reputation of being the best at their respective jobs. Eliminating these four major areas of attributes that commonly lead to occupational elitism, leaves us with the real reason border security SMEs still feel they have not earned the title of being the best. The SMEs in border security LE simply do not have

comparable historical criterions for determining what is the cannon for Homeland Security Triple Cs' proficiency. Without this baseline standard, self-justifying their reputational exclusiveness remains subjective and occupationally risky.

The question we must discuss now is, "Why does it matter if a border security SME believes they are or they are not among the best in their occupational field?" The citizens that require border security professionals to protect and serve them believe their border security practitioners should all be major league talents and potential future hall of famers. However, I debate, based on the SMEs in this study not being able to name more than one or two legendary border security practitioners, that these same citizens, that demand their protectors to be elite, will not be able to name a single border security professional that is fabled. I expand this conversation because the transient criminal enterprise throughout the Americas has legendarily infamous pundits that their internal criminal enterprise, the previously mentioned citizens, and even the border security LEOs know by name, by reputation, and by specific impact on a specific criminal act(s). The reputations of mafia, cartel, and gang legends such as: Al Capone, John Gotti, Pablo Escobar, and Billy the Kid impact the next generation of potential criminal or border security LE recruits. Adolescents that seek the incentives and motivators discussed throughout this study are influenced by the reputational fame that these criminals have earned (Racine, 2011). They can easily search and find the financial wealth and societal status elitism that these felons achieved. This cannot be said for Homeland Security professionals or even the border security LE sector.

Words have Meaning.

From the very infancy of this study's creation, the term "transient criminality" illustrated the importance "words" have to the Homeland Security discipline. The following words and phrases hold significant meaning to border security and transient criminal activities such as recruitment. These words are not tantamount with the "key terms" index located in the appendixes of this study; for these words and working definitions are the voices of this study's SMEs, the voices of border security practitioners. Their words link border security LE and the transient criminal enterprise in relationships of thoughts, theories, and moreover, their words provide reason to why both entities continue to operate their missions in the same battlespace at the same time. Further exploration of these terms and concepts should be explored to ensure Homeland Security is reaching its optimal potential in its efforts to slowdown and ultimately eliminate their transient criminal advisory. The list of key words and their applicable, study-specific definitions are listed in Appendix D. However, concepts for future research opportunities are listed and described below, as this study was ultimately designed to not only explore existing knowledge about the transient criminality threat to US border security, but, to discover new literary gaps and expose practical deficiencies that persist throughout the Homeland Security discipline.

Concepts.

Victimization. Transient criminal activity victimizes people in an array of traditional and unconventional ways. These victims suffer from physical, emotional, and mental wounds. What is the support for these victims, especially if the system cannot catch or even identify their perpetrators? How should victimology researchers and

practitioners approach recovery methods and techniques when damage is being inflicted by a faceless, transient threat that can strike fear and pain through physical, cyber, and financial networks that hold legitimate and illegitimate constructs and identities?

Just a Job Versus a Way of Life. The reality is that while border security LE may say phrases such as, “I live for this” or “I never stop being a cop” to describe their occupational choice, the “life” of a border security practitioner is far more than just a badge, gun, and an authority to investigate and arrest criminals. Border security practitioners receive a constant paycheck from a legitimate governmental or privatized funding source. They can earn a pension. They have health care options and vacation days that allow them to step away from the grind of their roles and responsibilities. Their families can go to school, play outside, and get jobs without any reprisal if they choose not to be a border security practitioner like their moms or dads. Yet, for the transient criminal, their survival is based on a lifestyle rather than a job. Each of the above-mentioned amenities border security practitioners receive upon beginning, working, and retiring from the occupational thin blue line brother/sisterhood must be sought after, earned, and then sustained through constant acts and behaviors that demonstrate loyalty and profit gains to and for the transient criminal enterprise. Families are protected and social statuses are determined by the value the transient criminal enterprise places on the reputation the transient criminal possesses. There are no days off for the transient criminal either. One SME said that while working undercover in the narcotics sector of the transient criminal world, they often remembered hearing lower-level management reminding new transient criminals that the transient criminal enterprise “only tests you sometimes, but they are always evaluating you.” The SME explained that even if you

were so to say ‘off’ of work for a day, the transient criminal enterprise instilled a sense of behavioral controlling fear from the paranoid notion that they were always watching your every move. The SME added that they “always felt someone in the organization knew what they were doing.” They continued by saying, “It didn’t matter if you were getting a slice of pizza, selling dope, or banging your wife, you always had in the back of your mind that today could be your last day.”

Being System and Process Driven not Personality Dependent. Homeland Security, with all its structure, policies, and SOPs, constantly make mistakes in the planning, execution, and recovery phases of border security operations because of emotional decision-making. When border security practitioners and entities self-sabotage by being individual personality dependent or whether they are coaxed by the adversary into emotionally charged real-world scenarios that require hasty decision-making, the concepts of being “a one man/woman army” or being the only one trained and able to perform whatever required function needed for mission achievement never leads to sustainably enduring success. Doing the heavy lifting as an agency or department upfront by building systems and processes that can be initially trained, quickly referenced, and easily comprehended by anyone in the border security field renders a repeatable, persistent, and predictable outcome for handling homeland security concerns.

Are We Asking the Right Questions in Training. As important as the meaning of words are to optimizing the potential of Homeland Security’s Triple Cs is the criticality of arranging those important words in the correct sequence to ask the right question, at the right time, to the right group of border security practitioners during training. The SMEs in this study expressed their educational ignorance to comprehending the terms,

elements of criminality, organizational structures and hierarchies, and moreover, the players associated with transient criminality's initial phase of increasing their enterprise: recruiting. For this reason alone, future research and training program development should combine their efforts, focusing on asking the right questions about this threat first, rather than just levying on the age-old cliché of "this is just how it has always been done." History can indeed teach us many valuable lessons on who to prepare to counter and combat mobile and even organized criminality; however, today's transient criminals and the modern transient criminal enterprise is comprised on a multifaceted, multilayered, multicultural identity that is fueled by a seemingly never ceasing flow of money, resources, and opportunities for criminal behavior. The old way of LE combined with the limited homeland security operational and personnel budgets and insufficient manpower to secure the geographical (forget about the cyber realm) borders of the US is just simply not going to be enough to stand toe-to-toe with today's transient criminal juggernaut.

What is the Harm Level of Transient Criminal Recruiting. This subtopic in our discussion is quite comical to me. Too often researchers and practitioners become frustrated with how data is interpreted by academics in higher education and high-ranking decision-makers in the field. The phrase, "You can make statistics say whatever you want them to say" is commonly argued during these censorious moments. Yet, the humor I find in this topic is in the fact that because research has not been conducted on transient criminal recruitment, specifically, quantitative research, no statistical dataset or baseline can be the crux of the age-old argument of defending a researcher's interpretation of the level of harm transient criminal recruiting has had or is currently having on Homeland

Security. This is a wide-open area of exploration and I urge future researchers to take on the challenge of building the datasets required for analysis and actionable interpretation of this threat.

What is a Border and is it Defined by the Border Security Threat the Same Way it is by Homeland Security. Border security practitioners, especially those at the operational level and in planner or “thinktank” positions, too often miss the opportunity to “red team,” wargame the current battlefield situation from the adversary’s perspective. Time and energy are mostly exhausted on internal border security measures of reactive LE to the current crisis caused by the threat or preparing for potential liability issues that result as fallout realities from mistakes made by border security LE during high stress in-the-moment policing decision-making. Forgetting or ignoring the fact that resources, people, CI, and even time are equally advantageous attributes of warfare to transient criminals as they are to border security LE. Winning the battle in gathering the most useable information from their adversary, creating actionable intelligence that describes and explains their adversary’s Triple Cs, and preemptively positioning their personnel and resources in strategic manners that outwit their foe based on the combination of the aforementioned quality of information and intelligence about their rival significantly improves the victor’s opportunities to isolate, eliminate, and control their opponent’s future moves on the metaphorical transient criminal and border security LE chessboard. Without red-teaming the transient criminal enterprise before conducting border security operations, Homeland Security will be amateurly performing real-world chess moves on a traditional flat chessboard while the transient criminal enterprise continues to play on a 4D chessboard. This ultimately results in border security LE believing their best laid

plans are operating three moves ahead of their transient criminal adversary; however, due to the stark differences in dimensional layers that separate border security for the transient criminal to, border security LE is offensively striking in a tunnel vision fashion while their threat is surrounding them from all sides, to include above and below them. A dedicated effort in joint communicated wargaming from the transient criminal enterprise perspective, with border security professionals that truly understand through research and field experience should be a priority throughout Homeland Security.

What is a Barrier and does the Border Security Threat Perceive LE Barriers the same. The consensus from the SMEs in this study suggest that the transient criminal threat not only knows about LE barriers, such as limited manpower, budget constraints, and legal, constitutional policies and statutes that impede, slowdown, or prevent border security practitioners from countering and combatting the transient criminal enterprise, but they actively seek to exploit, abuse, and take full advantage of the barriers they and Homeland Security both have and can create in order for ease of passage and increases of profit gains can be achieved. The flipside of this debatable coin argues that barriers do not exist for border security LE and that the adversary is just smarter, more adaptable, and better resourced than Homeland Security to be able to navigate the open, gray-area terrain. This notion of “ghost-barriers” serves border security LE well in the media and provides a very plausible and hard to deny excuse to why transient crime continues to expand at a worrisome rate year after year. I believe both positions in this debate have partial validity. The SMEs in this study painted clear pictures of the “barriers” they face in their efforts to deter, divert, and combat transient criminality. Based on their experiences, along with my own, I can confirm that the transient criminal border threat is

aware of the political, legal, and practitioner constraints that metaphorically handcuff border security LE officials from aggressively attacking the transient criminal enterprise with an untamed fury of the training and resources they do have at their disposal.

Additionally, the transient criminal enterprise knows that they have the upper hand when it comes to having less obstacles in their way during their mission operations. Because this adversary does not play by the same rulebook as border security LE (meaning that the laws and societal rules that govern citizenry behavior simply have no or a very limited influence of fear on them), transient criminals quickly become smart on when, where, and how they commit transient crimes. Optimizing the loopholes that border security LE must jump through to not only make an arrest on a transient criminal, but to have the charges that led to that arrest stick in a national or international court is the secret Harlem Globetrotters' play that everyone knows is coming, but you just can't seem to stop it or even slow it down.

What is Poverty. This simplistic three word question dives chin deep into the sociological depths of a core issue to why tactical LE, specifically local level policing, claims to be having major difficulties in identifying transient criminality, especially transient criminal recruitment. The SMEs in this study spoke about poverty by sociological norms and what US American culture from the middle class and higher view as wealth. Most of the SMEs' examples of poverty had a center of gravity that focused on socioeconomic status. A heavy concentration on financial wealth in tangible items such as money, cars, boats, guns, houses, and property explained what border security LE classified as caution and red flags for determining poverty or lack of poverty levels in people they encounter during their border security LE shifts and cases. As mentioned in

sections four and five of this study, SMEs even lumped certain stereotypical people into categories of “poverty” that attracts the transient criminal enterprise. The homeless and the unemployed led the way in this policing profile of poverty; yet, the motives to what the SMEs and the literature says a gang, terrorist, or cartel recruit looks for is far from limited by financial means alone (Racine, 2011). I am not suggesting that the homeless and unemployed, and other people who seek to be wealthier than they are should be ignored or even less a concerted target of surveillance for potential transient criminal recruitment. I instead seek to broaden the border security LE aperture to looking at poverty in a less linear monetary fashion. Organized criminal recruits are incentivized to join the criminal enterprise because the illicit enterprise provides believable opportunities for recruits to fill voids in their lives. These emptiness categories range from increases in financial growth, leveling up on social status, acquiring desired “things” that were never previously in realistic reach to obtaining a family-like community, an acceptance to a group and team, a meaning to live and a reputational identity to call their own. Each one of these categories raises the transient criminal recruit out of a self-associated poverty position. If border security LE is not actively looking past financial statuses to determine poverty levels in potential transient criminal recruits, and if border security LE is not being taught at an early stage in their careers that the term poverty exceeds the common notion of a lack of money, then the best Homeland Security can hope for is that their border security practitioners chop off one of the transient criminal hydra’s heads during criminal recruitment operations.

Law Versus Societal Acceptance. For the purposes of this study, border security, maybe more than any other LE entity, faces an extremely challenging socio-politically

charged conundrum. The reality of the world for resident Americans from the north and the south of the US, and the people that reside within the physical borders of the US, is fragmented by feelings, emotions and legal policies and procedures of asylum, deportations, and extradition. Due to the fact that society and the legal system do not see eye-to-eye on many, at times, all, of these critical border security touch points, LE is placed in a volatile, instable predicament of having to abide by the SOPs their agency and Homeland Security publishes along with serving the citizens of the US, several in states and geographical areas that touch the borders of the US, who adamantly disagree with these SOPs. The rapid adaptations and changes in the transient criminal enterprise's composition and operational battleplan to achieve their constant mission objectives merely fluctuates too quickly for the US policy creation and update processes to be integrated and effective in real-time operations.

Violence Versus White Collar. Transient criminality enters into a very unique criminal dual-threat category due to its dichotomy of violent and non-violent criminal behavior and criminal activities they commit. The SMEs in this study introduced that for the most part, the transient criminal enterprise wants to stay below the radar, silent or at least quiet to potential public releases or policing attention that could slow down or limit their maximum profit gains. Thus, it appears that external partnerships with cartels, gangs, and street criminals often provide the “muscle” the transient criminal enterprise requires. This allows for the transient criminal enterprise to achieve their goals of expanding their illicit financial network without the danger of damaging their covertness in the criminal operational execution phase of their mission. The gangs, cartels, and street criminals also get a win in this scenario. These previously mentioned criminal entities can

benefit from inciting fear to those they suppress. They improve their territorial gains through conflict and violence.

As for white collar crimes, the transient criminal network seems to have their hands deep into that honeypot. The SMEs claimed that is less of a risk for the transient criminal network to be tied to or to be directly involved with resourcing or even running fraud labs, cybercriminal pathways, and embezzlement schemes than it is for them to be connected to violent criminal behaviors. Plus, the fact that if the transient criminal enterprise can learn to trust, through fear, quid-pro-quo, or other means, that the gangs, cartels, and street criminals will do their jobs and do them well, then the transient criminal network can double-down on their commission of both violent and white collar crimes simultaneously with their only real attention being focused on non-violent criminality.

What Crimes Belong in a Transient Criminal Macro Category. In regard to crimes being categorized as transient, two significant outcomes were developed during this study. First, the SMEs all agreed that transient criminality should receive its own criminal index for reporting and recording crimes that are transient. Next, the SMEs provided a list of crimes that should be part of this new transient criminal categorization. These crimes include trafficking offenses, white collar crimes, and identity related criminality. The only debates the SMEs had when discussing the needed macro transient crime categories were which specific crimes should be added to the “white collar” subcategory and who or what agency should be in charge of data collecting. I suggest that instead of waiting for the “perfect” answer to these questions, Homeland Security, as an overarching border security entity and discipline, should create the new database, the

submission procedures, and determine the crimes that are required to report as transient. This list can be improved over time and the delegation of responsibility for running the database program can also be added later in the future.

How does Border Security Transition its Assets. The SMEs in this study were confident that they knew about and were trained on the resources and assets their border security LE agency possessed. However, they were hesitant (and some even resistant) to claim that their agency specific assets to fight transient criminality were with the right border security entity. Several SMEs believed that their agencies did have the right arrangement of resources for their current transient crime fighting mission; yet, the future of transient criminality seemed to worry them. I contest that border security may very well be in their best composition right now, but who knows what the future will bring. As transient crime evolves Homeland Security must also be willing to evolve. Being willing to realign and transfer duties, responsibilities, and resources to other or even newly created border security entities for the greater good of transient crime fighting effectiveness is likely going to determine whether or not the US borders remain at least an impediment to transient criminality.

What is Transient Criminal Justice. One of the most common frustrations my SMEs spoke about revolved around the concept of “justice.” Future research should conduct a deep dive on if and when a transient criminality focus becomes operational throughout border security LE, what should be the penalties, punishments, extradition, incarceration, and deportation criteria for committing and being found guilty of violating US transient criminal statutory laws?

When LEOs and Transient Criminals Cross Paths Who Realizes Who is Who

First. This topic of discussion resulted in a scary truth for LE. The SMEs revealed that they are virtually unaware of who is a transient criminal, a potential transient recruit, and who is not. The SMEs also alluded to the reality that criminals, especially organized criminals, know who the cops are, even the ones who are supposed to be covert and undercover. Because transient criminals and recruits can look like anyone, come from any ethnic background, and can live in any neighborhood, LEOs are at a significant disadvantage achieving both first strike ability on their adversary and owning the element of surprise when attacking their foe.

Whose Side is Who on. Due to the unintentional, and in most cases, disfunction between local, state, and federal border security LE's organizational structure and individual mission objects, many of the actions and ways to achieve personal mission success actually aides the transient criminal enterprise in being able to commit street level and even complex strategic crimes. This begs the question of if border security LE continues to struggle in inter and intra level communicating and fails to restructure their macro-organizational composition under the greater Homeland Security umbrella, are these purposeful decisions pinning border security agencies against each other and thus enhancing the transient criminal enterprises' Triple Cs.

Are Recruits "Kids" to the Bad Guys. Another great topic for discussion and future research is whether or not the transient criminal enterprise perceives potential recruits under the age of 18, especially 16, as kids? Do they view them as adults? Or, do they simply categorize them as employees of their enterprise? If border security LE is bound to enforcing juvenile policing techniques and tactics on transient criminals that are

given “adult” criminal missions, then LEO will once again be degraded in their abilities to fight this threat. Moreover, if the US justice system must also limit its sanctions and punishments for convicted transient criminals that are considered juveniles by US laws and regulations, then the potential that the justice system is creating more experienced future adult transient criminals and aiding in recidivism rates are necessary foods for thought.

Jurisdictional Responsibilities Versus Kind Gestures. Border security LE must immediately cease selfish organizational behaviors. Who owns the battle space is far less important today than it was in the past. The transient criminal enterprise threat does not have jurisdictional borders and thus, border security LE must become a joint fighting force in order to match this modern and expanding threat.

Measuring Border Security Saturation Effectiveness on Transient Criminality. This may be the most difficult future task for Homeland Security. A think-tank of eclectic Homeland Security academics, practitioners, and academic-practitioners at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels should be united to determine “effectiveness” criteria and to establish a baseline for if current manning and resourcing practices in the field are or are not making a difference in combatting transient criminality. Taking on a smaller aspect of transient criminality, such as recruitment may serve border security planners and analysts better than attempting to measure the entire transient criminal enterprises’ activity optempo. In analyzing just the recruitment aspect of transient criminality, a hyper focused joint effort of expending departmental resources and manpower toward saturating the streets where potential transient criminal recruitment takes place will result in a clear picture of effectiveness on whether or not the border security adversary is

increasing their profits in that respective area of operations. If illicit profits are on the rise, then it can be assumed more transient criminal activity is being conducted. This likely means that an increase in transient criminals has also occurred, ultimately resulting in an increase to effective transient criminal recruitment in that specific area being observed and analyzed. This model for tracking and determining measures of effectiveness can be expanded to new border security threat geolocations; hence, collective geo-criminality mapping of transient recruitment surges and decreases will render a true measure of effectiveness for that facet of transient criminality.

Practice as You Play. Another point of contention amongst the SMEs was how they were trained to combat similar to transient criminal threats. Many of the SMEs were athletes growing up. A common phrase coaches use in sports to train their players to be ready for an actual game is, “Practice as you play.” This idiom means that if you train hard, if you study, learn, and then practice what you have been taught with the intensity that you would have during a real game, or in this border security analogy, in a real-world mission, then you will perform much better. In sports, players are more confident in their ability to make a basketball shot, score a goal in soccer, or hit a home run in baseball if they have faced a defender that is trying to block their shot or strike them out. Contrariwise, if an athlete only takes defenseless shots at a goal and batting practice off of a coach that intends on throwing a batter “perfect” hittable pitches that practicing player will not be as prepared to face their adversary on the court or field when their opponent seeks to overcome them. This same process can be made true to border security practitioners. From tactics and techniques of identifying and arresting transient criminals to firearms training so that a border security LEO is prepared to deploy their force

continuum without hesitation and with precision, all of these trainings should be conducted in a crawl, walk, run methodology with the latter of the training phases, “run,” being as close to reality and at real speed practical exercise for the trainee as possible.

Is it Worth the Price to Pay to Play. Several of the SMEs in this study sparked conversations with me about the controversial concept of what it takes to play the game of cops and robbers with the transient criminal enterprise. First, the SMEs talked about the reality that the transient criminal enterprise has border security LEOs on their books and fighting for their team. Border security LE corruption is never an easy topic to discuss and it is not easy to accept; however, it is absolutely necessary to be honest about if advancements in combating the transient criminal enterprise threat. The second controversial issue mentioned by the SMEs regarding the topic of corruption, specifically, why transient criminality is able to reach success so easily and so often was because of the money politicians and political influencers make from the illicit activities the transient criminal enterprise commits by, with, and through criminal trafficking routes. The SMEs spoke about the complexity of this type of organized corruption. Most of the SMEs claimed that the employment and connection between the transient criminal enterprise, a border security LE entity, and the middle-man supporter and linkage to both criminals and cops is covert in nature. One SME explained this process by saying, “The truth is that you have to pay to play in this dangerous game. The truth is that LE, at any level, doesn’t have the money necessary to even sit at the table with the criminal enterprise. This means that sometimes non-governmental people need to step in so that the police have a chance to compete with the bad guys.” This SME added to their statement that they learned over a 20-year federal LE career that “you learn to trust

individual people from both sides” (LE and the criminal enterprise) and “you must accept that the thin blue line is not the fraternity of purity.” They concluded by saying, “If you can come out even after a career in this game, you survived it, you made a difference, and you should be proud of that.”

CONCLUSION.

The primary goal of this chapter was to share the SMEs’ thoughts, our discussions, and the scholarly literature that connected theory and practicality to the confidence levels border security LE have in their Triple Cs to combat transient criminality. Specifically, this study’s interview information sought to answer RQs one through four. The RQs covered the topics of: 1) the definition of transient criminality; 2) the practitioner’s training opportunities to combat and overall knowledge of transient criminality and its recruitment; 3) border security LE’s confidence in actionizing their Triple Cs against the transient criminality threat; and 4) the effectiveness of transient criminality information gathering and intelligence production processes. And, while this study was ultimately successful in its primary goals, additional information was provided by the SMEs that led to the next section’s discussion topics which require further research attention.

The lack of information sharing by DHS causes significant degradations to the tactical and operational systems and processes that are missioned to produce intelligence products for strategic leaders. Additionally, due to the lack of knowledge and training on and about transient criminality border security, the gravity of communication inadequacies DHS presents is seemingly immeasurable for effectiveness against the transient criminality threat. It is really a quite simple and logical concept. If local LEOs,

and other state and federal tactical agents, do not know what they should be looking for, then they cannot gather intelligence worthy information from the field. This is not to say that border security tactical assets are not trained in their initial academies and furthermore provided specific criterion for information collection requirements during operational missions. What this study's SMEs and scholars indicated was that US border security officers and agents for the last 30 years to present day have not been trained or provided collection requirements that are specifically focused on transient criminality. This failure to prepare tactical assets to perform at an operational level, as an intel analyst enhancer results in two lesser than optimal scenarios. One, tactical border security practitioners waste time, energy, and are placed at wasteful risk during their patrol and investigatory shifts. The SMEs suggest that they often roam aimlessly gathering information that will translate to having limited to no intelligence value. And two, the overwhelming noise that surrounds a tactical border security professional that does not have a clear scope of their information gathering task may choose to just not gather information at all. This does not mean that the patrol officer or investigator stops doing their border security LE jobs. In contrast, it means that the practitioner remissions themselves and focuses on gathering information and performing border security LE on areas and aspects of their occupation that has clearer and more directed intent and objective goals. Both scenarios improve the transient criminal enterprise's expansion of influence. These scenarios also leave border security intelligence professionals and their agencies equally frustrated with their tactical occupational brothers and sisters because both groups of protectors are bombarded with so much informational noise that intelligence, even raw intelligence, can become extremely difficult to find.

The twenty plus conversational topics mentioned at the end of this chapter merely scratch the foundational surface of the larger transient criminality problems, issues, and concerns DHS, specifically border security LE will continue to face for the near and foreseeable future. In the next and final section of this research project we will dive deeper into who, what, when, where, and why future research must be performed on transient criminality throughout the Americas. It will be in this conclusory section that this project is summated and considered complete.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMATION OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY.

Transient criminal activity is not only a real threat to the US' homeland security, but it is also expanding at an alarming rate which forces border security LE into significantly uncomfortable personnel and logistical positions. The expansion of the transient criminal enterprise implies that with more criminal opportunities, more crimes will occur and thus, more criminals will need to be recruited, employed, and then trained. With budget constraints across DHS and a lack of agreeance on what the definition of and what specific crimes belong in the transient criminality category, the transient criminal enterprise continues to operate effectively and efficiently across physical and conceptual borders throughout the world.

This study explored the competency, capacity, and capability levels of the US' border security LE as it relates to being trained, weaponized, and prepared to detect, counter, and combat transient criminality. A keen focus on what the border security fighting force knows and understands about how to identify and then divert or deter transient criminal recruitment was achieved.

WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS.

In reflection, this study experienced several limitations and potential shortcomings that must be addressed. The lack of topic specific literature inspired me to conduct this research. However, it was this same missing literature that lessened the validity and will limit the overall initial impact of my findings post-study. It will take future similar research, repeatably designed research, and advanced topical research on

transient criminality and its recruitment to enhance and solidify my research results in the Homeland Security discipline. Additionally, my participant selection criteria suffered from a researcher's bias flaw that I did not catch until after conducting my first few interviews. This bias initially led me to drive conversations based on what my subject selection criteria labeled my participant as. Once I realized that my SMEs categorized themselves differently than I had designed the selection criteria, I adjusted my interview approach and adapted to the needs of the research study, reducing any further researcher's bias. Finally, choosing what foundational baseline I wanted to build my research topic upon was subjective and could have started with several different approaches, theories, and methodologies, each potentially rendering different takeaways or at least different perspectives for both my and my SME's thoughts on the topic of transient criminality and its recruitment. Yet, these limitations were justified based on the constraints I mentioned in this section and in the opening limitations section of this study. Moreover, and conclusory, each of these limitations and weaknesses in my study can be improved upon during future research and I urge future researchers to learn from my mistakes while they enhance the Homeland Security discipline.

Additional Gaps. I began this research journey by exploiting a single homeland security research gap. While attempting to fill that void, I indirectly uncovered several additional gaps that have both academic research and practical application impacts. This study addresses these gaps by first identifying their existence. Then, it provides a synopsis of previously conducted research through both direct and comparative analyses. Finally, my study confirms whether the sociological theories in this study aid in explaining and addressing any potential connection between the identified research gap

and my specific research topic. The missing federal crime category for transient crimes and the lack of a unified and accepted transient criminality repository are prime examples of topically relevant gaps that appropriately fell into the sociology of security theory's purview during my research process. And, while many connective gaps found their way into my study's literature due to their likeness and applicability to my study's theoretical direction, not all of these gaps should be addressed in my study. Even after micro theories and concepts such as social disorganization theory and rational choice theory were added after the analysis phase of my research to help explain why themes existed between interviewees' responses, certain thematic gaps such as why do new border security LEOs' fear arresting known felons and why combatting drugs are still more prevalent in LE training and mission objectives than combatting fraudulent document crimes simply did not connect to my study's RQs, resulting in irrelevancy to this study. Yet, these gaps may hold significant relevancy to future researchers and future research topics and thus must be mentioned in this section of my study.

IMPLICATIONS.

This study contributes to the greater Homeland Security community, which includes both practitioners and academics. Its broader influence serves the public and private sectors that are dedicated to providing border security in and around the US' continental borders. Theoretically, this study expands the reach of the sociology of security theory by offering a new discipline, Homeland Security, for its concepts to provide validity, justification, and explanation. Practically, the definition of transient crime is available for all border security agencies, individually and collectively, to utilize on a local, state, federal, or international level. Additionally, this study provides a one-stop-shop for agencies to learn

what their border security brother and sister agencies have available in their Triple Cs. This should be levied for both proactive strategic planning and for crisis response actions. Ultimately, this project created research outlets that answered my research questions. It may not have solved my research problem of obtaining universal buy-in of my definitional coining of the term transient criminality. It also did not remedy the issues border security agencies still have with inter and intra level communications. It did not create a new curriculum for Homeland Security students or a training platform for border security practitioners to combat transient criminality. And, it certainly did not provide a policy that permitted pure academics access and control to instruct border security law enforcement in-service training. Yet, all of that is alright. Because what this research did achieve matters. It explored and identified that transient criminality is a real homeland security threat. It established that a definition and a reportable crime category for transient criminality are needed. It explained how both improved communication and the addition of a consortium between homeland security academics and practitioners would enhance the combative posture mentally and physically on the battlefield. This research project developed a strong foundation for future transient criminality research; a foundation that is supported by SME experiences, comparative scholarly research findings, and theoretical frameworks with applicable underpinnings for homeland security academics, practitioners, and intelligencers alike.

FUTURE RESEARCH.

The scope of this study was to explore how prepared, through training, knowledge, and experience, US border security LE currently is in protecting the US' borders from domestic and foreign transient criminal threats. This study's scope extended

to understanding the preparedness level border security inhibits when identifying and then combatting transient criminal recruitment. While answering these two questions, I discovered several areas in the US' border security organizational structure, training programs design and implementation, and systematic inter and intra communicational sharing of information and intelligence that requires further academic research and examination. The following subsections list these specific future research opportunities.

Border Security Organizational Structure.

There is a need for a concerted effort to be placed not only on the training pipeline of identification and then combatting the transient criminal recruitment threat, but also on manning power allocations for border security personnel. Expanding the radius exponentially by both geographical width across physical territories and hierarchical heights from blue to white collar professionals over exhausts the already understaffed border security LE force. If there is to be a proactive push to prepare for the future expansion of the transient criminal enterprise, then border security must start now on improving their recruiting efforts, incentive packages, and personnel and training budgets.

There needs to be a structured response procedure, much like Emergency Management has in their ICS. Establishing a leadership process that is accepted by all major LE agencies and based on all major, commonly combatted transient crime categories will improve communication before, during, and after a transient criminal event.

Training Programs.

Field Training. I recommend that pure academics be paired with a highly reputable and experienced field agent to co-develop a curriculum and then co-teach that curriculum to the border security LE force. Moreover, this consortium should be a federally funded program that limits membership through a competitive and stringent selection process. The ultimate goal is to build rapport and enduring relationships with the nation's brightest minds and most experienced practitioners so that these SMEs can walk into a classroom together and instantaneously own their audience's attention.

Today Homeland Security operates in a joint operational world. This cannot be just another DHS cliché phrase. It must take form and become part of the operational planning and decision-making processes throughout border security. Thus, it is my recommendation that a joint operations advisory board be created. This advisory board would have local, state, federal, and academic representatives dedicated to overseeing transient criminal related operations, especially on the southern borders of the US.

In-Service Training. We must depart from “objective” based border security LE standardized testing. These tests serve the agency as a check-the-box liability waiver, more than they prepare the practitioner for knowledge growth and most importantly, for practical application. Too much “brain-dumping” exists in border security. Hence, any potentially useful information that was provided about transient criminality and recruitment is likely to be forgotten because the border security student is too overly concerned with their next tested requirements. Removal of the border security LE blocks of instruction practice, that has become a staple for governmental security checks on learning, which focuses primarily on “objective” and “key words” will assist in avoiding

learning limitations for the student. Additionally, the elimination of the practices of focusing instruction on only listed “objectives” on a PowerPoint slide and the instructor “foot stomp” method, which is used before saying a specific key word like “transient criminality” or “recruitment,” will force the student to be more engaged throughout the block of instruction, rather than only present when they hear the aforementioned triggers.

Several recommendations for improving instructors’ requirements at each hierarchical level of border security LE became present during this study. First, federal instructors should be SMEs on the topic being taught and the individual instructor should have demonstrated success in the field with the tactics and techniques they are teaching. The concept of having the complete instructional package, the combination of knowledge and experience, is vitally important for a federal border security LE instructor because when they enter the classroom, the border security practitioner audience is immediately judgmental. If the federal instructor cannot win the audience’s respect early into the presentation, there will be most likely limited to poor knowledge transfer during that training session. Next, state level instructors should also be SMEs; however, their expertise should be related to specific systems and processes that can be utilized by all levels of border security LE. This means that field experience is still a key factor in the state instructor’s resume; however, the state instructor does not need to have an action hero reputation to gain the respect needed to teach federal, other state, or local border security LE practitioners. A full understanding and ability to demonstrate how to use state level systems and processes during instruction is what makes state instructors a valued asset in the classroom. Finally, local border security LE instructors do not need to be SMEs of their instructional topic. There are too many local border security LE

departments and offices to realistically think that local LE would have the bandwidth or budget to achieve 100% SME status for each of their instructors. Local instructors can be taught the basics of many in-service LE trainings; however, field experience in operational areas that are being taught significantly improves the instructor's competency and credibility with their interdepartmental colleagues.

Understanding the transient criminal recruiter's tactics and personas is crucial to combatting transient criminal recruitment. As a baseline, the following seven types of criminal recruiters should be taught to every entry level patrolling border security practitioner. These stereotypical recruiters are as follows: 1) the prodigy – the actionable example and poster boy for the criminal enterprise; 2) the designer – the convincer that they can see you being successful doing x, y, and z for the criminal enterprise; 3) the explainer – the debunker of all your “Nos;” 4) the motivator – the hype-man, the one that convinces you that you can do anything, be anything, have everything; 5) the challenger – the competitor that contends you can't cut it and your aren't physically, mentally, and emotionally tough enough to be part of the criminal enterprise; 6) the storyteller – the master of words, the one who captures your attention through dramatizations of people you could meet, places you could go, and things you could do if you joined the criminal enterprise; and 7) the dictator – the enforcer and demander of action, through brute force or psychological warfare of fear they will convince you that if you do not join the criminal enterprise the enterprise will do something bad to you or the people and things you love.

I believe it is the right time in this project to reiterate that just because you can't see a threat doesn't mean it is not already there. Whether or not border security practitioners

have been formally trained on how to identify and combat the transient criminal recruitment threat is irrelevant when considering the fact that the transient criminal enterprise is overtly providing a crystal-clear picture of their expansion of transient criminality. We know transient criminal recruitment is happening all around us. We must accept this reality and if formalized instruction is not currently being provided to us, then we need to be the consummate professionals and conduct self-study of this border security threat.

Higher Education Training. As a well-travelled academic-practitioner that has experienced cultures and communities that thrive under criminal rule, I wonder if there is at least some value in exploring whether or not transient criminals find their occupational choices “honorable” and if they do, why do they feel this way, especially when the stereotypes and stigmas of transient related crimes have such a societal negative connotation.

The leading NGOs referenced by SMEs were USAID, Doctors Without Borders, and other local US NGOs that were state, county, or city specific. In addition to NGOs, the SMEs added that they had been trained by a plethora of private contractors and private businesses throughout their border security careers. Obviously, the NGOs and private contractors were able to crack the code of becoming part of the border security LE instructional circle of trust. Finding out how NGOs and private contracted companies were able to become accredited and how they gained permissions to teach border security LE practitioners during in-service and broadening agency funded training would significantly ease academia’s continued struggles in achieving this like goal.

Communications.

After all the discussions about the lack of promotions and follow-through of inter and intra level communications in border security LE, I urge departmental leaders to reflect on the concept of blocking out the noise or removing the noise from the decision-making process during joint operations such as the fight against the transient criminal enterprise. When the noise is eliminated from the operational planning and execution phases of a joint mission, then logic and common sense can prevail as decision-making attributes for leaders. These moments of decision-making are often times clearer, simpler, and render the best results. Leaders must also remind themselves that there is no sound without silence.

I would like to introduce a new term that holds an aged-old actionable definition. The “Janitorial Effect” explains that crime is witnessed by one or more of a person’s senses, that criminal acts always leave evidence behind. Even the most well planned and executed crimes are observed either in the moment of the commission of the crime or are revealed through observations of changes in the operational environment by people who frequent and have duties associated with knowing how something should appear. Most of the time, those with the roles and responsibilities of cleaning up, the janitors of the world, are ignored by owners of properties, patrons of establishments, and criminals that seek to profit from lack of security presence. Everyone seems to walk right by these local SMEs without a second thought of what they say, what they do, or what they leave behind. Understanding the value of the “Janitorial Effect” can become a significant gamechanger for border security LE investigators. The local eyes and ears are present in the border areas that are vulnerable to transient criminal activities, to include recruitment. Simply

asking the right question to the right person may result in a lead that no formally trained border security practitioner would have found.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

Cyber. Cybercriminal recruitment is the way of the future. SMEs from this study that are currently attached to cyber units spoke about the realism of this threat and the difficulties that border security LE have now and will most likely face for years to come. The psychological tactic of “click bait,” a social media technique of tempting people with messaging to “click” or “post” information about themselves or others is present and is important to the transient criminal enterprise. This example is only one of many tactics the transient criminal enterprise and legitimate businesses use to gather information, gain intelligence, and to recruit their future employees and customers. Due to the limited resources and training, as well as, the constrictions of legality surrounding defending and combatting cybercrimes, this criminal realm may provide the most unexpurgated opportunistic route for transient criminality expansion.

Fighting Crime. Border security practitioners desire to fight crimes. This concept belongs to the aged-old notion of protecting the public and is a decisive contributor to why many border security practitioners chose to serve in a homeland security occupational field. I recommend designing a mentorship program that allows juvenile delinquents the opportunity to hone the transferable skillsets of their criminal passions into positive outcomes. If at-risk youths are identified and enrolled into this program early in their sociological and psychological maturation, then it can be hypothesized that this disenfranchised vulnerable to criminality subset of the US population can be transformed to fight for the good guys in the future. The concept of complete saturation

with positivity, opportunity, and role models that can demonstrate with words and actions that being a productive citizen has value provides a fighting chance to eliminate or at least spark a hesitant inquiry moment of doubt in the transient criminal recruit's decision-making process to join the "dark side." Obviously, there will be some very difficult conversations and comparisons that will be had in a program like this one; however, rational choice theory will serve as a reliable and consistent catalyst for describing and showing how much risk is taken in a criminal glidepath compared to the guaranteed positive outcome that is rewarded by choosing the glidepath of lawful and legality.

Split-Operations. There is truth in the proverb that "pressure bursts pipes but pressure can also create diamonds." Approaching the transient criminal recruitment problem as an "us versus them" conflict is not the only option, nor is it likely the option that will produce the best results. Instead of solely spending border security time, money, and resources on a linear attack plan that pins border security practitioners against both the transient criminal enterprise and their potential recruits, why not conduct a split operation of at least 70%/30%, where 70% of border security's Triple Cs are focused on combatting the current transient criminal enterprise threats and 30% of border security Triple Cs become dedicated to identifying, mentoring, and recruiting the vulnerable, potential criminal recruits. This strategic plan places constant pressure on the transient criminal enterprise and consistent counterpressure on the recruit. It will be interesting to see what mistakes the transient criminal enterprise makes when they start to have competition in their recruitment process, and it will be rewarding when diamonds start to be created for border security rather than just for the transient criminal enterprise.

Influencing. Another great opportunity border security LE has in impacting the transient criminal enterprise's recruitment process is through "influencing the influencers." There is a little bit of psychological operations at play with this tactic. First, the idea that everyone has an agenda must be accepted. Next, it is essential that border security LE acknowledges that the phrase "having an agenda" is not always a bad thing; it simply means that a person or group of people are motivated by a certain outcome, and they will put more effort into a relationship or operation if they believe they will achieve their desired outcome. Once these two concepts are trusted, then border security practitioners can begin shaping the battlefield with strategic messaging, pointed propaganda, and motivating incentives that lure in transient criminal recruiting influencers. When these influencers are where border security wants them and when the timing offers their target's most vulnerable state, that is the decisive moment when border security must deploy its Triple Cs to flip the criminal influencer into a border security asset. The criminal recruit will remain influenced by their recruiter; however, now that their recruiter is directly or indirectly tied to the border security network, the recruit and moreover, the transient criminal enterprise must decide whether the risk of continuing their relationships with the influencer (recruiter) is worth the reward.

Cultivating Controlled Chaos. Creating an operational environment where chaos and crisis for the transient criminal enterprise is an everyday struggle is another technique in which border security LE should explore. The concept of isolating this threat into a "culturally deranged" geolocation where stressors and pressures continuously force the bad guys to have to make hasty decisions will breed frustration, cause mistakes in wargaming, and most importantly, it will lead to the transient criminal enterprise to move

its operations elsewhere, perhaps to a place where less time is needed to achieve maximum profit gains. If this tactic is optimized and employed in enough geographical areas, border security may be able to funnel the transient criminal enterprise to the specific location within the US that they desire. This end state would place the control of the battle space in the hands of border security.

Focusing on the Fundamentals. Each facet of transient criminality: trafficking of drugs, trafficking of people, trafficking for sex, trafficking of weapons, and creation and distribution of fraudulent documents all started as standalone criminal acts. They all evolved from street level crimes to now being a multibillion-dollar component of the greater transient criminal enterprise. I asked one of my SMEs who has had a fifteen-year federal service career with the DEA if they ever imagined that when South America started to push millions of dollars worth of drugs across the southern US border, that the DEA and other border security agency would be attempting to combat a multi-billion dollar conglomerate of criminal activities that span from drugs to weapons to people. The SME lowered and shook their head side-to-side before saying, “Hell no.” The SME went on to explain that when they first started with the DEA, the federal government had all their eggs in the “war against drugs” basket and the strategic tunnel vision that was created by this hyper focused attention on drug smuggling allowed for other transient criminality to take form and become the new wave of illicit financial prosperity. The SME concluded their shared experience by explaining that transient crimes that gain the enterprise’s attention and become a staple in their arsenal of criminality doesn’t just happen overnight. Yet, the SME added that for border security LE that is exactly the way they felt. Because they were overzealous in combatting the criminal enterprise’s drug

epidemic, they had blinders on to the rest of the transient criminal world that was able to seemingly unopposed test the waters on trafficking weapons, illegal immigrants, and then people for sex in and out of the US.

Collective Genius. To really make a dent in the transient criminal enterprise's armor, border security must become a collective genius. Homeland Security and border security have no lack of expertise in their respective disciplines. Yet, the historical literature and this study's SMEs' experiences overwhelmingly convey the reality that SMEs operate in silos and thus, their combined knowledge, experience, and tactical abilities seldom, if ever, reach their optimal potential. Becoming a collective genius by unifying SMEs' Triple Cs from across all aspects and hierarchical tiers of border security LE must be the modern joint mission objective for Homeland Security. Achieving this level of organizational synergy and ascending to new heights on the staircase of relationships is the right answer to the question of how does border security give themselves a chance in the war against the transient criminal enterprise.

CONCLUSION.

All things must come to an end...or do they? This project is just the start, the beginning of the exposure of a dynamic and prosperous criminal realm that silently inflicts devastating social, financial, and psychological pains across the Americas. It is my hope that this project inspires others to join me in the task of tackling the transient criminal threat that seeks to take territory and excite fear through trafficking drugs, weapons, and people across our physical and conceptual borders.

One Last Question. Are we really experts? During my interviews, the SMEs were confident, as they should have been, in that they have earned the designated title of

“Subject Matter Expert” in their practical occupational field. Many of my SMEs also humbly accepted the SME designee as academics in the fields of criminal justice, LE, sociology, psychology, education, business, and even leadership. However, one SME seemed to summarize the majority opinion regarding being an SME of Homeland Security. They said, “If we don’t know the definition of a simple, but vitally important term like transient criminality and if we claim to have never even thought about transient criminal recruitment, how then can we justify calling ourselves subject matter experts?” This SME, along with many of their colleagues, struggled with identifying and accepting the title of SME for border security and Homeland Security because they just didn’t feel that they had enough experience, both practically and academically, to be “experts.” I perceive the SMEs’ expert statuses, in this study and across the border security sector, much differently. Homeland Security, as a standalone discipline, is still in its infancy. This means that there are zero “complete,” “perfect” SMEs currently advising and deciding on homeland security matters. Research is raw in the lab and new threats to border security are ever evolving in the field. This is and will be the way forward for the discipline of Homeland Security for the enduring foreseeable future. Yet this does not mean that we do not have SMEs in Homeland Security. Every social science discipline started with advisement from academic SMEs who demonstrated their expertise during their research projects and published works on subjects related to the new discipline being established. Practitioners who had demonstrated their expertise in comparable fields also added expertise to the new discipline. Combining both the academic’s and practitioner’s knowledge and experiences led to today’s household SME names such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, B.F. Skinner, and Edwin

Sutherland being renowned as the framework builders and still the foundational pillars for the fields of Sociology, Psychology, and Criminal Justice. Homeland Security is adding a new floor to the psychosocial justice headquarters and for that headquarters building to remain strong and resistant to naysayers and border security threats alike during construction, today's psychosocial justice experts from their various academic-practitioner backgrounds must confidently accept the challenge and the calling to be Homeland Security's founding fathers and SMEs.

Final Thoughts. This project was so much fun. Learning from some of the brightest, most experienced border security professionals in the world has enhanced and elevated my knowledge base as a Homeland Security academic-practitioner beyond what I could have ever dreamed possible. Moreover, my passion for serving and protecting the US from its current and future foreign and domestic threats has never been stronger. They say, "knowledge is power" and that with "great power comes great responsibility." I am ready to continue to battle in the trenches with the transient criminal enterprise. I am ready to compete for the commodity of human capital. This is merely the first of many ventures into the dark, dangerous, and intriguing underworld of transient criminality. Let's learn to recruit like champions and force the transient criminal enterprise to struggle to win the day!

APPENDIX A

Interview Process



The Researcher's Interview Guide

Introduction

Good _____. Thank you so much for volunteering to be part of my research project. You are a vitally important piece to this study's puzzle. I will always be completely transparent during this interview. So, let me start by recapping the consent form you signed. This is a completely voluntary interview. This means that you can stop participating at any time. I will be referring to you as _____. This will be your alias for this interview and throughout my dissertation writing process. In other words, your real name will never be used in any part of this project. I would like to record this interview, so that I can listen to your answers to my questions in the future. I will ensure that a copy of the transcribed interview is distributed to you. I will also destroy the video/audio record of this interview once this research is complete. Do you have any questions about this process?

I want to take a few minutes to explain the background of this study. I have spent the last 15 years of my academic-practitioner career attempting to counter the expansion

of illicit recruitment. My experiences have spanned from working as a school resource officer where I tried to help middle and high schoolers make the choice to not join local gangs to being a state agent where I investigated organized crimes like identity fraud and international chop shop operations. As a civil affairs and psychological operations Army officer I have spent years studying and operating in developing countries where transient criminality is expanding at alarming rates. In all of my experiences, I have found a glaring common theme: No formalized single or joint agency attention is given to the foundational step in the expansion of the transient criminal enterprise, the recruitment of transient criminals.

One last thing before we talk about transient criminality recruitment. This project is completely exploratory. So, if you don't know an answer to one of the questions, don't worry, just let me know that you haven't experienced that or simply don't know. Do you have any questions before we get started with our discussion?

Experience Questions

Let's talk about your experiences, your roles and responsibilities in border security, as it deals with countering transient criminality.

1. So, you work for ____; why did you choose that agency/institution?
2. Tell me a little bit about what a day in the life of being Agent/Officer/Dr. ____ looks like?
3. Have you had other jobs that now shape how and why you do what you do today?
4. What do you like best about the work you do? What do you like least?

5. On a personal level, what do you feel your role has meant to the fight against organized crime and/or transient criminality?

Border Security LE Questions

6. Tell me about a day you would give yourself a golden star, where you really felt you made a significant difference in fighting or advancing the field of border security against transient crime, where you enforced the law, found a missing link, reached a student or class, just really got it right?

- a. What made it such a success?
- b. How did you get ready?
- c. Where did you learn to do that?
- d. Could you have done what you did right out of initial training?

7. Do you think most of it was a gut feeling, formalized training, or something else?

8. Tell me about the total FUBR case, research project, class you taught. What happened?

- a. Knowing what you know now and if you were given the opportunity to go back to the beginning of this experience, what would you do differently? And, what difference do you believe that change would make?

Transient Criminality Questions

9. When you hear “transient criminality” what comes to your mind?

10. If you were given the opportunity to define “transient criminality,” what definition or key words would you choose to use?

- a. Why did you choose (that word) _____?

11. Some people think that “organized criminality” and “transient criminality” are the same thing, others say they are different, where do you sit on this debate? Why?
12. A similar debate revolves around the mission action terms of: “countering,” “detering,” “combatting,” and “diverting” criminality. Some say that all four words mean the same thing. Others say they are different. I’m going to ask you a few questions about each of these words.
13. Talk to me about how you counter transient crime?
14. Tell me about how you deter transient crime?
15. How do you divert transient crime?
16. What about combatting transient crime, how do you do that?
17. When you think about everything you know now about fighting transient crime, where did you get all that knowledge from?
18. Other than formalized training, how did you get great at your craft (ie: mentoring, graduate classes, self-taught, just talking about work stuff with friends)?
19. Without saying their names, can you describe to me your fab 5, your phone a friends when you need help with a transient case?
20. How did you build your informal transient crime fighting network of resources?
21. Let’s talk a minute about “backdoor” networks (the local, unofficial eyes and ears of your areas of operations). If you were to describe to a new officer/agent the importance of a backdoor networks, how would you go about doing that?

Recruitment Questions

22. From your formal training, professional experiences, and scholarly research, how would you profile/describe the current transient criminal enterprise recruit?

23. Do you talk or research about children being recruited?
24. Do you talk or research about girls being recruited?
25. What about gang members?
26. Do you discuss the connection between transient criminals and terrorists?
27. Have you ever just been listening to the radio, a podcast, scrolling through social media, or surfing the internet and just had to dig deeper into what you just heard or saw? Where did you go to get more information? Why did you choose to search for answers the way that you did? How did you learn this technique?
28. Have you been trained or have you studied on socioeconomic class issues and their influence on recruits' decisions to join the enterprise?
29. What do you know about sociological or psychological methods as enhancements to recruitment?
30. Alright, let's get away from the formal side of training. Tell me about the people you know are being recruited for transient crimes.
31. So, let's recap for a second and fill in a few gaps in your described recruit profile. You are saying that your ideal recruit for transient crime would be.
 - a. What age?
 - b. Where would they live?
 - c. What do they look like?
 - d. What do they like to do?
 - e. What type of jobs do they hold?
 - f. What is their education level?
 - g. What does their family structure look like?

- h. What influencers exist in their circles of life?

Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities Questions

- 32. The “Triple C’s” (Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities) are the bread and butter of every LE agency’s ability to fight crime. What specific tools are in your bat belt that help you combat transient criminal recruitment? **(For academics and intelligence analysts: What resources and support do you have that can help border security LE combat transient criminal recruitment?)**
- 33. Tell me about your experiences with working with other agencies. What works? What is broken? How would you fix it?
- 34. Let’s talk specifically about inter and intra level communications. In your opinion, is information from the field shared timely and accurately within your agency/discipline?
 - a. What about information sharing between agencies/institutions?
 - b. How would you improve this process?

Informational Gathering

- 35. How do you like to get information about the area in which you conduct/study border security operations?
 - a. What techniques do you like to use?
 - b. Who has the real scoop on what is going on?
 - c. What happens to the information you get from the “field” after you turn it in?
 - d. Where does it go?
 - e. Who exactly gets it?
 - f. What do they do with it?
 - g. Do you ever see it again?

36. Describe to me the perfect intelligence package for a transient crime case?
37. I want to hear about a time when the intelligence you received assisted you in solving a border security case **(For academics and intelligence analysts: I want to hear about a time when the research you conducted or intelligence package you created assisted in advancing a border security case/discipline?)**
38. Have you ever found out that your research was used or have you been afraid that your research could have been used by a practitioner in a way that you did not attend? Talk to me about the impact that made on you. Did it change your decision or direction for research? Publication?
39. Let's go back to a case that was a complete FUBAR. How did the intelligence you received or didn't receive impact your ability to counter this threat? **(For academics and intelligence analysts: let's go back to a study or intelligence production that was a complete FUBAR. What happened?)**

Training and Instruction Questions

This is the last section of questions about transient crime. I want to know a little bit more about your training and instruction experiences.

40. Were your trainings mostly or all interagency conducted? Meaning, where they designed, instructed, and conducted for your agency **(For academics: institution)** only?
- a. Who attended these training sessions? More importantly, who didn't attend that you thought probably should have?
41. Have you ever been trained by another LE agency **(For academics: institution)** on transient crimes?
- a. What about a non-governmental organization or private contractors?

42. Did the instructor(s) for your trainings have field experience or were they purely an academic/institutionally developed trainer/professor?

a. How did they train you? (Lecture, controlled practical exercises, real-world scenarios, a combination of methods)

43. You told me you learn best these ways (list them), if you had to prioritize them, where would you rank each and why?

Demographic Questions

We made it to the end. I need to ask you a few demographic questions and then we are done.

44. Would you describe yourself as an academic, a practitioner, or an academic-practitioner?

a. Why do you choose to refer to yourself that way?

i. As an academic, do you categorize yourself as a professor/instructor or a scholarly researcher, or both?

ii. Talk to me about why you chose to describe yourself that way?

b. As a practitioner, do you think of yourself as a first line LEOs, as an investigator, as an analyst, or as a policy maker, or as a combination of several of these categories?

1. Do you work at the tactical, operational, or strategic level?

2. Are you in a leadership position? Shadow leadership?

3. Do you have decision-maker authority?

45. Specifically, which of the following categories best describes your most recent professional experience?

- a. Academia (Professor, Scholarly Researcher, Instructor)
 - b. Homeland Security (CBP and Coast Guard)
 - c. Intelligence Professionals (CIA and Private Sector SME)
 - d. Federal LE (FBI, ICE, and DEA)
 - e. Local and State LE (Police Department, Sheriff's Office, State LEA)
 - f. Department of Defense (Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force)
46. How many years have you served as a practitioner?
47. How many years have you served as an academic?

Conclusion Questions

48. We talked about a lot today. Is there anything else you would like me to know?

Thank you for all of your time today. I really appreciate your help with this project.

APPENDIX B

Invitation to Participate in the Study



Letter of Interest

Dear Border Security Subject Matter Expert,

You are invited to participate in a study on border security's ability to counter and combat transient criminality recruitment throughout the Americas. My name is Chris Palme, and I am a doctoral candidate in Homeland Security at St. John's University, Queens, N.Y. I am conducting a study for my dissertation titled: *From the Deceptive Delinquent to the Illusive Illicit Alien: A Qualitative Study of 21st Century United States Border Security LE's Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities Designed to Counter Transient Criminality Recruitment.*

The purpose of the study will be exploratory in nature and will focus on identifying areas of opportunity to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of border security professionals in their efforts in fighting the threat of transient criminal recruitment. You will be sent an informed consent form that provides more details about this study and procedures of the interview process. The selection criteria for this study has two facets. First, the researcher will select two potential candidate subject matter experts from each of the fields of Academia, Intelligence, and Border Security LE. Next, each subject matter expert participant will be asked to recommend a colleague to be invited as a potential candidate. This process will continue until a total of 20 subject matter expert interviews or topical saturation occurs. The rationale for selecting these participants is based on subject matter expertise, which is determined for this study by a combination of academic-practitioner experience and occupational roles and responsibilities in the fields of Homeland Security, Border Security, Sociology, Psychology, and Criminal Justice.

The participation requirements for this study include an interview session with the researcher. If you agree to contribute, you will be asked to participate in a one-time interview session. The interview will be video and audio recorded. You may review the recording and request that all or any portion of the recording not be used in the study. The recording will also be destroyed upon the completion of this study. Participation in this study will involve approximately an hour of your time.

There is no known potential risk associated with your participation in this research. Pseudonyms will be used in the study to protect your identity, your name or any

identifying information will not be included in the study, and your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your confidentiality in this study is paramount. All records of your participation in this study will be secured and maintained on a locked and password-protected laptop in a locked file cabinet, and the researcher will have sole access to any information provided. You may decline to participate or withdraw from the study at any time, and you have the right to skip or not answer any questions you choose not to answer during the interview.

You will not receive any direct benefits for participating, but this research may help the researcher and the field of border security gain insight into how to counter and combat the current and future transient criminal recruitment epidemic.

If you have questions about the purpose of this investigation, you may contact the Principal Researcher, Christopher C. Palme by phone at 919.895.8637 or email at christopher.palme19@my.stjohns.edu. If you have questions concerning your rights as a human participant, you may contact my mentor, Dr. Keith Cozine at cozinek@stjohns.edu, or the University's Human Subjects Review Board at St. John's University, specifically Dr. Raymond DiGiuseppe, 718.990.1955, or digiuser@stjohns.edu. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Signature of Researcher

Date

APPENDIX C

Informed Consent Form



**ST. JOHN'S
UNIVERSITY**

Informed Consent Document

From the Deceptive Domestic Delinquent to the Illusive Illicit Alien:

A Qualitative Study of 21st Century United States Border Security LE's Capabilities,
Competencies, and Capacities Designed to Counter Transient Criminality Recruitment

Researcher: Christopher C. Palme

St. John's University

College of Professional Studies

Department of Homeland Security

Telephone: 919-895-8637

Email: christopher.palme19@my.stjohns.edu

Researcher's Statement

Thank you for considering to participate in my dissertation. This research project focuses on the levels of preparedness border security professionals have in countering and combating the transient criminal enterprise's recruitment process. This project is sanctioned by St. John's University's College of Professional Studies. The department chair of the Doctorate of Professional Studies in Homeland Security and my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Keith Cozine has approved this research project as being a noteworthy exploration into the development of the discipline of homeland security. The purpose of this consent form is to make sure you are informed about this study's processes and procedures. Please read the form carefully. You may ask questions about the purpose of the research, what I am asking you to do, the possible risks and benefits, your rights as a volunteer, and anything else about the research or this form that is not clear. When all your questions have been answered, you can decide if you want to be in the study or not. This process is called "informed consent."

PURPOSE

In this study, I am exploring why the transient criminal enterprise may be able to recruit its next generation of illicit employees without being significantly impeded by the US' border security sector. I am focusing on understanding the confidence levels of border security professionals in their capabilities, competencies, and capacities to counter, deter, divert, and combat transient criminal recruitment.

BENEFITS

There are no personal or professional benefits being offered for participating in this study. I am asking for your volunteerism during this research project in order to advance the discipline of homeland security and to strengthen the future training pipelines that are and will be devoted to countering and combatting transient criminality.

PROCEDURES

You are being asked to commit to one interview session with me. This interview will be conducted via the Webex online communication platform. I am anticipating that our discussion will last between an hour to an hour and a half; however, if our conversation lasts longer or shorter than that timeframe, that is alright.

The interview questions in this study will ask you about your professional experiences, as they relate to countering, deterring, diverting, and combatting transient criminality recruitment. We will talk about the training you have received and how successful that training was in effectively preparing you for border security operations against the transient criminal enterprise, specifically its recruitment strategies. We will conclude our talk with demographic questions. These specific questions will **NOT** ask you to provide any personally identifiable information.

I am requesting that our interview be video and audio recorded for two purposes. First, I will transcribe the entire interview for my research project; thus, I will need these recordings to ensure the transcription is accurate. Second, I would like to learn as much as I possibly can from you during our short time together. The video and audio recordings will provide me an opportunity to go back and view our nonverbal reactions and verbal changes in tone, etc. that occurred during the interview. I will not be sharing the recordings of our interview session with anyone outside of my committee and research team. The members of my team are also held to the same confidential requirements of protecting your identity and keeping your participation in this study confidential. Additionally, once this research project is complete, I will destroy all video and audio recordings. I will also provide you with a copy of the transcription of our interview for your records.

RISKS, STRESS, OR DISCOMFORT

I have taken every effort to reduce and eliminate any risks, stress, or discomfort his subjects could face while volunteering to participate in this research study. Due to the exploratory nature of this project, the first and most important risk mitigation action I

have taken is making sure that the identity of all participants are kept confidential. No link of personally identifiable information will be forwarded to the subject's employment agency or any other private or public business, agency, or institution. No stress is created for the subject by time sensitive deadlines. I am dedicated to making sure that the participant's professional and personal schedules take priority when scheduling an interview time and date.

OTHER INFORMATION

The information and data gained from your interview is confidential and will result in no linkages of you being part of this research project. The nature of this research is exploratory and thus, no identifiers will be present in this study that will connect you to any facet of this study. My dissertation committee, hired professional research consultant, Dr. Christopher Bradley from The Dissertation Coach INC, and I will be the only ones that will have access to your interview results (recordings and transcription (coding)). Once this dissertation is completed, I will destroy all video and audio recordings of your interview. You will also receive a copy of the interview transcription.

PARTICIPATION

Participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation at any time. You also may temporarily stop your participation and ask any questions you may have during this research project. I may also withdraw you at my professional discretion.

CONTACT INFORMATION

If at any time you have questions regarding the research being conducted or your participation in this study, you should contact the researcher, Christopher C. Palme, at (919) 895-8637 and/or christopher.palme19@my.stjohns.edu. You should also contact the researcher and/or any member of the researcher's dissertation committee if you have any concerns or complaints about the research.

Researcher's Dissertation Committee

Dr. Keith Cozine at cozinek@stjohns.edu

Dr. Bernard Jones at jonesb1@stjohns.edu

Dr. Cheryl Brown at CLB2@reinhardt.edu

Dr. Deirdre Sommerlad-Rogers at dsommerl@calpoly.edu

If at any time you have comments regarding the conduct of this research or questions about your rights as a research participant, you should contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Administrator at irbstjohns@stjohns.edu.

RTICI T'S ST TE ME T

I have read the above information and understand my role in participating in this research project. I volunteer to take part in this research. I have had a chance to ask questions. I understand that if I have questions later, about the research, I can ask the researcher listed above. I understand that I may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation at any time. I also understand that the researcher may withdraw me from the research at his professional discretion. I understand that the researcher will video and audio record our interview and will transcribe our discussion. I consent to my interview being video and audio recorded and I acknowledge that all recordings will be destroyed upon the completion of this research project. I will receive a copy of this transcription. If I have questions about my rights as a research participant, I can call the Institutional Review Board office at irbstjohns@stjohns.edu. I certify that I am 18 years of age or older and freely give my consent to participate in this study. I will receive a copy of this document for my records.

Subject's Signature (Consent): _____ Date: _____

Su ject's r inted am e: _____

RESE R C E R'S ST T E M E T

I have discussed the proposed research with this participant, and in my opinion, the participant understands the benefits, risks, and alternatives (including non-participation) and is capable of freely consenting to participate in the research.

Researcher's Signature: _____

Date: _____

Researcher's r inted am e: _____

APPENDIX D

Definitions of Key Terms



Table 1.1 Defines Key Terms as They Are Implemented in This Study

Table 1.1

Definitions of Key Terms as Defined or Referenced by SMEs in the Field of Homeland Security

<u>Key Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
Ability	The level at which a person can action the combination of talent and skill they have in a practical or training environment.
Alternative Futures Analysis	The way practitioners use information and intelligence to help predict how the future might unfold.
Assessment	The end state product of capturing the condition, value, and importance levels of a person, place, or thing in a culture of interest.
Asymmetrical Warfare	Warfare techniques and tactics that are considered unconventional and differ from traditional military and paramilitary styles of fighting.
Border Security	Tactics and techniques used to protect and defend the borders and people of a country, county, and/or city.
Capabilities	The level of ability a practitioner or entity possesses.
Capacities	How much of a specific resource a practitioner or entity has available to them.

Cascading Effect	The cause-and-effect relationship between one border security event and another.
Center of Gravity	The decisive person, place, or objective that is the nucleus to the mission's success or failure outcome.
Civil Instability	The fragility level and cause of that fragility in a society, community, and/or culture.
Competencies	The collective genius of what the Homeland Security community knows and what their enemies know.
Criminal Mapping	The end state intelligence product of coding criminality across a geographical front by using information gathered from the field.
Critical Vulnerability	The decisive vulnerability of a person, place, or objective that if not protected or secured will result in catastrophe to border security levels.
Culture	The way a group of people live; to include, but is not limited to: people's religious beliefs, traditions, language, interactions with good and evil.
Disenfranchised	When a person or group of people believe or are deprived from the basic abilities to being able to connect and contribute to the culture they either reside or want to reside in.
Enablers	The person, place, or object that allows for action to occur.
Enterprise	An organization that is comprised through the commonality goal of making money.
Exclusionary Classification	The organizational technique of categorizing the characteristics that exclude people from specific groups, communities, and cultures.

Force Multiplier	A person, place, or object that enhances and increases Homeland Security's tactical, operational, and strategic missions. The border security threat also has force multipliers and many times these multipliers can aid both entities' missions.
Fragility	The level of resiliency a person, place, or object has to outside pressure.
Fragmentation	The process of separating the parts of a system or entity to either disrupt or improve its organizational structure and integrity.
Gangs	A group of three or more that share ideals and perform actions that are criminal in nature.
Geospatial Intelligence	The focused intelligence technique of understanding the human impact of an event based on the time and place in which the event has or will occur(ed).
Globalization	The current and increasing organizational scope and scale of border security and criminality reach that extends across the world.
Homeland Security	The hierarchical lead of US border security planning, preparation, and execution of missions against domestic and foreign enemies.
Human Intelligence	An information gathering and intelligence analysis technique that focuses on learning directly from people who live and work in a geographical area of border security interest.
Incentive	A tangible or conceptual benefit strive for or earned/given for doing something for someone or something else.
Influencers	A person, place, or object that shape another's decision-making based on

	<p>physical, mental, and emotional ties they have with the targeted subject.</p>
Intelligence Process	<p>The systematic process of gathering information, analyzing that information, turning the information into intelligence, and then distributing the intelligence products throughout the intelligence sector.</p>
Multisource Intelligence	<p>The information gathering and intelligence creation tactic that utilizes more than one intelligence technique to learn about a specific target and/or objective.</p>
Meta-Framing	<p>The practice and discourse through which security is elevated to the level of a dominant ordering principle of social organization by competing with other such principles in contemporary societies, particularly inclusion, equal participation, freedom of movement, and the right to privacy (Bajc and de Lint, 2011).</p>
Mission Creep	<p>Moving quicker than planned through the mission achievement process. Skipping or bypassing critical steps in the process due to the assumption that the step is either not necessary or will not render a potentially unpredictable outcome. This is often a result of allowing for assumptions, partial intelligence products, and biases based on past personal experiences to influence real-time decision-making.</p>
Open-Source Intelligence	<p>An information gathering and intelligence analysis technique that utilizes unclassified, unrestricted access websites, written texts, data sets, etc to build information packages and intelligence products.</p>
Operator Driven Policy	<p>An academic-practitioner concept that claims that border security policies</p>

should be created by practitioners in the tactical environment.

Organized Crime

Criminality that has a business-like structure to include (but is not limited to): an accepted leadership chain of command, jointly united common goals, and an effort to meet these objectives through planning, preparing, and executing missions, events, and actions for the greater organization.

Predator Confusion Effect

The difficulty predators experience in targeting and capturing individual prey in a group as the number of prey in the group increases (Tosh, 2006).

Predatory Design

When a predator(s) creates their target profile's victimization environment. This level environment conditioning often includes shaping operations that limit the victim's life choices on where they go, how they move from one place to another, who they interact with, and even how they can respond to the people, places, and things in their life.

Psychosocial Criminal Effect

The two-phased transformation process in which a person psychologically and sociologically decides that a life of criminality is more than a notional thought or potential future; the completion of both phases of this process leads to the primed opportunity to recruit and enlist the individual to a criminal organization or a criminal activity.

Readiness

The current status of border security E's and the transient criminal enterprise's ability to conduct their organizations primary, secondary, and triarchy missions.

Recruitment Pathways

The physical, mental, and emotional glidepaths in which legitimate and illegitimate recruits are guided towards in

	efforts to influence and enable the recruit to join a given organization or cause.
Signal Intelligence	The information gathering and intelligence analysis technique that focuses its efforts on the utilization of communications and information systems.
Smuggling	The criminal movement of a commodity of goods across borders, barriers, and through restrictive boundary lines.
Social Currency	A socially constructed value for an item, person, or service that holds monetary equivalency to that respective culture due to the unique social impact that valued entity creates.
Social Decay	The infrastructural, cultural, political, and economical deterioration of a society due to intentional and unintentional, internal and external destruction.
Social Identity Theory	How society influences, develops, and shapes a person's identity.
Social Networking Theory	How a person's behavior is shaped and how their decision-making is influenced by the way in which their internal and external networks link and intertwine.
Social Spaces	Cultural places of congregation that often host people who share ideals, hobbies, and similar interests. Social spaces can be physical or cyber, digital locations.
Sociology of Chaos Theory	The impact and effectiveness of how inter and intra communication deficiencies in gathering information and processing intelligence through the concepts associated with how civil components of society interact with the fragility of that culture's most critical centers of gravity.
Sociology of Security Theory	How culture and societal norms, beliefs, and traditions influence and impact

	<p>security planning, preparation, and the execution of protection missions and actions.</p>
Sociopsychological Threading	<p>The social science phenomenon that is caused by the presence of sociological concepts, theories, and practices that overstress a culture to the point of psychologically altering their thoughts, beliefs, and decision-making. The relationship between sociology and psychology in these incidences are so tightly woven and inseparable that the group(s) of people that are affected find it easier to continue to move toward their new way of life rather than attempt to return to their cultural roots.</p>
Sustainability	<p>The ability for a program, system, or process to remain intact, functioning, and successful over time and under an array of different hierarchical leadership.</p>
Tactical Intelligence	<p>Specific intelligence that is gathered from the field of operations by trained border security personnel that are not categorized as HUMINT intelligencers.</p>
Terrorism	<p>A specific type of criminal act(s) that derives from ideologies and seeks to instill fear and cause harm to the people of a culture that do not share the terrorist(s)' beliefs.</p>
Threat-Shifting	<p>The act of adapting, morphing, and maneuvering the transient criminal enterprise's personnel, their motives, and even the way they commit crimes to improve the likelihood that the criminal organization will continue to prosper and outwit border security LE.</p>
Trafficking	<p>The criminal act of exploiting a commodity for the purpose of profiteering.</p>

Transfer Pathways

The point of intersection between transient criminality and border security operations. For the transient criminal this corridor is known as a potential opportunity to expand their enterprise. Whereas, for border security, these throughways offer a primed chance to catch a transient criminal in the act of committing a transient crime.

Transnational Criminal Organizations

Criminal organizations that plan, prepare, and commit crime between and across different countries.

Transient Criminality

Illegal activities that move goods, people, or services between or across geographical borders and barriers.

Appendix E



List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

The following list of abbreviations are provided in order to assist the reader in fully comprehending the uniqueness of homeland security, LE, and military jargon utilized in this study.

<u>Abbreviation/Acronym</u>	<u>Complete Name/Phrase</u>
AAR	After Action Review
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIKR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support
COP	Common Operating Picture
CSI	Crime Scene Investigation
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DSS	Diplomatic Security Services
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTO	Field Training Officer
FUBAR	Fucked Up Beyond Repair
GEN Z	Generation Born Between 1997 and 2012
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
HUMINT	Human Intelligence

IC	Intelligence Community
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IRB	Institutional Review Board
JOC	Joint Operations Command
K-9	Specially Trained Police or Military Dog
LE	Law Enforcement
LEO	Law Enforcement Officer
LPR	Lawful Permanent Resident
NARC	Narcotics Agent/Officer
NSA	National Security Agency
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
PME	Professional Military Education
PR	Public Release of Information
ROI	Return on Investment
RQ	Research Question
SBI	State Bureau of Investigation
SCM	Success Case Method
SDT	Social Disorganization Theory
SES	Socioeconomic Status
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SNT	Social Networking Theory
SOCT	Sociology of Chaos Theory
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOS	Sociology of Security
SOST	Sociology of Security Theory

SRT	Special Response Team
S.T.E.M.	Science, Technology, Engineering, Math
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
Triple Cs	Capabilities, Competencies, Capacities
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UCR	Uniform Crime Report
US	United States
USC	United States Citizen
VIP	Very Important Person

APPENDIX F

Border Security On-hand Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities that Enhance Combatting Transient Criminality

Agency	Capability	Competency	Capacity
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Foreign Intelligence Gathering Espionage White-Collar Crime Investigations Fraud Investigations Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysis Crime Data Analysis Crime Scene Investigations	Financial Crime SME Emerging Threat SME Cyber Crime SME Organized Crime SME	Counterterrorism Division Counterintelligence Division Cyber Crime Division Counter Transnational Crime Division White-Collar Crime Division Nationwide Jurisdiction with International Limitations Federal Crime Lab CJIS National Virtual Translation Center NCIC IAFIS UCR NIBRS Mobile Command Center
Central Intelligence Agency	HUMINT Gathering and Analysis Covert Operations Nonproliferation of WOMD Investigations National Clandestine Services and Investigations School for	Foreign Intelligence SME Counterintelligence SME Cyber Crime SME Organized Crime SME Intelligence Analysis SME	Special Activities Center Counterterrorism Division Cyber Crime Division Counterintelligence Division Narcotics Division Information

	Intelligence Instruction		Operations Center Nationwide Jurisdiction with International Limitations School for Intelligence Analysis Transnational Crime Division
Diplomatic Security Service	Diplomatic Courier Service Conduct Technical Security Operations Conduct Security Engineering Operations National and Foreign Dignitary Protectors Provide S.T.E.M. Security Instruction and Research Leading Cyber Security Resourcing to the Public and Private Sectors of US Border Security Publishers of Multiple National Security Intelligence Reports Intelligence Support to Air, Land, Sea, and Space Security Operations Strategic Cybersecurity Analyses	International Diplomatic SMEs Security Intelligence SMEs Security Engineer SMEs Technical Security SMEs Worldwide Intelligence SME Cybersecurity SMEs SIGINT SMEs Security Intelligence Research SMEs Cryptologic SMEs	Worldwide Jurisdiction Diplomatic Courier Task Force Security Engineering Task Force Technical Security Task Force Nationwide Jurisdiction Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Collaboration Center IG National Security Hotline
National Security Agency			
Customs and Border Patrol	Criminal Trafficking Patrol Border Security Strategic Planning and Executors of	Border Security Contingency Planning SMEs Checkpoints and Ports of Entry Security SMEs	Nationwide Jurisdiction Aircraft and Sea Assets and Personnel

	<p>Border Security Operations Ports of Entry Protection Border Checkpoints Protection Agriculture Protection Customs Enforcement Cargo Security Operations</p>	<p>Human Trafficking SMEs Customs and Legal Entry SMEs Agricultural Security SMEs Cargo and Imports SMEs</p> <p>Border Security Surveillance SMEs</p>	<p>Cargo Security Task Force K9 and Handlers Ground Border Security Vehicles Drones Night and Thermal Vision Resources</p>
Secret Service	<p>Diplomatic Protective Threat Investigations</p> <p>Safeguarding of US Financial Infrastructure Operations Cybercrime Investigations</p> <p>Financial Crimes Investigations Illicit Asset Investigators and Retainers Counterfeit Investigations</p>	<p>US Political VIP Security SMEs</p> <p>National Security Event Planning SMEs</p> <p>US Financial Infrastructure and Currency Protection SMEs Public Safety SMEs</p> <p>Financial Crimes SMEs</p> <p>Forensic SMEs</p>	<p>Nationwide Jurisdiction with Worldwide Limitations National Threat Assessment Center</p> <p>Missing and Exploited Children Task Force</p> <p>National Computer Forensics Institute Victim and Witness Assistance Program</p>
Army	<p>Transnational Criminal Mapping Input and Analysis</p> <p>Joint Service Operations</p> <p>Development of Embassy and Diplomatic Partnerships Development of International</p>	<p>Special Operations SMEs on: Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, and Small Team Tactics Conventional and Unconventional Weapons Experts</p>	<p>Most Overall Personnel for Border Security Operations</p> <p>Civil Affairs Corps</p> <p>Psychological Operations Corps</p> <p>Special Forces</p>

	<p>Government Consortiums Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Detection and Monitoring Systems and Technology Analysis Counter Illicit Trafficking Operations</p>		<p>Delta Force Arsenal of Conventional and Unconventional Weaponry Fleet of Air, Water, and Ground Vehicles and Resources Military Intelligence Corps, to include: HUMINT operators and analysts Military Fusion Cells Counter Illicit Trafficking Task Forces Interdiction Task Forces Worldwide Jurisdiction Western Hemisphere Inc Partner Nations Support Teams US Army South US Northern Command Special Operations Command South Joint Task Force Bravo</p>
<p>Marines</p>	<p>Covert Mission Operations Joint Service Operations Protection of Embassy and Diplomatic Facilities and VIPs</p>	<p>Recon and Small Team Tactics SME Maritime Trafficking SME Drug Interdiction SME</p>	<p>Civil Affairs Operators Aviation Assets and Pilots Military Intelligence to include: HUMINT Operators and</p>

	Development of International Government Consortiums	Security Cooperation Activities	Recon Teams Worldwide Jurisdiction
		Maritime Security Operations SME	US Marine Corps Forces South Command Diplomatic Security Teams Maritime Trafficking Task Forces
Navy	Worldwide Jurisdiction Joint Service Operations	Signal and Communications SME Maritime Trafficking SME	Navy Seals Counter Marine Crime Patrol and Task Forces for Piracy, Illegal Immigration, and Trafficking of Goods Naval Transport of Assets and Personnel
	Development of International Government Consortiums Leaders and Instructors of International Medical Support Services	Marine Interdiction SME Targeting, Detecting, and Monitoring of Illicit Trafficking SME	Aviation Assets and Pilots US Naval Forces Southern Command/US 4 th Fleet Joint Interagency Task Force South
Highway Patrol	Conduct Counterterrorism Operations Provide First Response to Criminal Activities Provide Counter Crisis Response to Public	Motor Vehicle Crime SME State Level Diplomatic Security SME Highway Routes SME	Counterterrorism Units Statewide Jurisdiction Natural Disaster Response Team

	Deploy Special Response Services		Helicopters and Pilots Dogs, Horses, and Handlers
Department of Justice (State)	<p>Fraud Investigations and Analysis</p> <p>Missing Persons Investigations ALE Investigations</p> <p>State Capitol Police Patrol and Investigations State Homeland Security Investigations Permits and Licenses and Vehicle Theft Investigations Conduct Statewide In-Service Training for LEOs</p>	<p>Curriculum Development SME</p> <p>State Specialty Programs SME Instructor Training/Certification SME Major Vehicle Related Crimes SME</p> <p>Organized Fraudulent Crimes SME</p> <p>Community Policing SME</p>	<p>Curriculum Specialists and Instructors Drug Education Task Force Victim/Witness Assistance Team</p> <p>Missing Persons Support Team</p> <p>State LEO Training College/Campus</p> <p>Statewide Jurisdiction</p> <p>Crime Data Division</p> <p>State Identity Fraud Division Disaster Fraud Hotline Justice 101 Community Outreach Program Project Safe Neighborhoods Program ALE State Capitol Police</p>
State Bureau of Investigation	<p>Environmental Investigations</p> <p>Fraud Investigations and Analyses Local LE Crime Scene Evidence Processing</p>	<p>Complex Crime SMEs</p> <p>Professional Standards SMEs LEO Internal Affairs SMEs</p>	<p>CSI/Crime Lab</p> <p>Environmental Crime Unit State Fraud Lab</p>

	<p>Local LEO Internal Affairs Investigations Arson Investigations Illegal Drug Investigations Child Crimes Investigations</p>	<p>LEO Specialty Resources and Experience SMEs Fraud Analysis SMEs Arson Crimes SMEs</p> <p>Child Crimes SMEs</p> <p>State Illegal Narcotics SMEs Environmental Crime SMEs CSI and Crime Lab SMEs</p>	<p>Air Wing and Pilots</p> <p>Polygraphy Unit Arson Crime Unit</p> <p>Cyber Crime Unit</p> <p>Election Corruption Unit Child Crime Unit</p> <p>Drug Unit</p> <p>Statewide Jurisdiction</p>
<p>Police Department</p>	<p>Local Level City Criminal Investigations Local Level Specialty LE Responses Local Level City LE Patrolling Local Level City Evidence Collection Local Level City Community Outreach</p>	<p>Local Urban Populace SMEs</p> <p>Local Criminal Activities SMEs</p>	<p>SWAT</p> <p>Detectives</p> <p>Drug Units</p> <p>CSI</p> <p>Investigative Services Bureau</p> <p>Special Enforcement Division Patrol Division International Airport Division Community Relations Division Special Operations Division K9 Armored Vehicles Mobile Command Center</p>
<p>Sheriff's Office</p>	<p>Local Level County and City Criminal</p>	<p>Local Rural Populace SMEs</p>	<p>SRT</p>

Investigations	Local Level Specialty LE Responses	LE Administrative Processing SMEs	Detectives
Local Level County and City LE Patrolling	Local Level County and City Evidence Collection	Local Criminal Activities SMEs	VICE/Drug Units
Local Level County and City Community Outreach	Local Level County and City Administrative Delivery	Local Juvenile Crimes SMEs	CSI
Server of Local Criminal Warrants	County Jail Operations		Helicopters and Pilots
County Court Protection Operations			K9 Units
			Evidence Division
			Patrol Division
			Administrative Enforcement Division
			Latent Print Division
			Juvenile Crimes Division
			School Resource Officer
			Drone Unit
			Street Crime Unit
			Special Enforcement Team

APPENDIX G

Border Security Wishlist of Capabilities, Competencies, and Capacities

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Capability</u>	<u>Competency</u>	<u>Capacity</u>
Federal Bureau of Investigation	None	None	None
Central Intelligence Agency	None	None	None
National Security Agency	None	Increased Opportunities to Present Intelligence to the Federal, State, and Local LEO on Patrol	None
Customs and Border Patrol	Improved Laws that Limit Deportation and Increase Judicial Sentencing for Transient Criminality that Starts Outside the US but is Caught Inside the US	Internal Cross-Training Between Patrol and Specialty Tactical Units	Personnel Increase
Secret Service	None	Improvement to Security Protection Knowledge for Local and State LE Partners	None
Diplomatic Security Service	None	None	None
Army	Increase in Authorities to Offensively Engage Transient Criminals OCONUS in “Non-Combat” Specified Countries of Operations	None	None
Marines	None	Better Understanding of What the Army Special Operational Forces Can and Cannot Do in Joint Theatre Operations	None
Navy	None	None	None
Highway Patrol	None	None	None
Department of Justice (State)	None	More Opportunities to Conduct Joint Research with Federal LE Agencies and Academic Institutions	None

State Bureau of Investigation	None	None	More Integration During the Intel Process with Local and Federal LE Operations
Police Department	Certifications and Opportunities that Allow for Patrol to Work with State and Federal Agencies on National Security Issues at the Local Level	Training for Patrol on Specialty Policing Topics	Budget Increase
Sheriff's Office	Internal Intelligence Production and Analysis	Better Understanding of the National Strategic Border Security Plan	Personnel Increase
	Certifications and Opportunities that Allow for Patrol to Work with State and Federal Agencies on National Security Issues at the Local Level	Training for Patrol on Specialty Policing Topics	Operations Budget Increase
	Increased Authorities to Arrest Illegal Immigrants	Better Understanding of the National Strategic Border Security Plan	Personnel Increase

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